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“A worthy woman who can find?  For her price is far above rubies.  The heart of her 
husband trusteth in her.  And he shall have no lack of gain.  She doeth him good and not 
evil all the days of her life.” 
 
Proverbs 31: 10-12, KJV 
Many years ago, I was set to embark upon a journey much like the one I have just 
completed.  God had other plans for me; plans that of course, only He knew.  Shortly 
before I was to begin my doctoral journey, He changed my life‘s course.  My life to that 
point had been full of heartache.  Maybe He saw the heartache and decided to change it, 
or maybe its purpose was to make me appreciate what was to come.  Only God knows.  
Either way, God was gracious to me, and sent me a Godly woman to quickly turn my life 
into one filled with enduring, pure, sweet love, and ever-present joy.  I thank God for 
giving me His eternal Grace through His son Jesus Christ, and for bestowing upon me in 
this earthly life, a righteous beauty, whose love for me has been as constant and 
unwavering as her support of me and everything I have pursued.  Only God knew what 
my journey would be, and what would happen along the way.  Because only He knew the 
failures, triumphs, and all things in between to come, only He knew the helpmate I most 
needed to see me through it all.  And so, He sent Rebecca to me all those years ago, and 
while she has seen me through all that God knew was to come, there she was again, ready 
to stand by me as I began this doctoral journey a little more than three years ago.  I thank 
God for my beautiful, loving, Godly wife, Rebecca.  Without God‘s Grace or the Godly   




wife He sent me, this journey would not have been possible.  Thank you Rebecca for 
taking this journey with me.  I expect we will have many more.  I love you. 
 
“Even a child maketh himself known by his doings, whether his work be pure, and 
whether it be right.” 
Proverbs 20: 11, KJV 
During my journey with Rebecca, God again showed His graciousness by giving 
us our beautiful daughter, Mary Chamberlin.  She has been a blessing each and every day 
she has been in our lives.  We know that Mary Chamberlin is truly a child of God, for she 
is pure of heart, and kind in spirit.  I hope she will remember my doctoral journey, and all 
those many nights when she came to my study to kiss me goodnight, only to find me 
sitting in the same place early the next morning; and that she will take away the lesson 
and understanding that doing anything takes much effort, but doing anything well takes 
steadfast, resolute commitment.  I expect she will do many things in her life, and I have 
great confidence that with God‘s help, she will do all of them well.  I thank God for the 
gift of Mary Chamberlin, and my hope is that I was able to use the opportunities God 
gave me to teach His child well.  Thank you Mary Chamberlin for understanding why 
what I was doing was so important.  I love you. 
Two others among my family also deserve special thanks.  The first is my father, 
Jack Cummings, whom I have always tried to make proud, yet at times, I am sure my 
efforts have fallen short.  From the moment I first told him I was considering embarking 
upon this doctoral journey, he never doubted my abilities.  His unconditional love and 
resounding confidence gave me great strength along the way to work hard, and to make 
him proud.  Daddy, I hope I did.  Thank you and I love you. 




I also owe many thanks to my brother, Kelly Cummings.  Surely he was surprised 
the day I told him my plan to pursue a doctorate.  No doubt as my journey unfolded, he 
wondered more than once, what my plans were when my journey was completed.  I am 
grateful for his willingness to keep things running smoothly at the office while I diverted 
increasing amounts of attention away from our business, even though all the while he 
must have wondered what was to come.  Thank you Kelly and I love you. 
Were it not for my friend, and mentor, Dr. Don Epley, I would never have set foot 
in the Mitchell College of Business as anything other than a visitor.  Don recognized 
something in me that I only saw in time.  Since the day we met, and during the many 
hours we have spent together since, his encouragement, guidance, inspiration, leadership, 
and friendship have been very dear to me, and have had everything to do with the success 
of not only this journey, but my next one as well.  I thank God for seeing to it that my 
path crossed with Don‘s.  Thank you Don, you are truly my friend. 
From the beginning of my journey, in many ways I was probably not the best fit 
for Kennesaw‘s DBA program.  I will never forget that moment after spending nearly a 
year getting through the various stages of the application process, I sat in the interview 
room knowing I needed to really close the deal if I ever stood a chance at admission.  Dr. 
Gabriel Ramirez looked at me and said that my research interest overview was about real 
estate, and that the faculty in the DBA program did not know much about real estate.  I 
looked right at him and deadpanned that I did not know much about finance; I quickly 
added that maybe I could teach them something about real estate while they could teach 
me something about finance.  It was the worst close of my life, and I knew that my 
attempt at humor was a disaster when no one cracked a smile.  I drove back to Mobile 




convinced I was dead in the water.  Yet somehow, even though I was somewhat of an 
outlier, they saw fit to make an exception in my case, and I am forever grateful for the 
opportunity they gave me.  Once they did, I vowed to make the most of it.  Thank you to 
those whose input tipped the decision in my favor. 
The beginning of this journey was a little bumpy at first, and there were some 
who caused me to doubt if I had even made the right choice.  Dr. Torsten Pieper spent 
well over an hour on the telephone with me one September afternoon urging me on.  As 
soon as the conversation was over, all doubts vanished.  He probably never fully realized 
the profound effect that telephone conversation had on me.  I can only express my 
sincerest thanks to him, and assure him that had we not spoken, quite likely I would not 
be writing his name at this moment, as my journey would have ended far too soon.  
Thank you Torsten, I will never forget what you did for me. 
Two others, who knew early on that I doubted neither my abilities, nor my will, 
but my presence and fit for the program, are Dr. Joe Hair and Dr. Neal Mero.  Both men, 
wise, learned men, are committed to the excellence of their craft, and both seek to inspire 
their students to make similar commitments in pursuit of their passion.  For that, they 
both have my utmost respect.  On more than one occasion, their quiet assurances that I 
was in the right place kept me from falling off of my journey‘s path, and continually 
inspired me to always keep moving forward.  Thank you both Joe and Neal.  You both 
have been tremendous influences in my life, and have both been integral to any success I 
have achieved. 
It seemed that beginning with our very first class, Dr. Gabriel Ramirez, no doubt 
recalling the fantastic impression I had made months earlier, eyed me somewhat warily.  




In time though, I began to sense that he understood me as one who truly wanted to be 
here, and who would never quit until the work was complete, even if I did not always 
seem to get it right the first time around.  He was always willing to answer every question 
nearly as quickly as we asked, and though we surely frustrated him more than once, he 
always encouraged me and my finance and accounting classmates, Lisa, Tonya and 
Robert, to exceed all expectations, even our own.  His guidance not only in class, but also 
in advice on the things we should do to prepare for success in academia, have for me, 
proved invaluable.  From the beginning, he insisted we go to conferences to present 
papers, to learn new ideas, and build a network of colleagues and potential coauthors.  I 
followed his advice and from those experiences came the ideas for both of the essays in 
this dissertation, entrée into leadership in one of the most prestigious academic real estate 
societies in the world, and development of a group of fellow researchers with whom I 
expect to work in the future.  I garnered so much respect for Dr. Ramirez during our year 
of classes, that when it came time to pick a Chair for my dissertation committee, he was 
the obvious best choice.  Gabriel, I know you spoiled me.  I also know that I could have 
never completed this journey if not for your unceasing commitment to my success.  
Nights, weekends, holidays, day after day, month after month, you were always available, 
and were always quick to respond.  Our work styles fit together like a hand in a glove, for 
me anyway.  I probably drove you crazy sometimes, and I am grateful you never kicked 
me to the curb even though you should have more than once.  You were the perfect 
choice for my Chair.  I will never forget what you have done for me, and can only hope 
that somehow, someday, that you will be as glad as I am that you were such a vital part of 
my journey.  You are a scholar‘s scholar, with ethics above reproach.  I have valued all of 




the time you have given me.  More importantly, I have come to value your friendship as 
well.  I vow never to tarnish your reputation.  Gabriel, there are simply no words that can 
adequately express my gratitude for what you have done for me, so I will not attempt to 
write any at all. 
 As I stood at the front of the room, for well over two hours presenting my final 
paper, each of the questions Dr. Divesh Sharma asked me seemed increasingly 
penetrating, painful even; yet at the same time they were all insightfully revealing and 
remarkably thought-provoking.  When it was over, my head ached, my body drained.  As 
I walked with him to lunch, I asked him if he really thought my paper had any upside.  
He assured me it was worthy of a dissertation.  Not until that very moment had I given 
any serious thought to what my dissertation topic or topics might be.  As I settled in over 
the weeks ahead, not only did the topic keep coming back to me as a possibility, but so 
did the selection of Divesh as the Second Chair on my Committee.  Divesh, although you 
jokingly told us that day in class that your nickname was ‗Dissertations R Us,‘ it turns out 
those words were more prophetic than comical.  Thank you Divesh for your keen 
insights, motivation, and guidance, as well as for the opportunity to study under and work 
with a true scholar. 
 The funny thing about taking a journey is that one always expects to do really fun 
things and visit incredibly beautiful places.  What inevitably is the most surprising though 
are the people one meets along the way.  So it was with this doctoral journey.  I thank 
each of my classmates—Christine, Chuck, Donna, Frank, George, Hank, Lee, Lisa, Kelli, 
Morten, Robert, Scott, Shalonda, and Tonya—for the unique privilege I had to take this 
journey with you.  As we have all done our best to keep calm and carry on, each of you 




have touched my life in so many different, remarkable ways.  I cherish the time we spent 
together, the meals we enjoyed as we ate our way through some of Atlanta‘s finest 
restaurants, everyone‘s passion for learning that inspired me to always want more, and 
the comfort of knowing that when I was down, all I needed to do was reach out, and you 
all would lift me up.  Only those who have experienced what we have can truly 
understand and appreciate how unbelievably difficult this kind of journey really is.  For 
me, the journey was that much more special because I took it with each of you. 
Finally, I must say that although my Mama died a year before my journey began, 
I know she would have been proud of my endeavor.  She always aspired to learn and 
grow and experience new things, and I respect all of her efforts, many of which were 
incredibly difficult.  She fought many battles in her own journey.  She never ceased to 
amaze me by her many successes.  Mama, I love you, and I miss you terribly. 
Oh what a journey it has been.  What a journey, indeed!  
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Economic equilibrium is the point at which the supply and demand curves 
intersect, remaining unchanged until affected by some exogenous force (Samuelson & 
Nordhaus, 2004); one such exogenous force is information.  Economic equilibrium per 
se, does not depend upon the presence of information, much less, perfect information.  
However, economic actors can manipulate and affect equilibrium outcomes by either 
providing sufficient, too much, or even misleading information (Dixit & Skeath, 1995).  
Information is therefore a powerful force that can disrupt equilibrium, create 
inefficiencies, and deter economic actors from either taking action, or taking less than 
desirable action.    
When markets are efficient, market participants have near perfect information, 
and economic exchanges have the highest probability of transacting efficiently, smoothly, 
and without friction.  Hence, it is reasonable to consider that in markets with greatly 
reduced information asymmetries, efficient, frictionless economic exchanges are more 
likely to occur.  However, when one party knows more than a potential transacting party, 
information asymmetry occurs.  To mitigate this situation, more informed parties often 






way to reduce information asymmetries works to help pave the way for efficient, 
frictionless exchanges. 
Information asymmetries can take the simplest form, such as when only a baby 
knows how hungry he/she is, or when only a farmer knows how fresh his tomatoes are.  
Information asymmetries can also be more complex, such as when only a mortgage loan 
applicant knows the likelihood of his continued employment, and thus his future ability to 
repay his debt.  Conceptually, sending signals to overcome these information deficiencies 
seems quite simple, logical even.  In the cradle, the hungry baby signals his/her mother 
by crying softly to prompt feeding.  At the market, the clever farmer signals shoppers by 
displaying juicy tomato slices to entice purchases.  At the bank, the eager mortgagor 
signals the lender by expounding his job fondness to underscore his creditworthiness.   
Yet, no one had theoretically explained the concept of signaling until Michael 
Spence (1973), in his groundbreaking doctoral dissertation, first proposed signaling 
theory.  Signaling theory suggests that firms and individuals who are able to reduce or 
even eliminate information asymmetries within their respective markets will motivate 
greater investment successes than their competition.  If it is true that markets and their 
participant‘s value information, and more importantly, highly accurate, credible 
information, then it is important to understand how to use signaling to reduce information 
asymmetry, and provide incentives designed to improve the probabilities of motivating 
economic exchanges. 
Because of the U.S. financial crisis of 2007-2008, the nation‘s capital and real 
estate markets contracted, making raising capital and selling real estate difficult.  
Economic conditions changed quickly, and accurate, reliable information was in short 




supply.  As market frictions spurred higher levels of information asymmetries between 
participants in the capital and real estate markets, those firms and individuals taking steps 
to reduce or eliminate information asymmetries stood the best chances of motivating 
investments. 
This research is comprised of two essays that explore strategies implemented by 
firms and individuals to reduce information asymmetries, and prompt favorable responses 
from less informed parties within the capital and real estate markets; in essence, to 
motivate investment.  In Essay 1, ―Motivating Capital Investment: REITs, Transparency, 
and the Audit Construct,‖ I examine the question in the context of Real Estate Investment 
Trusts‘ pursuits of capital.  In Essay 2, ―Motivating Real Estate Investment: Buyer and 
Agent Sales Incentives,‖ I examine the question in the context of residential real estate 
sellers‘ pursuits of real estate sales.  Although both essays use different datasets and 
methodologies, the goals of each essay are the same: to examine ways in which market 
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MOTIVATING CAPITAL INVESTMENT: 
REITS, TRANSPARENCY, AND THE AUDIT CONSTRUCT 
 
ABSTRACT 
This research examines the relationship between Real Estate Investment Trusts‘ uses of 
the audit process to increase financial transparency, and their ability to attract and/or 
maintain reasonable access to capital investment.  I find that capital investment is 
positively and significantly associated with three commonly used audit-related attributes:  
auditor quality (captured by higher audit fees), auditor specialization (captured by 
industry-audit specialization), and auditor reputation (captured by the audit firm being a 
Big 4 auditor).  Moreover, I find the positive relationship between capital issuance and 
auditor fees remains after controlling for the financial crisis of 2007-2008.  This positive 
association between the use of audit fees as a means of signaling transparency and capital 
investment after the crisis offers a possible strategy for firms seeking capital investment 
during periods of high capital market illiquidity resulting from a severe external shock to 
the financial markets. 
Keywords: Real Estate Investment Trusts; financial transparency; REIT transparency; 






MOTIVATING CAPITAL INVESTMENT: 
 
REITS, TRANSPARENCY, AND THE AUDIT CONSTRUCT  
 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) are corporations that invest in income-
producing real estate, mortgages collateralized by real estate, and real estate-related 
securities.  United States federal law requires REITs to distribute at least 90% of their net 
income to shareholders as dividends (Scherrer, 2004).  Because of this de minimus 
requirement, REITs must frequently turn to the debt and equity capital markets to raise 
the funds necessary to finance their investments and operations.  Historically, this has not 
been a challenge as investors have viewed REITs as an attractive and relatively safe way 
to invest in real estate (Goebel & Kim, 1989; Goodman, 2000, 2003).  Indeed, Table 1 
shows that over a 35-year period, as an asset class, REITs outperformed many major 
stock market indices.
1
  Even after the financial crisis of 2007-2008, in most cases, REITs 
outperformed major stock market indices annually as shown in Table 2. 
The financial crisis triggered restricted debt financing and increased equity 
investor wariness, creating difficulties for many participants in the highly illiquid capital 
(Brunnermeier, 2008).  Beginning in mid-2007, and continuing through the end of 2008, 
declines in bank loans for acquisitions, investment, and revolving credit facilities were 




                                                 
1
 Data obtained from NAREIT, available at www.reit.com.  




Table 1.  Long-Term Historical Investment Performance Comparison of REITs 
Versus Other Major Indices. 
 






1-Year 8.28 2.11 5.53 -4.18 -1.8 
3-Year 21.04 14.11 11.66 15.63 18.21 
5-Year -1.42 -0.25 -0.4 0.15 1.52 
10-Year 10.2 2.92 2 5.62 2.94 
15-Year 8.91 5.45 4.35 6.25 4.79 
20-Year 10.91 7.81 6.98 8.52 7.74 
25-Year 10.01 9.28 7.74 8.68 8.38 
30-Year 11.95 10.98 9.19 9.81 9.01 
35-Year 12.98 10.57 7.4 NA 9.83 
Notes:  The table above compares historical investment returns of the FTSE NAREIT All REIT index to 
the stock market indices of the S&P 500, Dow Jones Industrial Average, Russell 2000, and NASDAQ 
Composite Index, for various time periods from 1976 – 2011.  Data obtained from NAREIT, available at: 
http//www.reit.com. 
 
















2002 5.22 3.82 31.08 -23.37% -16.76% -31.53% -21.58% 
2003 38.47 37.13 57.39 26.38% 25.32% 50.01% 45.37% 
2004 30.41 31.58 18.43 8.99% 3.15% 8.59% 17.00% 
2005 8.29 12.16 -23.19 3.00% -0.61% 1.37% 3.32% 
2006 34.35 35.06 19.32 13.62% 16.29% 9.52% 17.00% 
2007 -17.83 -15.69 -42.35 3.53% 6.43% 9.81% -2.75% 
2008 -37.34 -37.73 -31.31 -38.49% -33.84% -40.54% -34.80% 
2009 27.45 27.99 24.63 23.45% 18.82% 43.89% 25.22% 
2010 27.58 27.96 22.60 12.78% 11.02% 16.91% 25.31% 
2011 7.28 8.29 -2.42 0.00% 5.53% -1.80% -5.45% 
Notes:  This table presents a comparison of annual investment returns for the FTSE NAREIT All REITs, 
All Equity REITs, and All Mortgage REITs indices, to the returns of stock market indices for the S&P 500, 
DJIA, Russell 2000, and the NASDAQ Composite Index.  All data REIT reported by NAREIT, available at 
www.reit.com.  All other data reported by 1Stock.com, available at www.1stock.com. 
 
quarter of 2008 than in the third quarter, and 79% lower than in the second quarter of 
2007 just prior to the beginning of the sub-prime mortgage meltdown.
2
  Many lenders 
                                                 
2
 Technically, the financial crisis began during the summer of 2007 when two Bear-Stearns mortgage-
backed securities hedge funds, holding nearly $10 billion in assets imploded (see, Foster, 2008); the crisis 
continued into 2008. 




struggled to maintain adequate capital reserves, and those banks that were able to shore 
up their reserves through customer deposits reduced lending far less than banks without 
such access (Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010).  Bond debt was difficult to place because of 
yield curve uncertainties (Adrian & Shin, 2010), and equity issues were equally 
challenging in the face of tumbling stock markets (Block & Sandner, 2009).   
 Because of their structure, REITs have to raise external capital.  After the crisis, 
as economic uncertainties tightened credit markets and increased information 
asymmetries among financial market participants, it was important for REITs to 
implement strategies designed to reduce information asymmetries as much as possible so 
that they could continue to access needed capital.  Doing so, however, was difficult 
because many real estate markets were in decline, and convincing investors to invest in 
REITs—firms in the business of investing in real estate—was challenging (Basse, 
Friedrich, & Bea, 2009). 
The decisions a firm makes about the formation of its capital structure are critical 
to its opportunities for growth and profitability (Myers, 1984; Titman & Wessels, 1988).  
Capital structure decisions are complex, and often become more complicated because of 
information asymmetries between firm managers and potential investors.  If investors or 
lenders are reluctant to invest because of information asymmetries, capital markets 
function inefficiently (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Merton, 1987).  As in Akerlof‘s (1970) 
lemons problem, if investors cannot distinguish between the ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘ 
investments because of information asymmetries, they will either not invest at all, or will 
price all investments as if they are ‗bad‘ ones.  Thus, it is important that firms resolve the 




‗lemons problem‘ by reducing information asymmetries that contribute to investors‘ 
reluctance to invest (Healy & Palepu, 2001).   
Whether seeking equity or debt, the more effective firms are at conveying 
information about themselves to potential investors and lenders, the more they can 
decrease information asymmetries and motivate capital investment (Beatty, 1989; Carter 
& Manaster, 1990).  One study in particular investigates using some aspects of the audit 
process to reduce information asymmetries (Titman & Trueman, 1986).  However, as of 
yet, no study has examined how using the audit-related attributes of auditor quality 
(captured by higher audit fees), auditor specialization (captured by industry-audit 
specialization), and auditor reputation (captured by the audit firm being a Big 4 auditor) 
as mechanisms to increase transparency, impact access to capital investment.  In this 
paper, I explore these relationships, and collectively refer to these three audit-related 
attributes as the Audit Construct.  
Firms that raise capital either through initial public offerings (IPOs), seasoned 
equity offerings (SEOs), or by issuing different types of debt financing provide a 
prospectus to investors containing detailed information about their business structure, 
management team, operations, investments, and performance.  At a minimum, disclosure 
regulations dictate that a prospectus contains certain elements of information, which 
prudent investors carefully scrutinize when considering investing.  Even so, firms 
frequently include information in the prospectus that exceeds that which is required by 
regulators.  In doing so, their intent is often to provide additional signals to investors 
about the firm‘s value, investment grade, and future prospects (Deeds, Decarolis, and 
Coombs, 1997). 




The prospectus also includes extensive, detailed information about the firm‘s 
auditor and the audit process.  Research shows that firms hire higher quality auditors, and 
often pay much higher audit fees to signal to investors that their financial information is 
highly credible (Datar, Feltham, & Hughes, 1991; Titman & Trueman, 1986).  Investors 
interpret such signals to mean the auditor will be less likely to succumb to pressures by 
the firm‘s management to paint a rosier picture than actually exists.  Because investors 
view the information presented as being more transparent, in a sense, the firm is relying 
on the reputational capital of the higher quality, more expensive audit firm to signal to 
investors that they are more financially transparent (Feltham, Hughes, & Simunic, 1991).   
It seems reasonable then to expect that by using the audit process to convey 
increased transparency to investors, firms can also increase the likelihood of attracting or 
increasing capital investment.  In this study, I take a different approach by examining the 
connection between REITs‘ uses of the Audit Construct as a means of signaling increased 
financial transparency, in order to motivate capital investment.  This is an important issue 
because, just as other highly regulated, complexly structured firms that access capital 
markets frequently must do, REITs continually need strategies supportive of their efforts 
to motivate investment, especially when market conditions make accessing capital 
difficult.  In the next section, I present existing research supporting using the audit 
process and audit-related attributes to convey increased financial transparency to 
investors.  In the following sections, I present and discuss the results of the empirical 
analyses that test my expectation that there is a positive association between using the 
Audit Construct as a means to signal increased transparency and increased capital 
investment.   




Section II.  Literature Review 
When a corporation‘s management makes the decision to become a real estate 
investment trust (REIT), inherent in that decision is awareness that due to the dividend 
distribution requirements required by federal law, the nature of its capital structure will 
be irrevocably different after obtaining REIT status.  Understanding the unique capital 
structure of REITs is therefore essential to appreciating the significance of their 
successfully conveying financial transparency to capital markets.  I begin by reviewing 
some of the most widely researched areas of capital structure, and continue with a 
discussion of the history and structure of REITs, with particular focus on the significant 
differences between the capital structure of typical corporations and those of REITs.  I 
follow with an assessment of general agency problems, paying specific attention to those 
agency problems most important to REITs.  I then discuss using the audit process as a 
means of reducing information asymmetry and increasing financial transparency.  In the 
last section, I identify gaps in the literature, and discuss the importance of addressing 
them in this study. 
 
Theories of Capital Structure 
Current capital structure theories stem from the Modigliani-Miller Theorem, 
which states that in a perfect market a firm‘s financing decisions are irrelevant with 
respect to its value (Modigliani & Miller, 1958).  As seminal a work as it is, it disregards 
the realities of taxes, bankruptcy, agency costs, asymmetric information, adverse 
selection, and the ebb and flow of capital market inefficiencies.  This oversight leads 




modern capital structure researchers to focus instead on the trade-off theory, the pecking 
order theory, and the market timing theory.   
The essence of the trade-off theory is that when pursuing leverage, firms strive for 
optimal balance between the benefits and costs of leverage.  Under static trade-off theory, 
firms ideally balance their capital structures using a mix of debt and equity (Altman, 
1968).  While there are associated benefits, such as the use of debt as a tax shield, there 
are risks as well, such as the increased risks of financial distress and bankruptcy from 
higher debt levels.  Also important are agency costs associated with the use of debt and 
equity that result from conflicts of interest between management and owners due to 
asymmetric information (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986).  Dynamic trade-off 
theory considers the interaction between financing decisions made by a firm in one 
period, and the prospects of where a firm will be in another period (Baker & Wurgler, 
2002); variations through time due to changes in operations or investments affect the 
firm‘s demand for capital, and therefore, influence its financing decisions.   
The essence of the pecking order theory is that firms prefer internal financing to 
external financing.  Because investors tend to discount a firm‘s value when management 
opts to issue equity over debt, firms will issue equity only if internal funds or debt 
financing are not available (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984).  However, in both 
cases, adverse selection occurs because of information asymmetry (Bharath, Pasquariello, 
& Wu, 2009).  Investors often counter information asymmetry by exerting influence on 
management through block voting or control by directors, while lenders often do so by 
using varying credit terms to differentiate between good and bad borrowers.  This is why 




established banking relationships are so important to firms such as REITs, which must 
borrow frequently (Hardin & Wu, 2010).  
An important research conclusion regarding the pecking order theory is that while 
Myers and Majluf (1984) indicate that informational asymmetry and leverage move in the 
same direction, Ross (1977), Leland and Pyle (1977), Downes and Heinkel (1982), 
Blazenko (1987), John (1987), Poitevin (1989), and Ravid and Sarig (1989) show no 
correlations between leverage and a firm‘s value.  However, these findings seem 
intuitively at odds with each other.  Consider that reductions in information asymmetry 
lead to reduced leverage, yet leverage is a means by which firms use to maximize value.  
Leary and Roberts (2010) indicate that although strict interpretation of the pecking order 
leads to poorer firm performance, when firms modify, or more loosely apply their 
adherence to the pecking order hypothesis, the theory‘s predictive power improves.  This 
finding is consistent with Fama and French (2002) who find strong links between the 
trade-off theory and the pecking order theory, and each theory‘s respective abilities to 
predict financing decisions.     
 The essence of the market timing theory is that firms are generally indifferent 
over using debt or equity to finance their investments, but rather time their decisions 
based on existing market conditions that place the highest value on one choice over the 
other (Baker & Wurgler, 2002).  Thus, when market valuations are high, we expect firms 
to issue equity, but when they are low, we expect firms to issue debt.  It follows then that 
as a firm‘s stock prices rise and fall, the effects of this movement directly influence its 
capital structure.  Huang and Ritter (2009) test the market-timing theory by examining 




how quickly firms adjust their capital structure, and find that the market timing theory 
becomes less important the faster firms adjust toward their target leverage. 
 
Signaling Theory 
 Signaling theory springs from the seminal proposition that an informed party will 
convey information to influence a particular desired response by an uninformed party 
(Spence, 1973).  The ‗signaled‘ information effectively reduces information asymmetry 
between the parties, and works to persuade the uninformed party to act in a way they 
otherwise would not.  Senders design signals to motivate a particular response; signals 
must be costly to lend to credibility, and be difficult to mimic.  Receivers of signals make 
decisions about the intended purpose of the signal, the credibility of the sender, and the 
accuracy, and reliability of the information received (Spence, 1973). 
A major empirical implication of signaling is how a news event affects a firm‘s 
stock price.  For example, when firms announce intentions to issue debt, Myers and 
Majluf (1984) and Krasker (1986) find no price effects when the debt has little risk, but 
Noe (1988) and Narayanan (1988) show that prices decrease when firms issue more risky 
debt.  When firms announce plans to issue equity, studies show that stock prices 
decrease, and that price changes are proportional to the amount of information 
asymmetry, and the size of the equity offering (Krasker, 1986; Korajczyk, Lucas & 






REIT History and Structure 
In 1960, the United States Congress passed legislation authorizing the formation 
of REITs to provide average investors access to different types of income-producing real 
estate, and the benefits of diversification and liquidity (Scherrer, 2004).  While REITs 
enjoy certain tax advantages that other corporations do not, they are also subject to 
certain unique ownership structure and tax treatment requirements.  Table 3 illustrates the 
primary differences between REITs and corporations.  REITs must annually elect to 
maintain REIT status, and if they fail to comply with the law, they lose their REIT status.  
The most significant difference between REITs and non-REITs is the requirement that 
REITs distribute a minimum of 90% of net taxable income to shareholders as dividends.   
Doing so leaves REITs with little free cash flow for operations or new investments. 
Because dividends are deductible from corporate taxable income, many REITs 
pay out all of their taxable income as dividends, and pay no corporate income taxes 
(Edgerton, 2010).  Shareholders pay taxes on dividends and any capital gains at the 
individual level.  Most states honor this federal tax treatment, and do not require REITs 
to pay state income tax.  Like other businesses, but unlike partnerships, REITs cannot 
pass any tax losses through to its investors (Howe & Shilling, 1988).   
Equity REITs focus primarily on owning and operating income-producing real 
estate.  They also participate in other real estate related activities such as leasing, 
maintenance, tenant representation, and development of real property.  Mortgage REITs 
focus on lending money directly to real estate owners and operators, but only on existing 
properties (Ambrose & Linneman, 2001).  REITs do not provide construction or 
development financing.  However, they do apply their management expertise to 




Table 3.  Major Legal Differences Between a REIT and a Corporation. 
 
REIT CORPORATION 
A REIT may deduct dividends from its taxable 
annual income.  Dividends only taxed at the 
individual shareholder level when dividends issued 
annually and not at the corporate level.   
A corporation (C-Corp) is subject to so-called 
―double taxation‖ meaning taxable annual income 
taxed at both the corporate level, and then again, at 
the individual level if/when dividends declared and 
issued. 
A REIT must distribute a minimum of 90% of its 
annual taxable income as dividends to shareholders. 
A corporation is free to choose if/when it will 
declare and issue dividends to shareholders. 
A REIT must invest a minimum of 75% of its assets 
in cash, government securities, real estate property, 
real estate mortgage loans, and shares in other 
REITs. 
A corporation is free to invest its assets in any way 
they see fit. 
A minimum of 75% of a REIT‘s gross annual 
income must come from rents from real estate 
holdings, interest from real estate mortgages, or 
capital gains from the sale of real estate assets. 
A corporation‘s gross annual income may come 
from any source; no minimums or maximums 
required of any particular source of gross annual 
income. 
A minimum of 95% of a REIT‘s gross annual 
income must come from rents from real estate 
holdings, interest from real estate mortgages, capital 
gains from the sale of real estate assets, dividends, 
interest, and capital gains from the sale of securities. 
A corporation‘s gross annual income may come 
from any source and there are no minimums or 
maximums required of any particular source of 
gross annual income. 
A REIT may not be a financial institution. A corporation may be a financial institution. 
A REIT must have a minimum of 100 shareholders. A corporation may have only 1 shareholder. 
No more than 50% of the outstanding shares of a 
REIT owned by 5 or fewer investors during the last 
half of each year. 
There are no minimums or maximums applicable to 
the percentages of ownership of a corporation‘s 
outstanding shares. 
Notes:  The table above contrasts the major differences as defined by federal law between REITs and non-
REITs.  Data obtained from NAREIT.  Data obtained from NAREIT, available at: http//www.reit.com.  
 
manage their interest rate risks using various hedging strategies, derivative investments, 
and securitized mortgage instruments (Ambrose & Linneman, 2001).   
Most REITs specialize in one property type or geographic location.  Investment 
opportunities in the REIT industry are diverse, as REITs invest in various types of 
income-producing real estate including shopping centers, regional malls, office buildings, 
industrial properties, self-storage facilities, multi-family properties, manufactured homes, 
hotels and resorts, health care facilities, and even timberland (Beals & Singh, 2002).  A 
few REITs invest in a diversified portfolio of property types, but REITs that do so tend to 




be larger and well established, and are the exception, not the norm (Capozza & Korean, 
1995).  
 My earlier review of capital structure research was to set the stage for 
highlighting and contrasting the significant differences in capital structure policies 
between REITs and corporations.  REIT capital structure literature differs from that of 
other corporations by recognizing that regardless of their choice to issue equity or debt, 
neither action has much impact on a REIT‘s stock price (Danielsen, Harrison, Van Ness, 
& Warr, 2009).  This is because REIT investors understand the implications of the 
federally mandated dividend distribution requirement, and therefore, REITs needs to raise 
capital frequently.  However, because they must turn to the capital markets more 
frequently than other types of corporations, it is also critical that REITs present a 
compelling case to the capital markets to motivate investment.  Increasing transparency is 
one way of doing so.   
 
REITs and Agency Problems 
Examinations of agency problems in the literature are numerous.  Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Myers and Majluf (1984) address means to reduce asymmetric 
information between a firm‘s managers and its investors.  Houston and Ryngaert (1997), 
Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (1998), and Van Ness, Van Ness, and Warr (2001) 
investigate the role that stock pricing plays in the reduction of concerns about asset 
substitution and adverse selection.  Diamond (1984, 1991), Ooi, Ong, and Li (2010), and 
Williamson (1987) study the role of the use of debt as a monitoring function to reduce 
moral hazard and frictions between firms and investors.  Another well-documented 




monitoring mechanism is the effective use of the audit process to reduce agency 
concerns, and send strong, positive signals about a firm‘s corporate governance efficacy 
to the capital markets (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2002; Danielsen, Harrison, 
Van Ness, & Warr, 2010; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005).   
Understanding that REITs are very different from other types of corporations, 
investors believe REITs have less severe agency problems (Bauer, Eichholtz, & Kok, 
2010).  For example, moral hazard is not as concerning, as there is little money available 
for managers to waste.  Adverse selection is less of a concern, as failure to comply with 
required investment thresholds subjects REITs to losing their REIT status (Danielsen et 
al., 2009); hence, investors are generally less apprehensive that REIT managers will 
reject investment opportunities in order to hoard cash.   
Chen, Chung, Lee, and Liao (2007) indicate that firms can reduce information 
asymmetry and increase their financial transparency through better corporate focus and 
governance.  Capozza and Seguin (1999) affirm that REITs‘ corporate focus is clear due 
to tax codes mandating investment of substantially all of their assets in income-producing 
real estate.  Anglin, Edelstein, Gao, and Tsang (2011) find correlations between reduced 
levels of information asymmetry and better REIT corporate governance.  Compared to 
other types of firms that have more free-cash flow available for significant, new 
investments, because REITs must distribute substantial portions of their net income, they 
are much more dependent on new capital.  As REIT investors understand this, typically, 
asymmetric information is less problematic (Gentry & Mayer, 2003).  Even so, because 
higher levels of information asymmetries after the 2007-2008 crisis led to more 
challenging capital market conditions in general, it was important that REIT managers 




work to minimize any potential information asymmetries to strengthen their abilities to 
continue to attract new capital investment.  One way firms can lower information 
asymmetries is by sending clear financial transparency signals to investors (Brau & 
Holmes, 2006).  Indeed, Danielsen et al. (2009) conclude that successful financial 
transparency signaling is an effective means of attracting capital investment.   
 
The Audit Process, Financial Transparency Signaling, and REITs 
The audit process is a well-documented monitoring mechanism effective in 
reducing agency conflicts.  Firms use it to send financial transparency signals to 
investors—signals intended to reduce information asymmetries—when they engage 
financial intermediaries to represent their efforts to raise capital (Healy & Palepu, 2001).  
In receiving signals, investors make decisions about the intended purpose of the signal, 
the credibility of the sender, and the accuracy of the information received.  In using the 
audit process as a transparency signaling mechanism, certain audit attributes such as audit 
quality, fee structure, and auditor reputation become factors that investors use to evaluate 
a firm‘s financial transparency (Datar, et al., 1991; Titman & Trueman, 1986).  Because 
REITs can benefit from sending strong signals to investors designed to convey their 
financial transparency, the audit process, including hiring high quality auditors and 
paying higher audit fees—presumably to secure higher quality audits—is a means of 
transparency signaling that is a critical aspect of REIT capital structure mechanisms 
(Danielson, et al., 2009).
3
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 Demsetz (1968) and Bagehot (1971) were the first researchers to study the link between asymmetric 
information and the firm‘s financial market liquidity.  They show a relationship exists between the bid-ask 
spread in the stock price for a particular firm, and the trading characteristics of its securities.  Glosten and 




The studies of Titman and Trueman (1986) and Feltham et al. (1991) support the 
idea that firms wishing to convey positive signals to investors will hire auditors with 
higher quality reputations.  An interesting aspect of the auditing process is the 
motivations of the firms that hire the auditors.  In game, finance, and behavioral theories, 
the possibility exists that low quality entities would mimic actions (signals) employed by 
high quality firms to reap the benefits of the signal.  Thus, to be credible, the signal must 
be costly and difficult to replicate in order for investors to perceive the signal as a 
separating equilibrium (Spence, 1973).  Hiring auditors with higher quality reputations is 
costly; firms often do so as a way of signaling increased transparency to investors.   
Danielsen, Van Ness, and Warr (2007) suggest that when firms pay higher audit 
fees to auditors with higher quality reputations, they benefit from the reputational quality 
of the audit firm.  Investors‘ perceptions of higher auditor quality reputation add 
credibility to the audit process and financial information transparency.  Hence, investors 
will more likely favorably view firms that hire auditors with higher quality reputations 
over those that do not.  Balvers, McDonald, and Miller (1988) posit that auditor 
reputation sends an important signal when firms issue new securities.  They indicate the 
intention of selecting a highly reputable auditor is to signal greater audit credibility.  
Their findings suggest that appointing a highly reputable auditor tends to lower earnings 
variability, reflecting favorably on the investment banker selecting the auditor.  A 
                                                                                                                                                 
Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985) find trading differences between informed and uninformed traders result 
from the presence of asymmetric information.  Glosten and Milgrom (1985) demonstrate that spreads 
between a security‘s bid and ask prices result from the level of an informed trader‘s private information.  
Amihud and Mendelson (1986, 2000) find a positive correlation between information asymmetry and 
capital costs.  Danielsen et al. (2010) suggest that bid-ask spreads partly reflect the significance of 
information asymmetries affecting investors.   




somewhat related finding by Datar et al. (1991) reveals firms that choose higher quality 
auditors do so to convey private information to investors.   
Daily, Certo, Dalton, and Roengpitya (2003) find that in firms pursuing equity 
offerings, if managers are aware of negative information, it is unlikely they will hire high 
quality auditors.  Because audit firms that fail to reveal negative information that they 
uncover may face possible criminal prosecution, such a possibility acts as a deterrent to 
non-disclosure.  This also relates to the reputation of the audit firm, as not revealing 
negative information and facing criminal charges later, or the possibility that the market 
eventually finds out about the negative information can be very damaging to a firm‘s 
reputation.  These two consequences provide compelling motivations for most auditors to 
be very diligent and careful in the course of an audit.  It makes sense then that if a firm‘s 
management is aware of potential negative information, it will be less likely to hire the 
highest quality auditor.  This is not to say or suggest that only the highest quality auditors 
will find and reveal negative information.  Rather, it is to say that there is a higher 
probability that lower quality audit firms may not have the resources to provide higher 
quality audits.  Thus, by not hiring a high quality auditor, firms potentially signal to 
investors that the firm poses higher investment risks. 
There are numerous studies using audit fee structure to signal transparency.  
Francis, Lys, and Vincent (2004) find that REITs typically experience more favorable 
investor reaction than other types of firms when issuing securities, and that signaling 
plays a significant role in the way investors react to such offerings.  As it is highly 
probable that audit quality and auditor reputation will influence their efforts to raise 
capital, assuming that costly audits translate into greater transparency, Danielsen et al. 




(2009) examine which firms are most likely to benefit from a higher priced audit.  They 
posit that REITs that undertake expensive audits increase their liquidity.  They also 
reason that it is likely that non-REITs are willing to absorb higher audit fees to signal 
greater transparency, and hence, attract investors.  Danielsen et al. (2009) find firms 
signal greater financial transparency through heavier investment in audit services, and 
reduce their capital costs when issuing SEOs.  Beatty (1989) finds that firms who pay a 
premium for audit services have lower initial returns after going public.  This suggests 
that firms willing to pay more for audit services do so to signal increased financial 
transparency to investors.  Higgs and Skantz (2006) conclude that investors interpret high 
audit fees as signals of a firm‘s commitment to high earnings quality.  In their 
examination of voluntary auditor choice, Hay and Davis (2002) find that firms seeking 
higher quality audits (again, knowingly make a choice to pay higher audit fees) do so for 
signaling reasons.  Similarly, in their examination of small auditees, Peel and Roberts 
(2003) find that small firms willingly hire higher priced audit firms in order to send 
signals of operations and earnings quality to investors.  Signaling is important to firms 
seeking to reduce information asymmetries, and increase financial transparency because 
doing so enhances abilities to attract investment.  For firms such as REITs that must 
access capital often, it is especially important.    
 
REIT Liquidity and Information Transparency Mechanisms  
Providing timely financial information reduces information asymmetry (Bushman 
& Smith, 2001, 2003; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Fama & Jensen, 1983).  However, 
in order to be effective, the financial information must be transparent.  Just as important, 




in order for the receiver to view the information as transparent, the receiver must also 
view both the information received and the sender as being credible.  Firms can signal 
their credibility and financial transparency by providing highly accurate and reliable 
audited financial statements (Hope, Thomas, & Vyas, 2009).  Because investors tend to 
favor firms that are more transparent, greater transparency helps firms attract investment, 
and therefore, increase their liquidity (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2002; 
Danielsen, et al., 2010; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005).  Hence, it seems logical that if 
using vigorous audit services ―can improve liquidity for any firm, it seems especially 
likely to do so for REITs‖ (Danielsen et al., 2009, p. 517).   
 
REIT Complexity and Information Transparency Mechanisms 
Highly regulated firms or those holding multifarious, wide-ranging assets 
typically require complex, expensive audits (Chersan, Robu, Carp, & Mironiuc, 2012).  
For example, banks and other types of financial institutions, which quite often own and 
operate their businesses through a labyrinth of holding companies, subsidiaries, and 
controlling interest positions, are subject to a high threshold of regulatory compliance 
(Boo & Sharma, 2008).  Auditors examining their books must employ a high degree of 
scrutiny to limit their potential liability associated with audit results.  REITs are also 
highly regulated and many are extremely complex, owning and operating their assets 
through a vast network of subsidiaries, partnerships, and joint venture arrangements.  
Because of their multifaceted nature, REITs face a persistent challenge to minimize 
information asymmetries between themselves and investors; the financial crisis only 
exacerbated this task (Hardin & Wu, 2010).  Therefore, due to their frequent need for 




capital investment, after the crisis, it was critical for REITs to find ways to meet this 
challenge.  By hiring higher quality auditors, audit specialists, or auditors with a higher 
quality reputation (such as a Big 4 audit firm), REITs could take steps not only to reduce 
information asymmetries, but more importantly, they could send clear transparency 
signals to investors to motivate capital investment. 
Audits of REITs are complex, partly because they operate in a highly regulated 
environment, and partly because the majority of their assets are valuation driven.  Unlike 
a typical corporation, federal laws dictate not only how and to what extent REITs must 
distribute their income, but also how and to what extent they must invest their assets.  As 
shown in Table 3, in addition to the dividend distribution requirement, REITs must invest 
a minimum of 75% of their assets in cash, government securities, real estate property, 
real estate mortgage loans, and shares in other REITs.  Hence, REIT audits are often 
complex because of the diversity of their assets, and market effects on their underlying 
values.   
With regard to equity REITs, individual, property level real estate assets are 
essentially independent, self-contained investments, each with their own sources and uses 
of revenues and expenses, and each with their own degrees of risk that vary from 
property to property.  These may be difficult for the auditor to understand or value 
(Danielsen et al., 2009; Friday & Sirmans, 1998).  This is because the values of income-
producing real estate assets are determined at the individual property level based on the 
cash flows produced by each property within a portfolio (Epley, Rabianski, & Haney, 
2002); evaluating these types of assets may be difficult for many auditors because they 
lack professional real estate appraisal expertise.  Similarly, auditing mortgage REITs is 




difficult because within their portfolio, they hold myriad commercial mortgage-backed 
securities, real estate mortgage notes, and other types of real estate credit facilities.  
Without a thorough understanding of the specific risks associated with each instrument 
within the portfolio, providing a detailed audit of a mortgage REIT could be very 
difficult.  In either event, auditing an equity or mortgage REIT can potentially be 
extremely complex and costly.  Therefore, it is necessary to control for REITs‘ 
complexity when analyzing REITs in the context of the audit process.   
The financial crisis compounded the REIT audit-complexity problem in several 
ways.  Income-producing properties in a portfolio, or more accurately, the cash flows 
derived therefrom, are highly dependent on the credit risk of the tenants providing the 
income (Epley, et al., 2002).  During the crisis, the financial health of many tenants, 
especially those that were not public companies, may have been difficult, if not altogether 
impossible to ascertain.  The risks associated with possible disruptions in future cash 
flows from each of the properties within a REIT portfolio would have also been difficult 
to quantify and evaluate.  Additionally, carefully managing operating expenses of 
income-producing real estate is essential to producing and protecting investment returns 
(Epley, et al., 2002).  A significant portion of operating expenses stems from the costs of 
property and casualty insurance.  If an insurer‘s business suffered during the crisis as a 
result of deterioration of its own operations or investments, or worse, failed, the impact 
on properties within a REIT‘s portfolio could be significant as well (Monroe, 2009).  
Finally, financing related to an income-producing property is critical to the stability of its 
cash flows (Epley, et al., 2002).  As banks struggled during the crisis, the risks and 
uncertainties related to poor bank performance, or even failure, potentially posed 




problems for REITs.  This is because it may have been difficult to reposition debt on 
portfolio properties facing financing resets or looming balloon payments after the crisis.  
Any of these market condition difficulties may have added to the complexity of auditing 
REITs, especially ones with very diverse property portfolios, or high-credit-risk tenant 
mixes.   
 
REITs‘ Auditor Relationships and Financial Transparency  
Hardin and Wu (2010) show that REITs with strong banking relationships tend to 
obtain public debt-ratings, enabling them to go to the public debt markets more often.  
These REITs typically use less bank financing secured or collateralized by their 
underlying real estate assets.  They conclude that establishing banking relationships 
enable REITs to lower their leverage.  This is important because investors tend to favor 
firms with lower leverage because reduced capital costs decrease financial risk (Baxter, 
1967).  Just as the existence of banking relationships and rating agency status convey 
information to the market as to the prospects of the firm, auditors‘ relationships with their 
client firms likely have an impact on the transparency of firms‘ financial information and 
access to capital markets.   
Investors understand that, over time, auditors gain significant understanding about 
the nature of their clients‘ business operations (AICPA, 1978; Bells, Marrs, Solomon, & 
Thomas, 1997), and numerous researchers find a positive association between auditor 
tenure and audit quality (Geiger & Raghunanandan, 2002; Johnson, Khurana & 
Reynolds, 2002; Myers, Myers, & Omer, 2003; Mansi, Maxwell, & Miller, 2004).  
Similarly, Ghosh and Moon (2005) find empirical support for a positive relationship 




between auditor tenure and investors‘ beliefs about the firm‘s earnings quality.  In 
addition, longer auditor tenure may improve investors‘ perceptions of the quality of a 
firm‘s financial transparency because of learning curve effects associated with new 
auditors.  Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) mandates individual auditor 
rotation within an audit firm, hiring a new audit firm does necessitate a certain ‗learning 
curve‘ for the new audit firm; not surprisingly, audit failures are higher in the early years 
of an auditor‘s engagement (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002).  Based on these studies, a 
reasonable inference is that the longer an auditor provides services for a firm, the more its 
reputation is at stake.  It is reasonable then that after a long record of consistent quality 
service, the market expects a continuation of that service.  Therefore, the market likely 
perceives a mistake by the audit firm after a long record of good service with suspicion, 
and as potential deterioration of service.   
On the other hand, investors may also view extended auditor tenure as somewhat 
problematic.  Although engaged by the auditee, an essential duty of the auditor is to 
remain independent in the conduct of its audit to safeguard the interests of other 
interested parties such as investors, lenders, and employees (Lavin, 1976; Schleifer & 
Shockley, 2011).  So it seems plausible that after years of engagement—years spent 
developing a sound sense of the nature of its client‘s business—mistakes or errors made 
by a long-term auditor might lead some to question the auditor‘s independence (Carcello 
& Nagy, 2004; Chang & Monroe, 1994; Goldman & Barlev, 1974; Johnson, Khurana, & 
Reynolds, 2002), or whether the auditor capitulated to client demands rather than risk 
future revenues (Basiousis, Gul, & Ng, 2012; Hoyle, 1978; Windsor & Cavanaugh, 




2012).  Still, an auditor might simply fail to remain diligent in pursuit of its audit 
responsibilities (Braswell, Daniels, Landis, & Chang, 2012; Mautz & Sharaf, 1961).  
Similarly, hiring an auditor with industry specialization is likely to play an 
important role in conveying financial transparency to the markets, especially when the 
auditee presents a complex audit (Abdolmohammadi, Searfoss, & Shanteau, 2004).  
Choosing to specialize in a particular industry is not a decision that audit firms take 
lightly, as doing so requires committing substantial amounts of time and money to train 
audit personnel on the workings of a particular industry (Lim & Tan, 2010).  Because of 
the auditor‘s advanced knowledge about the specific nature of an auditee‘s industry, the 
likelihood is lower that the firm‘s management will deceive or mislead the auditor 
(Solomon, Shields, & Whittington, 1999).  Equally important is that precisely because of 
the audit firm‘s industry specialization, safeguarding its reputational capital is also an 
important incentive to perform quality audits (Watts & Zimmerman, 1983).  This is 
because, as an industry specialist, the audit firm is at greater risk of losing other clients in 
the same industry, should it make a mistake auditing one.  In other words, by becoming 
an industry audit specialist, in a sense by proverbially ‗putting its eggs in one basket,‘ the 
audit firm has much more to lose.  Investors understand the significance of an audit 
firm‘s commitment to becoming an industry specialist, and realize firms often hire audit 
specialists to improve their disclosures (Dunn & Mayhew, 2004), thereby enhancing their 
transparency.  As discussed earlier, many REITs are complex firms with diverse, wide-
ranging assets.  Hence, hiring an auditor recognized as a REIT audit specialist can be an 
important mechanism through which REITs can signal increased transparency to 
investors.   




Audit firm size and reputation is also likely to convey information about the 
financial transparency of the auditee.  Auditor quality is often associated with auditor size 
because larger audit firms have more resources and provide higher quality audits 
(DeAngelo, 1981).  When information asymmetry is high, such as when a firm is 
preparing to issue equity for the first time, firms are more likely to engage a larger, higher 
quality auditor (e.g. Big 4 auditor) for signaling purposes.  The studies of Balvers et al. 
(1988), and Firth and Smith (1992) provide evidence to support this argument.  They find 
that firms experience less IPO underpricing when they hire larger audit firms.  
Willenborg (1999) finds support for signaling in his study of the demand for pre-IPO 
audit services by showing a Big-5 audit is more valuable.  Firth and Liau-Tan (2003) find 
a correlation between investor perceptions of high risk IPOs, and audits performed by 
high quality auditors.  Similarly, Simunic and Stein (1987), Beatty (1989), and Chan, 
Ezzamel, and Gwilliam (1993) show that large audit firms charge higher audit fees than 
their smaller competitors because of the demand for their higher quality services, 
generally driven by their higher audit quality reputation. 
 
Research Implications and Contributions 
Historically, REITs have largely been successful in raising both equity and debt 
capital.  Table 4 shows the number of equity and debt issues, and the commensurate 
amounts of money raised by REITs through such offerings from 2002-2011.  Generally, 
the number of issues and the amounts of capital raised increased each year prior to the 
2007-2008 crisis, but not surprisingly, the numbers fell precipitously afterwards.  This 
evidence suggests one of two things:  either (1) REITs did not seek increasing amounts of  








Equity Issues Debt Issues 
Total Equity & 
Debt 
      # $ 
% of 
Total 
       #       $ 
% of 
Total 
        #         $ 
2002 113 $8,384 42.41% 74 $11,383 57.58% 187 $19,768 
2003 154 $13,309 52.07% 74 $12,252 47.93% 228 $25,562 
2004 169 $21,176 55.03% 97 $17,306 44.97% 266 $38,482 
2005 118 $15,405 41.09% 141 $22,088 58.91% 259 $37,492 
2006 119 $22,205 45.30% 85 $26,812 54.70% 204 $49,018 
2007 86 $17,876 49.61% 43 $18,155 50.39% 129 $36,031 
2008 71 $12,818 71.25% 11 $5,173 28.75% 82 $17,991 
2009 96 $24,234 69.93% 34 $10,422 30.07% 130 $34,656 
2010 117 $28,221 59.48% 56 $19,230 40.53% 173 $47,450 
2011 131 $37,490 73.11% 33 $13,790 26.89% 164 $51,280 
Notes:  The table above reports equity, debt, and combined equity and debt capital investment made in all 
publicly-traded REITs as reported by NAREIT.  All data reported in millions of dollars, available at 
www.reit.com 
 
capital after the financial crisis, which is inconsistent with REITs‘ well-established need 
to raise capital frequently, or, most likely, (2) generally, the financial crisis severely 
constrained REITs‘ access to capital markets. 
Whether the capital outlet is the equity or debt market, when investors have a 
better understanding of the financial condition of the firm, the higher the likelihood they 
will invest.  Therefore, engaging in actions that reduce or eliminate information 
asymmetry and thus signaling increased transparency, is one logical strategy for firms to 
pursue when attempting to raise capital.  After the crisis, facing a new, very uncertain 
financial environment, all firms seeking new capital had to find ways to reduce or 
eliminate information asymmetries.  Because of REITs‘ dependence on new capital, the  
question then becomes: How do REITs reduce information asymmetries and increase 
their abilities to motivate capital investment?  




Collectively, the extant research underscores the importance of using the audit 
process as a mechanism for reducing information asymmetries to signal increased 
transparency.  The literature also connects increased transparency to increased capital 
investment.  Thus, the expectation is that the financial crisis increased the prevalence of 
information asymmetries within the financial markets, leading to higher levels of 
illiquidity and investor conservatism, and increasing the difficulties of raising new 
capital.  If using the audit process to signal transparency is important for all firms seeking 
to increase capital investment, clearly it must be as important, if not more so, for capital-
dependent REITs. 
To date, there has been no examination of whether increased transparency via the 
auditing process leads to better access to capital markets, and more importantly, during 
periods of high capital market illiquidity caused by a major shock to the financial system.  
This study contributes to the literature by examining how highly regulated, complexly 
structured firms that raise capital frequently use the audit process to signal transparency 
to attract new investment.  Although the outcomes pertain specifically to REITs, the 
results are important in many other respects.  All firms that rely heavily on capital 
markets can gain from this study‘s insight into using the audit process to signal increased 
transparency as a means of attracting capital investment.  Investors choosing among 
investment alternatives will benefit through a better understanding of how firms use the 
audit process to signal transparency.  Finally, the results will give researchers a deeper 
understanding of how increased transparency, resulting from using the audit process, can 






Section III.  Hypotheses Development 
Exogenous events can shock and disrupt capital markets, and create pressures on 
market equilibrium.  As many investors respond by moving money from equities and 
corporate debt into safer investments such as government debt and cash, often the result 
is substantially increased capital market illiquidity.  Any type of shock that creates 
volatile, unstable market conditions, combined with swift investor reactions that work to 
reduce liquidity, can make raising capital difficult.  The severity of the shocks to the 
financial system, and the ensuing post-crisis market conditions caused major problems 
for many firms needing to raise new capital.  Even though REITs faced the same situation 
as all capital market participants seeking new investment, for them it was likely more 
challenging.  As cash flows fell due to required dividend payouts, and in some instances, 
reduced rent flows from struggling real estate portfolios, REITs had no choice but to seek 
new capital investment.  Still, they had to do so at the very time when real estate markets, 
experiencing significant value declines throughout the country, were generally out of 
favor with investors (DeLisle, 2007, 2008).   
As discussed earlier, Table 4 shows that the number of equity and debt issues, and 
the total amounts of capital raised by all publicly traded REITs fell dramatically after the 
onset of the financial crisis.  Although the numbers gradually began to improve in 2009, 
and continued to do so thereafter, not until 2011 did total investment eclipse the high set 
in 2006.  Therefore, a reasonable question to consider is: What steps REITs took to 
attract investment from wary investors, nervous about highly illiquid, unstable financial 
market conditions?  In the literature review, I highlight several studies that examine 




different ways that firms signal financial transparency to investors to attract new capital 
investment.  One of them, using the audit process, is the focus of this research.   
Using a two-part approach, I examine the relationship between REITs using the 
Audit Construct to increase transparency and accessing new capital.  In the first part of 
the analysis, I examine the relationship between the Audit Construct and equity, debt, and 
combined equity and debt investment, posited by the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1:  There is a positive association between the Audit Construct and 
equity investment in REITs. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  There is a positive association between the Audit Construct and 
debt investment in REITs. 
 
Hypothesis 3:  There is a positive association between the Audit Construct and 
combined equity and debt investment in REITs. 
 
In the second part of the analysis, I examine the relationship between REITs‘ use of the 
Audit Construct and access to new capital, accounting for possible mediating effects of 
the financial crisis, posited by the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4:  The financial crisis of 2007-2008 positively influenced the 
relationship between the Audit Construct and equity investment in 
REITs. 
 
Hypothesis 5:  The financial crisis of 2007-2008 positively influenced the 
relationship between the Audit Construct and debt investment in 
REITs. 
 
Hypothesis 6:  The financial crisis of 2007-2008 positively influenced the 
relationship between the Audit Construct and combined equity and 
debt investment in REITs. 
 




Section IV.  Data Selection and Sample Construction 
After compiling a list of publicly traded REITs that operated at some point during 
the period 2002-2011, I reduce the sample to include only those REITs that operated and 
elected REIT status for each year during the study period.
4
  I then review each REIT‘s 
annual report to determine the total number of subsidiaries owned or operated, and 
properties owned or controlled, respectively, by the selected REITs.
5
  I collect financial 
and other firm information from the Center for Research and Security Prices (CRSP) and 
Compustat databases, and audit firm and services information from the Audit Analytics 
database.
6
  The CRSP, Compustat, and Audit Analytics databases do not have a common 
identifier.  Therefore, I hand match all necessary REITs‘ financial, accounting, audit, and 
other firm-specific data to construct the final data sample comprised of 98 publicly traded 
REITs.  Table 5 lists and describes the variables I use in the analysis. 
As shown in Table 6, 17.45% of the REITs in the sample hold a diversified 
portfolio of properties.  The sample includes 11 multifamily and 11 residential REITs, for 
22.44% of the sample.  Office, Healthcare, and Lodging & Resort REITs comprise 27.6% 
of the sample with 9 properties each.  Table 7 presents selected financial data for the 
REITs in the sample.  Total assets and total liabilities average $4.24 and $2.87 billion, 
respectively, while average stockholder equity and long-term debt are $1.24 and $1.9 
billion, respectively.  On average, REITs have net income of $89.37 million, on annual 
revenues of $598 million. 
                                                 
4
 REITs must annually elect REIT status, and disclose their election in their annual proxy statement.  Data 
available at http://www.sec.gov. 
5
 Data available at http://www.sec.gov. 
6
 Data obtained by licensed access to the Wharton Research Data Services, owned and operated by the 
University of Pennsylvania, available at http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/index.cfm. 




Table 5.  Description of Variables. 
 
Variable Variable Description 
ln(Equity Investment) Natural log of proceeds from common and preferred stock issuance
1
 
ln(Debt Investment) Natural log of proceeds from debt issuance
1
 
ln(Equity & Debt Investment) 
Total value of ln(Equity Investment) and ln(Debt Investment) as defined 
above 




A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the auditor employed by an 




Big 4 Auditor 
A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the auditor ranks as a Big 4 
audit firm, and 0 otherwise
4
 
Bid-Ask Spread The standard deviation of the mean annual bid-ask spread 
Intangible Assets The total value of intangible assets
1
 
Book/Market Computed as book value
1
 divided by market value
1
 
ROA Net annual income
1









A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if an individual REIT's audit firm 




Natural log of all non-audit fees including income tax preparation services, 





The natural log of the number of properties owned or controlled by the 





The natural log of the number of subsidiaries owned or controlled by the 





A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if an individual REIT has 
operations outside of the United States as reported in CRSP/Compustat 




A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if an individual REIT has 
extraordinary items and/or discontinued operations as reported in the 










Log values computed on values reported in the Compustat database.   
2
Log values computed on 
values reported in the Audit Analytics database.   
3
Specific REIT audit and auditor information reported in 
the Audit Analytics database.   
4
The group of audit firms currently known as the ―Big 4‖ includes 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, and KPMG, ranked "1" through "4" based 
on annual revenues, respectively, as reported at http://www.big4.com.   
5
Specific, individual REIT 10-k 
annual reports accessed at http://www.sec.gov.   
6
Property Y-type indicates type of REIT industry 
classification including Multifamily, Manufacturing, Healthcare, Shopping Center, Freestanding, Regional 
Mall, Lodging/Resort, Diversified, Office, Industrial, Office/Industrial Mixed, Self-Storage, Commercial 








Table 6.  REIT-Type Distributions. 
 
REIT Specialization   REIT Type 
# of REITs in 
Sample 
% of REITs in 
Sample 
Diversified Portfolio of Properties 
 
Equity 17  17.35% 
Multifamily Residential Properties 
 
Equity 11  11.22% 
Retail Shopping Center Properties 
 
Equity 11  11.22% 
Office Properties 
 
Equity 9  9.18% 
Healthcare Properties 
 
Equity 9  9.18% 
Lodging & Resort Properties 
 
Equity 9  9.18% 
Retail Regional Mall Properties 
 
Equity 6  6.12% 
Residential Mortgage Investments 
 
Mortgage 6  6.12% 
Office & Industrial Properties 
 
Equity 5  5.10% 
Freestanding Single-Tenant Properties 
 
Equity 4  4.08% 
Industrial Properties 
 
Equity 4  4.08% 
Residential Manufactured Home Properties 
 
Equity 3  3.06% 
Commercial Mortgage Investments 
 
Mortgage 3  3.06% 
Self-Storage & Mini-Warehouse Properties 
 
Equity 1  1.02% 
Notes:  A total of 98 REITs maintained REIT status during the entire sample period of 2002-2011 as 
confirmed in specific, individual REIT 10-k annual reports. 
 
Table 7.  Summary Statistics - REIT Firm Financial Information ($,000,000s). 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. 25th Median 75th 
Total Assets 980 4241.69 6914.66 1013.14 2356.18 4970.25 
Intangible Assets 980 51.97 242.16 0.00 0.00 12.65 
Total Liabilities 980 2874.69 5675.55 530.19 1428.67 3078.19 
Long Term Debt 980 1903.69 2582.56 336.67 1072.03 2292.27 
Annual Revenues 980 598.63 900.21 138.63 303.06 674.72 
Earnings Before Interest & Taxes 980 191.39 312.20 46.18 106.89 233.34 
Net Income 980 89.37 217.02 12.05 45.87 128.93 
Stockholder Equity 980 1246.49 1603.97 295.73 763.73 1539.79 







Section V.  Research Design and Methodology 
In this study, the outcome of interest is Capital Investment, which I proxy for by 
using the three measures of equity investment, debt investment, and combined equity and 
debt investment.  I use the metrics in Danielson et al. (2009), along with a third 
dimension, auditor specialization, to compose the Audit Construct.  As done in the 
literature, I use these three audit-related variables in particular to capture Transparency.  
In the first part of the analysis, the study period is much broader, covering the years of 
2002-2011.  In the second part of the analysis, I analyze the impact of the financial crisis 
on this expected relationship.  
 
Empirical Model – Part 1 
 In addition to the main independent variables I use to capture Transparency, I 
include three additional vectors of variables to capture the dimensions of Firm 
Characteristics, Auditor Relationship, and REIT Complexity.  I also use a number of 
dummy variables to control for effects related to specific REIT-types and/or changes 
across time.  The empirical model for the first part of the analysis takes the following 
form: 
Capital Investment   =  ᶂ {Transparency, Firm Characteristics, Auditor 
Relationship, REIT Complexity}.                                      (1)  
 
Transparency Vector 
 Earlier, I mentioned research findings that firms often pay higher audit fees to hire 
higher quality auditors to signal to investors that their financial information is highly 




credible (Datar, Feltham, & Hughes, 1991; Titman & Trueman, 1986).  Therefore, the 
central piece of the investigation centers on Transparency.  To proxy for auditor quality, I 
use the variable ln(Audit Fees),
7
 which is the natural log of audit fees.  To capture auditor 
specialization, I use the variable Specialist,
8
 a dummy variable that takes the value of one 
if the auditing firm has performed audits on more than 30% of the audits in the entire 
sample in each year, and zero otherwise.  Finally, to proxy for auditor reputation, I use 
the variable Big 4 Auditor,
9
 a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the auditor 
ranks as one of the Big 4 audit firms, and zero otherwise. 
Earlier, I also discuss the association between information asymmetry, financial 
information transparency, and the bid-ask spread, a widely used measure of transparency.  
Intangible assets are difficult to define or value, aggravated by the fact that firms often 
choose not to reveal certain information that they view as proprietary.  Researchers 
commonly use intangible assets to proxy for information asymmetry.  I include two 
additional variables within the Transparency vector: Bid-Ask Spread, which I construct 
using the standard deviation of the mean annual bid-ask spread of each REIT‘s stock 




                                                 
7
 Audit fee information comes from the Audit Analytics database. 
8
 For the purposes of this research, auditor specialization includes auditors that performed 30% or more of 
all REIT audits in the sample.  Table 8 groups all REIT audits by audit firm, total audit fees, and average 
audit fees.  Of the 980 total REIT audits performed in the sample, Ernst & Young, LLP, performed 327, or 
33.37%.  All other auditors each performed less than 18% of the total number of REIT audits in the sample.  
Auditor rank order is by percentage of REIT audits performed.  
9
 The group of audit firms currently known as the ―Big 4‖ includes PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP,  
Deloitte & Touche, LLP, Ernst & Young, LLP, and KPMG, LLP, ranked 1 through 4 based on annual 
revenues, respectively (www.Big4.com, 2012). 




Table 8.  REIT Auditors 
 




# REIT          
Audits 
% of 
REIT      
Audits 






Ernst & Young 1 327 33.37%        367,564                  1,124  
KPMG 2 175 17.86%        140,926                     805  
PricewaterhouseCoopers 3 167 17.04%        146,222                     876  
Deloitte & Touche 4 118 12.04%        128,541                  1,089  
BDO USA 5 69 7.04%          42,508                     616  
Grant Thornton 6 49 5.00%          48,530                     990  
PKF O‘Connor Davies 7 14 1.43%            3,077                     220  
Reznick Group 8 14 1.43%            1,736                     124  
Berenfeld Spritzer Shechter & Sheer 9 8 0.82%               667                       83  
Swalm & Associates 10 8 0.82%               451                       56  
McGladrey & Pullen 11 7 0.71%            1,662                     237  
Burr Pilger Mayer 12 6 0.61%            1,690                     282  
Calvetti Ferguson & Wagner 13 5 0.51%            7,286                  1,457  
Moss Adams 14 5 0.51%               653                     131  
Donaldson Holman & West 15 2 0.20%            1,402                     701  
Epstein Weber & Conover 16 2 0.20%               154                       77  
Moore Stephens 17 1 0.10%                 79                       79  
Cherry Bekaert & Holland 18 1 0.10%                 77                       77  
Brady Martz & Associates 19 1 0.10%                 51                       51  
Farmer Fuqua & Huff 20 1 0.10%                 10                       10  
Totals   980  100.00%        893,285                     912  
Notes: REIT Auditor Rank ranked first by the number of REIT audits performed and then by the total audit 




Firm Characteristics Vector 
Within the sample, REITs vary by type, size, and industry focus.  To capture and 
control for the differences between them, I use variables within the Firm Characteristics 
vector.  First in the group is Book-Market, which I calculate by dividing book value (total 
assets minus total liabilities and total intangible assets) by market value (common shares 
outstanding at year‘s end multiplied by share price at year‘s end).  The second variable is 
ROA, the result of dividing net income by total assets.  Rounding out the Firm 




Characteristics vector is Leverage, which I compute by dividing total liabilities by total 
assets.   
 
Auditor Relationship Vector 
 In addition to the three primary components of the Audit Construct, I also use a 
vector of two additional observable variables to control for other aspects of the 
relationship between the audit firm and its client.  The first variable in the Auditor 
Relationship vector is Initial, a dummy variable taking the value of one if the current 
auditor is in either the first or second year of engagement, and zero otherwise.  Audit 
firms commonly provide clients with non-audit services such as tax preparation, risk 
management, and pension plan administration consulting services.  Fees for these types 
of services can often exceed those paid for audits.  Some researchers theorize that audit 
firms price audit services somewhat as a ‗loss-leader‘ in order to gain a foothold in to a 
firm, thus paving the way for the provision of more profitable ‗non-audit‘ services (Antle, 
Gordon, Narayanamoorthy, & Zhou, 2006; Knechel & Sharma 2012).  Even so, 
regulators have long had concerns about the relationship between an auditor and its 
client, and its impact on firm transparency.  In 2001, even before the passage of SOX, the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission began requiring full disclosure of audit and 
non-audit fees amidst concerns over firm transparency, audit and non-audit fees, and 
auditor independence (Danielson, et al., 2009).  Less than two years later, SOX went 
even further by establishing stringent new standards designed to enhance auditor 
independence and limit conflicts of interest (Naiker, Sharma, & Sharma, 2013).  Because 
the rationale is that high non-audit fees weaken auditor independence, and hence, by 




extension, reduce audit quality, non-audit fees can influence investors‘ perceptions of 
firm transparency.  Although the research in this paper does not specifically explore the 
impact of non-audit fees, I include the variable ln(Non-Audit Fees), the natural log of 
non-audit fees, to control for the impact of non-audit fees.   
 
REIT Complexity Vector 
 As earlier discussed, auditing REITs is often a complex process, partly because 
REITs operate in a highly regulated environment, and partly because of the means used 
to value investments within their portfolios.  I include a number of observable variables 
within the REIT Complexity vector to capture the complex asset types and/or corporate 
structures associated with the REITs within the sample.  The variables I use include 
ln(Subsidiaries), the natural log of the total number of subsidiaries owned or controlled 
by the REIT; ln(Properties), the natural log of the total number of properties owned or 
controlled by the REIT or one of its subsidiaries; Foreign, a dummy variable taking the 
value of one if the REIT conducts business outside of the United States, and zero 
otherwise; and Extra/Disc., a dummy variable taking the value of one if the REIT has 
extraordinary items or discontinued operations, and zero otherwise.  Within the sample, 
there are 12 different equity REIT types and 2 different mortgage REIT types, so for 
robustness, I also use dummy variables to control for each of the different REIT-types. 
 
Testable Equation 
To test each of Hypotheses 1-3, I conduct four separate estimations.  In the first 
three estimations, I individually test each of the Audit Construct components.  In the 




fourth estimation, I combine all components together.  I do this to account for any 
potential collinearity problems that may occur from grouping all variables within the 
same model.  Again, using data from all REITs during the entire sample period, the 
outcome of interest is Capital Investment, which I capture using equity, debt, and 
combined equity and debt investment, using the testable form of Equation (1) as follows: 
Capital Investment       = β0 + β1∙ln(Audit Fees) + β2∙Specialist  
+ β3∙Big 4 Auditor +β4∙Bid-Ask Spread  
+ β5∙Intangible Assets + β6∙Book/Market  
+ β7∙ROA + β8∙Leverage + β9∙Initial  
+ β10∙ln(Non-Audit Fees) + β11∙ln(Properties)  
+ β12∙ln(Subsidiaries) + β13∙Foreign  
+ β14∙Extra/Disc. + β15-26∙REIT Type + ε.            (2) 
 
Empirical Model – Part 2 
Thus far, the research question examines the relationship between REITs‘ use of 
the Audit Construct as a means to convey increased financial information transparency 
and capital investment.  In the second part of the analysis, I analyze the impact of the 
2007-2008 financial crisis on the relationship between the Audit Construct and capital 
investment.  After adding a fifth vector, Financial Crisis, the extended empirical model 
takes the following form: 
Capital Investment   =  ᶂ {Transparency, Firm Characteristics, Auditor 






Financial Crisis Vector 
 Using the model shown in the form of Equation (2), I add additional variables 
within the Financial Crisis vector to investigate the interactive effects between the crisis 
and each of the Audit Construct components.  The first variable added is Crisis, a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one for the period 2008-2011, and zero for the period 
2002-2007.  I also add three interaction terms, the first of which is Crisis*ln(Audit Fees), 
which captures the interaction between Crisis and ln(Audit Fees); it is designed to 
measure whether or not the relationship between audit fees and capital investment is 
affected by the financial crisis.  The second interaction term is Crisis*Specialist, which 
captures the interaction between Crisis and Specialist; it is designed to measure whether 
or not the relationship between audit specialist and capital investment is affected by the 
financial crisis.  The third interaction term is Crisis*Big 4 Auditor, which captures the 
interaction between Crisis and Big 4 Auditor; it is designed to measure whether or not the 
relationship between Big 4 auditor and capital investment is affected by the financial 
crisis.   
 
Testable Equation 
The testable form of Equation (3) is as follows: 
Capital  Investment   = β0 + β1∙Crisis + β2∙ln(Audit Fees)  
+ β3∙Crisis*ln(Audit Fees) + β4∙Specialist  
+ β5∙Crisis*Specialist  + β6∙Big 4 Auditor   
+ β7∙Crisis*Big 4 Auditor  +  β8∙Bid-Ask Spread  
+ β9∙Intangible Assets  +  β10∙Book/Market  




+ β11∙ROA + β12∙Leverage  +  β13∙Initial  
+ β14∙ln(Non-Audit Fees) + β15∙ln(Properties)  
+ β16∙ln(Subsidiaries) + β17∙Foreign  
+ β18∙Extra/Disc. + β19-30∙REIT Type + ε.            (4) 
I test each hypothesis using robust regression estimations.  I also account for the 
possibility of any firm-related or time-related invariant characteristics affecting the 
REITs within the sample.  For example, a diversified REIT that invests in different types 
of properties, such as regional shopping malls, office properties, or timberland, may have 
entirely different factors affecting their abilities to raise capital, than a REIT that only 
invests in one type of property.  Likewise, as business cycles change over time, it is 
possible that a REIT that invests strictly in one property type, for example retail 
properties, may experience different investor responses when seeking equity as opposed 
to another type of REIT.  This may be due to one particular property sector falling out of 
favor as an investment, or having trouble at one point in time versus other types of REITs 
in the same period.  Therefore, in addition to using dummy variables for each firm year to 
account for changes over time, I also use dummies to control for the different types of 
REITs within the sample.    
 
Section VI.  Results and Analysis 
Descriptive Statistics 
Other than year-specific and REIT-type variables, Table 9 presents descriptive 
statistics for all variables that I use in the analysis.  On average, REITs in the sample 
have $132.9 million in total equity investment.  Given that most of the REITs in the 




sample are Equity REITs investing in real estate properties, it is understandable that as 
illustrated in Chart 1, debt constitutes a substantial portion of their overall capital, 
totaling over $2.5 billion.  However, leverage ratios average only 60%.  Annual audit fees 
are a substantial expense, averaging $911,515.  More than a third of the firms in the 
sample use a REIT audit specialist, nearly all use a Big 4 auditor, and close to 20% of 
auditors are in their first or second year of engagement.  Statistics for several variables 
confirm the existence of REIT complexity within those REITs in the sample.  The 
average number of properties owned is 245, with a median number of 112.  In addition, 
most REITs tend to have a substantial number of subsidiaries, averaging 135.7.  Only a 
fraction of REITs conduct foreign operations.  Slightly more than half of the audits report 
either an extraordinary item (a net income adjustment made due to an unusual or 
infrequent occurrence, such as a loss due to a hurricane), or a discontinued operation (a 
net income adjustment made because a portion of a company‘s operation is discontinued, 
such as due to the sale of an asset). 
Correlations  
Table 10 presents correlations of the variables I use in the analysis.  As indicated, 
although ln(Equity) is not strongly correlated with ln(Audit Fees) (0.30), ln(Debt) does 
have a strong correlation with ln(Audit Fees) (0.68), as does ln(Equity & Debt) (0.70).  
Although the correlation between ln(Audit Fees) and Specialist is not strong (0.15), the 
expectation that a Big 4 Auditor charges higher fees does show up somewhat in the 
correlation between ln(Audit Fees) and Big 4 Auditor (0.40).  Finally, again providing 
support for the discussion centered around REIT complexity, ln(Audit Fees) are 
significantly correlated with ln(Properties) and ln(Subsidiaries) at (0.51 and 0.55, 




Table 9.  Descriptive Statistics - Dependent & Independent Variables. 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. 25th Median 75th 
Equity Investment ($,000,000s) 980 132.923 311.653 1.139 31.645 158.333 
ln(Equity Investment) 840 3.399 2.395 1.878 4.058 5.246 
Debt Investment ($,000,000s) 973 2513.338 4960.427 468.072 1286.987 2650.700 
ln(Debt Investment) 969 6.882 1.584 6.161 7.171 7.886 
Equity & Debt Investment ($,000,000s) 973 2647.033 5155.188 507.282 1390.827 2816.782 
ln(Equity & Debt Investment) 969 6.970 1.553 6.252 7.239 7.945 
Audit Fees ($,000s) 980 911.516 986.854 342.591 673.500 1072.150 
ln(Audit Fees) 980 13.290 0.961 12.744 13.420 13.885 
Specialist 980 0.334 0.472 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Big 4 Auditor 980 0.924 0.264 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Bid-Ask Spread 953 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.003 0.005 
Intangible Assets ($,000,000s) 932 54.647 248.033 0.000 0.000 15.721 
ln(Intangible Assets) 409 3.123 1.926 1.906 3.121 4.478 
Book-Market 980 0.577 2.154 0.349 0.516 0.732 
ROA 980 0.026 0.056 0.011 0.025 0.045 
Leverage 980 0.605 0.193 0.502 0.595 0.707 
Initial 980 0.190 0.392 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other Fees ($,000s) 980 430.075 885.781 47.815 159.997 392.591 
ln(Other Fees) 980 11.932 1.538 11.135 11.983 12.881 
Properties 980 245.363 364.864 33.000 112.500 273.000 
ln(Properties) 860 4.863 1.360 4.078 4.931 5.740 
Subsidiaries 980 135.695 281.810 14.000 45.000 146.000 
ln(Subsidiaries) 945 3.886 1.525 2.773 3.871 5.004 
Foreign 980 0.020 0.141 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Extra/Disc 980 0.532 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Notes:  The table above presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis (except for 
REIT-type and Year Dummies).  REIT-type distributions and selected financial data for the REITs in the 
sample presented in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. 
 




FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11
Debt 396 460 630 666 883 1875 1331 1034 1039 1242


























Table 10.  Correlations. 
 
# Variable Name 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 ln(Equity) 1.00 
                
2 ln(Debt) 0.42* 1.00 
               
3 ln(Equity&Debt) 0.48* 0.99* 1.00 
              
4 ln(Audit Fees) 0.30* 0.68* 0.70* 1.00 
             
5 Specialist 0.18* 0.19* 0.20* 0.15* 1.00 
            
6 Big 4 Auditor 0.10* 0.40* 0.40* 0.40* 0.20* 1.00 
           
7 Bid-Ask Spread -0.23* -0.38* -0.40* -0.43* -0.11* -0.40* 1.00 
          
8 Intangible Assets 0.07* -0.02 -0.02 0.16* 0.04 -0.11* 0.07* 1.00 
         
9 Book/Market -0.03 -0.11* 0.11* 0.11* -0.09* -0.11* 0.10* 0.05 1.00 
        
10 ROA -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.02 -0.05 0.05 0.05 0.01 1.00 
       
11 Leverage -0.04 0.53* 0.49* 0.20* 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.26* -0.13 1.00 
      
12 Initial -0.04 -0.13* -0.14* 0.20* -0.07 -0.19* 0.11* 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 1.00 
     
13 ln(Other Fees) 0.13* 0.40* 0.40* 0.48* -0.00 0.25* -0.16* 0.11 -0.05 0.01 0.11* -0.07* 1.00 
    
14 ln(Properties) 0.29* 0.59* 0.60* 0.51* 0.28* 0.39* -0.43* 0.04 0.18* 0.06 -0.79* -0.19* 0.27* 1.00 
   
15 ln(Subsidiaries) 0.26* 0.45* 0.46* 0.55* 0.00 0.25* 0.23* 0.18* -0.03 0.04 0.06 -0.18* 0.34* 0.42* 1.00 
  
16 Foreign 0.69 0.10 0.10 0.25* 0.05 0.04 -0.07 0.51* -0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.04 0.14* 0.09* 0.15* 1.00 
 
17 Extra/Disc 0.04 0.15* 0.15* 0.20* -0.03 0.17* -0.15* 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.15* -0.04 0.18* 0.30 0.20 -0.02 1.00 






respectively).  Even though some relatively high correlations between variables exist, as 
Variance Inflation Factor tests result in factors less than 5.0 for all variables, 
multicollinearity does not threaten the results (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010).  
 
Results of Hypotheses Testing 
In the initial empirical analysis, I test Hypotheses 1-3.  I expect to find a positive 
relationship between the Audit Construct and equity, debt, and combined equity and debt 
capital investment in REITs, respectively.  Positive and significant coefficients for 
individual Audit Construct components would indicate support for the hypotheses with 
respect to each component.  In the extended empirical analysis, I test Hypotheses 4-6.  I 
expect to find that capital investment is lower for all REITs after the financial crisis 
because of the significant drop in financial markets activity after the crisis.  Negative and 
significant coefficients for the financial crisis dummy would confirm this expectation.  I 
also expect to find that after the crisis, REITs that utilize the Audit Construct would 
experience greater equity, debt, and combined equity and debt capital investment than 
REITs that did not utilize the Audit Construct.  Positive and significant coefficients for 
the interaction terms will confirm these expectations, and allow interpretation of the main 
effects of the individual Audit Construct components. 
 
Hypothesis 1-3 Results 
Table 11 shows the results for testing Hypothesis 1 that there is a positive 
association between the Audit Construct and equity investment in REITs.  In Models 1a, 






Table 11.  Results of OLS Regression testing the expectation of a positive association between the Audit Construct and equity 
investment in REITs. 
 
  Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 1d 
  Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error 
ln(Audit Fees) 0.569*** 0.152         0.442*** 0.159 
Specialist     0.752*** 0.180     0.624*** 0.185 
Big 4 Auditor         0.803* 0.480 0.399 0.506 
Bid-Ask Spread -115.050*** 41.102 -120.156*** 40.466 -118.873*** 42.257 -116.644*** 39.896 
Intangible-Assets -6.537* 3.607 -6.903* 3.658 -6.323* 3.643 -7.039* 3.602 
Book-Market Ratio -0.297 0.283 -0.347 0.276 -0.376 0.278 -0.244 0.278 
ROA -0.467 1.216 -0.778 1.242 -0.718 1.189 -0.459 1.238 
Leverage -1.247* 0.725 -1.043 0.719 -1.229* 0.745 -1.280* 0.719 
Initial 0.026 0.243 -0.012 0.240 0.056 0.243 -0.004 0.241 
ln(Non-Audit Fees) -0.016 0.059 0.044 0.057 0.048 0.058 -0.006 0.058 
ln(Properties) 0.367*** 0.085 0.404*** 0.084 0.463*** 0.084 0.324*** 0.086 
ln(Subsidiaries) 0.121 0.079 0.234*** 0.075 0.188** 0.074 0.173** 0.080 
Foreign -0.047 0.405 0.266 0.392 0.418 0.384 -0.042 0.402 
Extra/Disc 0.144 0.180 0.199 0.179 0.154 0.180 0.176 0.178 
Multifamily 0.064 0.610 0.900 0.611 0.661 0.614 0.435 0.617 
Manufacturing -0.837 0.675 -0.333 0.695 -0.464 0.738 -0.325 0.714 
Healthcare 0.594 0.607 1.115* 0.612 0.997 0.622 0.777 0.606 
Shopping Center -0.004 0.603 0.952 0.618 0.549 0.613 0.565 0.618 
Freestanding -1.007 0.718 -0.186 0.730 -0.812 0.742 -0.438 0.722 
Regional Mall 0.196 0.727 1.378* 0.737 0.883 0.730 0.795 0.747 
Lodging/Resort 1.013 0.635 1.994*** 0.648 1.571** 0.648 1.491** 0.648 
Diversified 0.100 0.625 1.092* 0.632 0.666 0.627 0.597 0.644 
Office 0.599 0.623 1.580** 0.629 1.250** 0.626 1.023 0.638 
Industrial 0.047 0.662 1.310* 0.684 0.618 0.670 0.763 0.691 
Office/Indust -0.528 0.676 0.513 0.686 0.038 0.679 0.041 0.683 
Constant -4.545*** 1.742 -0.036 1.045 -0.245 1.097 -4.140** 1.748 
Number of Obs. 661 661 661 661 




F 9.863 9.507 9.357 9.460 
Adjusted R2 0.245 0.247 0.233 0.256 
Notes:  In each of the four models presented, the dependent variable is equity investment, with the model variation being the respective inclusion or exclusion of 
ln(Audit Fees), Specialist, and Big 4 Auditor, as indicated in bold-faced type in the table. ln(Audit Fees), Specialist, and Big 4 Auditor are variables comprising 
the Audit Construct. Bid-Ask Spread is an often used measure to capture transparency. Intangible Assets is used to capture firm's level of information asymmetry 
or opacity. Book/Market, ROA, and Leverage are used to capture individual REIT firm characteristics. Initial and ln(Other Fees) are used to capture individual 
REIT-auditor relationships. ln(Properties), ln(Subsidiaries), Foreign, and Extra/Disc are used to capture firm complexity. Year dummies are used but are not 






(ln(Audit Fees), β = 0.569; Specialist, β = 0.752; and, Big 4 Auditor, β = 0.803, 
respectively), while in Model 1d, the coefficients for ln(Audit Fees) and Specialist are 
positive and significant (β = 0.442 and β = 0.624, respectively).  These results provide 
partial support for the hypothesis, suggesting that investors view REITs that either pay 
higher audit fees or engage audit specialists, as more transparent, and are willing to 
provide equity investment.  
Table 12 shows the results for testing Hypothesis 2 that there is a positive 
association between the Audit Construct and debt investment in REITs.  Results mirror 
those from Hypothesis 1 testing showing partial support for the hypothesis.  In Models 
2a, 2b, and 2c, the coefficients for the Audit Construct components are positive and 
significant (ln(Audit Fees), β = 0.564; Specialist, β = 0.344; and, Big 4 Auditor, β = 
0.466, respectively), while in Model 2d, only the coefficients for ln(Audit Fees) and 
Specialist are positive and significant (β = 0.519 and β = 0.199, respectively).  As in 
Hypothesis 1 testing, these results suggest that investors are willing to invest in REIT 
debt when REITs increase their transparency as captured by higher audit fees or hiring 
audit specialists.  
Table 13 shows the results of testing Hypothesis 3 that there exists a positive 
association between the Audit Construct and combined equity and debt investment in 
REITs.  In Models 3a, 3b, and 3c, the coefficients for ln(Audit Fees), Specialist, and Big 
4 Auditor are all positive and significant (β = 0.571, β = 0.368, and β = 0.581, 
respectively); likewise, in Model 3d, all Audit Construct component coefficients are 
positive and significant (β = 0.513, β = 0.217, and β = 0.237, respectively).  These results 






Table 12.  Results of OLS Regression testing the expectation of a positive association between the Audit Construct and debt 
investment in REITs. 
 
  Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c Model 2d 
  Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error 
ln(Audit Fees) 0.564*** 0.048         0.519*** 0.049 
Specialist     0.344*** 0.066     0.199*** 0.061 
Big 4 Auditor         0.466*** 0.104 0.123 0.106 
Bid-Ask Spread -39.507*** 6.993 -52.014*** 7.591 -44.725*** 7.692 -37.868*** 7.098 
Intangible-Assets -6.672*** 0.731 -7.202*** 0.867 -6.536*** 0.838 -6.711*** 0.763 
Book-Market Ratio 0.147*** 0.051 0.107** 0.043 0.111*** 0.042 0.153*** 0.049 
ROA 0.691* 0.382 0.326 0.438 0.410 0.391 0.681* 0.394 
Leverage 3.227*** 0.273 3.478*** 0.292 3.359*** 0.303 3.211*** 0.283 
Initial 0.077 0.066 0.045 0.068 0.077 0.067 0.076 0.065 
ln(Non-Audit Fees) 0.058*** 0.016 0.133*** 0.018 0.132*** 0.017 0.060*** 0.016 
ln(Properties) 0.334*** 0.032 0.409*** 0.034 0.433*** 0.033 0.318*** 0.032 
ln(Subsidiaries) 0.110*** 0.021 0.201*** 0.023 0.173*** 0.022 0.128*** 0.023 
Foreign 0.455*** 0.139 0.922*** 0.178 0.967*** 0.166 0.451*** 0.145 
Extra/Disc 0.186*** 0.055 0.247*** 0.058 0.205*** 0.059 0.201*** 0.055 
Multifamily 0.216 0.134 0.891*** 0.120 0.804*** 0.124 0.344*** 0.133 
Manufacturing -0.304** 0.144 0.009 0.160 -0.064 0.170 -0.146 0.146 
Healthcare 0.093 0.131 0.539*** 0.119 0.497*** 0.119 0.142 0.129 
Shopping Center 0.154 0.119 0.813*** 0.107 0.662*** 0.108 0.325*** 0.122 
Freestanding -0.174 0.216 0.353* 0.210 0.073 0.221 0.006 0.208 
Regional Mall 0.598*** 0.172 1.459*** 0.165 1.276*** 0.175 0.772*** 0.168 
Lodging/Resort 0.088 0.161 0.816*** 0.151 0.638*** 0.161 0.237 0.154 
Diversified 0.228* 0.138 0.905*** 0.131 0.743*** 0.134 0.379*** 0.139 
Office 0.658*** 0.130 1.428*** 0.119 1.282*** 0.122 0.793*** 0.127 
Industrial 0.166 0.142 1.006*** 0.144 0.706*** 0.139 0.399*** 0.146 
Office/Indust 0.368*** 0.122 1.118*** 0.130 0.924*** 0.115 0.558*** 0.138 
Constant -5.286*** 0.501 -0.686** 0.287 -0.878*** 0.289 -5.091*** 0.501 
Number of Obs. 761 761 761 761 




F 104.621 93.544 104.057 106.361 
Adjusted R2 0.816 0.785 0.781 0.818 
Notes:  In each of the four models presented, the dependent variable is debt investment, with the model variation being the respective inclusion or exclusion of 
ln(Audit Fees), Specialist, and Big 4 Auditor, as indicated in bold-faced type in the table. ln(Audit Fees), Specialist, and Big 4 Auditor are variables comprising 
the Audit Construct. Bid-Ask Spread is an often used measure to capture transparency. Intangible Assets is used to capture firm's level of information asymmetry 
or opacity. Book/Market, ROA, and Leverage are used to capture individual REIT firm characteristics. Initial and ln(Other Fees) are used to capture individual 
REIT-auditor relationships. ln(Properties), ln(Subsidiaries), Foreign, and Extra/Disc are used to capture firm complexity. Year dummies are used but are not 
reported.  All regressions use robust estimations. Statistical significance indicated as: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, respectively. 
 
Table 13.  Results of OLS Regression testing the expectation of a positive association between the Audit Construct and 
combined equity and debt investment in REITs. 
 
  Model 3a Model 3b Model 3c Model 3d 
  Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error 
ln(Audit Fees) 0.571*** 0.047         0.513*** 0.048 
Specialist     0.368*** 0.066     0.217*** 0.061 
Big 4 Auditor         0.581*** 0.102 0.237** 0.103 
Bid-Ask Spread -41.043*** 6.843 -53.648*** 7.495 -44.390*** 7.460 -37.658*** 6.822 
Intangible-Assets -6.507*** 0.703 -7.055*** 0.855 -6.265*** 0.807 -6.456*** 0.723 
Book-Market Ratio 0.112** 0.046 0.072* 0.041 0.079** 0.040 0.121*** 0.043 
ROA 0.360 0.406 -0.009 0.476 0.095 0.403 0.362 0.422 
Leverage 2.612*** 0.260 2.865*** 0.279 2.717*** 0.290 2.572*** 0.268 
Initial 0.051 0.066 0.018 0.068 0.055 0.067 0.053 0.065 
ln(Non-Audit Fees) 0.062*** 0.016 0.138*** 0.017 0.136*** 0.017 0.065*** 0.016 
ln(Properties) 0.316*** 0.031 0.389*** 0.034 0.413*** 0.033 0.298*** 0.032 
ln(Subsidiaries) 0.119*** 0.021 0.213*** 0.023 0.181*** 0.022 0.138*** 0.023 
Foreign 0.354*** 0.130 0.823*** 0.167 0.867*** 0.154 0.354*** 0.135 
Extra/Disc 0.155*** 0.053 0.217*** 0.057 0.171*** 0.058 0.168*** 0.054 
Multifamily 0.243* 0.136 0.933*** 0.128 0.848*** 0.131 0.400*** 0.135 
Manufacturing -0.208 0.146 0.119 0.168 0.065 0.174 -0.006 0.146 
Healthcare 0.131 0.139 0.584*** 0.132 0.537*** 0.133 0.189 0.137 
Shopping Center 0.182 0.123 0.861*** 0.117 0.709*** 0.117 0.389*** 0.125 




Freestanding -0.108 0.223 0.441** 0.220 0.141 0.231 0.091 0.215 
Regional Mall 0.667*** 0.174 1.550*** 0.169 1.358*** 0.179 0.872*** 0.169 
Lodging/Resort 0.159 0.159 0.907*** 0.154 0.717*** 0.163 0.332** 0.153 
Diversified 0.243* 0.139 0.938*** 0.137 0.769*** 0.139 0.420*** 0.141 
Office 0.680*** 0.133 1.467*** 0.126 1.312*** 0.128 0.838*** 0.130 
Industrial 0.209 0.140 1.077*** 0.146 0.760*** 0.140 0.475*** 0.144 
Office/Indust 0.493*** 0.112 1.266*** 0.125 1.066*** 0.106 0.718*** 0.127 
Constant -4.921*** 0.500 -0.274 0.286 -0.541* 0.287 -4.704*** 0.497 
Number of Obs. 761 761 761 761 
F 103.133 87.458 105.158 108.215 
Adjusted R2 0.813 0.782 0.778 0.818 
Notes:  In each of the four models presented, the dependent variable is combined equity and debt investment, with the model variation being the respective 
inclusion or exclusion of ln(Audit Fees), Specialist, and Big 4 Auditor, as indicated in bold-faced type in the table. ln(Audit Fees), Specialist, and Big 4 Auditor 
are variables comprising the Audit Construct. Bid-Ask Spread is an often used measure to capture transparency. Intangible Assets is used to capture firm's level of 
information asymmetry or opacity. Book/Market, ROA, and Leverage are used to capture individual REIT firm characteristics. Initial and ln(Other Fees) are used 
to capture individual REIT-auditor relationships. ln(Properties), ln(Subsidiaries), Foreign, and Extra/Disc are used to capture firm complexity. Year dummies 







audits, hire REIT industry-audit specialists, and/or hire auditors with a higher quality 
reputation, as more transparent, and are thus willing to invest in their equity and debt 
offerings.  
 
Hypotheses 4-6 Results 
 As I state earlier, the financial crisis caused major disruptions in the capital 
markets, resulting in capital flight, and conditions of severe illiquidity.  Therefore, I 
expect there was less equity investment for all REITs.  However, more importantly then 
is: How did REITs that needed to raise capital differentiate themselves from others 
seeking capital under such restricted market conditions?  Table 14 shows the results for 
testing Hypothesis 4.  As shown in Model 4a, the Crisis dummy coefficient is negative 
and significant (β = -5.978), confirming the expectation that equity capital investment 
was less for all REITs after the crisis.  However, the interaction term Crisis*ln(Audit 
Fees) coefficient is positive and significant (β = 0.405).  This suggests that audit fees had 
a larger impact on equity investment in REITs in the post-crisis period than before the 
financial crisis.
10
  There is no statistical significance for the interactive terms for 
Crisis*Specialist and Crisis*Big.  These results suggest that after accounting for the 
effects of the downturn in the financial markets caused by severe exogenous shocks, there 
is partial support for Hypothesis 4 with respect to the auditor quality component of the 
Audit Construct. 
                                                 
10
 After controlling for the interactive effect of the financial crisis, the slope parameter for ln(Audit Fees) is 
0.856 (derived from the addition of the coefficients for ln(Audit Fees) (β = 0.451) and Crisis*ln(Audit 






Table 14.  Results of OLS Regression testing the expectation that the financial crisis of 2007-2008 positively influenced the 
relationship between the Audit Construct and equity investment in REITs. 
 
  Model 4a Model 4b Model 4c Model 4d 
  Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error 
Crisis -5.978** 3.021 0.047 0.489 -0.753 0.923 -5.755* 3.036 
Crisis*ln(Audit Fees) 0.405* 0.220         0.348 0.234 
ln(Audit Fees) 0.451*** 0.162         0.355** 0.171 
Crisis*Specialist     -0.064 0.322     -0.220 0.320 
Specialist     0.779*** 0.218     0.713*** 0.224 
Crisis*Big 4 Auditor         0.877 0.823 0.730 0.923 
Big 4 Auditor         0.306 0.555 -0.056 0.603 
Bid-Ask Spread -116.057*** 40.583 -120.441*** 40.547 -119.410*** 42.417 -118.842*** 39.657 
Intangible-Assets -6.749* 3.754 -6.839* 3.642 -6.396* 3.652 -7.064* 3.697 
Book-Market Ratio -0.297 0.278 -0.351 0.277 -0.380 0.278 -0.259 0.274 
ROA -0.667 1.212 -0.767 1.243 -0.721 1.187 -0.590 1.234 
Leverage -1.250* 0.720 -1.053 0.721 -1.237* 0.747 -1.320* 0.718 
Initial 0.025 0.242 -0.015 0.240 0.057 0.244 -0.015 0.240 
ln(Non-Audit Fees) -0.018 0.059 0.044 0.057 0.052 0.059 -0.008 0.058 
ln(Properties) 0.368*** 0.085 0.403*** 0.084 0.465*** 0.084 0.320*** 0.086 
ln(Subsidiaries) 0.117 0.078 0.234*** 0.075 0.188** 0.074 0.170** 0.079 
Foreign -0.115 0.418 0.265 0.392 0.429 0.385 -0.107 0.415 
Extra/Disc 0.134 0.179 0.200 0.180 0.147 0.180 0.165 0.178 
Multifamily 0.031 0.576 0.899 0.608 0.659 0.617 0.384 0.580 
Manufacturing -0.841 0.651 -0.333 0.693 -0.455 0.740 -0.341 0.689 
Healthcare 0.533 0.574 1.111* 0.608 1.003 0.625 0.706 0.568 
Shopping Center -0.032 0.569 0.950 0.616 0.571 0.617 0.534 0.583 
Freestanding -1.054 0.694 -0.183 0.729 -0.807 0.745 -0.475 0.695 
Regional Mall 0.172 0.700 1.376* 0.734 0.886 0.733 0.750 0.718 
Lodging/Resort 0.951 0.602 1.989*** 0.645 1.564** 0.651 1.399** 0.613 
Diversified 0.065 0.592 1.090* 0.629 0.664 0.631 0.542 0.608 
Office 0.558 0.590 1.580** 0.626 1.259** 0.629 0.975 0.603 




Industrial 0.021 0.631 1.309* 0.682 0.620 0.673 0.723 0.658 
Office/Indust -0.564 0.642 0.512 0.683 0.053 0.681 0.000 0.646 
Constant -2.979 1.891 -0.020 1.040 0.185 1.123 -2.474 1.870 
Number of Obs. 661 661 661 661 
F 9.753 9.216 9.138 8.887 
Adjusted R2 0.247 0.246 0.233 0.257 
Notes:  In Model 1, Crisis and Crisis*ln(Audit Fees) are added to examine the impact of audit fees on post-crisis equity investment. In Model 2, Crisis and 
Crisis*Specialist are added to examine the impact of auditor specialization on post-crisis equity investment.  In Model 3, Crisis and Crisis*Big 4 Auditor are 
added to examine the impact of auditor reputation on post-crisis equity investment.  In Model 4, Crisis and all three interaction terms are included to examine the 
impact of the Audit Construct on post-crisis equity investment.  Bid-Ask Spread is an often used measure to capture transparency. Intangible Assets is used to 
capture firm's level of information asymmetry or opacity. Book/Market, ROA, and Leverage are used to capture individual REIT firm characteristics. Initial and 
ln(Non-Audit Fees) are used to capture individual REIT-auditor relationships. ln(Properties), ln(Subsidiaries), Foreign, and Extra/Disc are used to capture firm 
complexity.  Year dummies are used but are not reported.  All regressions use robust estimations. Statistical significance indicated as: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** 








Table 15 shows the results for testing Hypothesis 5.  As shown in Model 5a, the 
Crisis dummy coefficient is negative and significant (β = -1.709); however, the Crisis 
dummy coefficients are positive and significant in Models 5b and 5c, yet insignificant in 
Model 5d.  The interaction terms are insignificant in all models.  Although a definitive 
conclusion is not possible, conceivably it is possible that REITs that could not raise 
equity capital after the crisis, and were able to shift to debt, were those that could not pay 
higher fees to obtain higher quality audits.  However, they could still engage an industry-
audit specialist and/or a Big 4 auditor (the other two attributes used to signal 
transparency).  If so, perhaps the debt was more in the form of collateralized bank loans; 
transparency would therefore be less important as banks would most likely rely more 
heavily on the values of underlying REIT assets.  This may suggest that the type of 
security issue (debt, in this case) in combination with certain audit attributes jointly serve 
to signal financial transparency.  
Table 16 shows the results for testing Hypothesis 6.  As shown in Model 6a, the 
Crisis dummy coefficient is negative and significant (β = -1.709), again providing 
confirmation that, as expected, there was less overall capital investment for all REITs 
after the crisis.  The Crisis*ln(Audit Fees) interaction term coefficient is positive and 
significant (β = 0.113).  Similar to the results from testing Hypothesis 4, this suggests that 
audit fees had a larger impact on combined equity and debt investment in REITs after the 
crisis than before it.
11
  There is no statistical significance for the interactive terms for 
Crisis*Specialist and Crisis*Big.  Therefore, the conclusion is that there is partial support 
for Hypothesis 6 with respect to the auditor quality component of the Audit Construct.
                                                 
11
 After controlling for the interactive effect of the financial crisis, the slope parameter for ln(Audit Fees) is 
0.657 (derived from the addition of the coefficients for ln(Audit Fees) (β = 0.544) and Crisis*ln(Audit 






Table 15.  Results of OLS Regression testing the expectation that the financial crisis of 2007-2008 positively influenced the 
relationship between the Audit Construct and debt investment in REITs. 
 
  Model 5a Model 5b Model 5c Model 5d 
  Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error 
Crisis -1.533* 0.905 0.288** 0.136 0.542** 0.212 -1.535 0.987 
Crisis*ln(Audit Fees) 0.099 0.065         0.112 0.078 
ln(Audit Fees) 0.540*** 0.048         0.491*** 0.051 
Crisis*Specialist     0.065 0.109     0.036 0.101 
Specialist     0.317*** 0.074     0.185*** 0.070 
Crisis*Big 4 Auditor         -0.140 0.168 -0.133 0.206 
Big 4 Auditor         0.535*** 0.125 0.172 0.140 
Bid-Ask Spread -38.132*** 6.909 -51.883*** 7.594 -45.004*** 7.509 -36.847*** 7.014 
Intangible-Assets -6.658*** 0.748 -7.226*** 0.868 -6.507*** 0.833 -6.699*** 0.779 
Book-Market Ratio 0.157*** 0.052 0.109** 0.044 0.106** 0.044 0.160*** 0.051 
ROA 0.629* 0.379 0.312 0.438 0.418 0.393 0.607 0.391 
Leverage 3.218*** 0.274 3.486*** 0.291 3.363*** 0.304 3.215*** 0.285 
Initial 0.068 0.067 0.048 0.068 0.082 0.067 0.071 0.066 
ln(Non-Audit Fees) 0.057*** 0.016 0.133*** 0.018 0.131*** 0.017 0.058*** 0.017 
ln(Properties) 0.332*** 0.032 0.409*** 0.034 0.433*** 0.033 0.317*** 0.033 
ln(Subsidiaries) 0.109*** 0.021 0.201*** 0.023 0.173*** 0.022 0.127*** 0.023 
Foreign 0.448*** 0.138 0.922*** 0.180 0.957*** 0.167 0.438*** 0.144 
Extra/Disc 0.186*** 0.054 0.246*** 0.058 0.206*** 0.059 0.202*** 0.055 
Multifamily 0.204 0.129 0.891*** 0.123 0.802*** 0.124 0.329** 0.128 
Manufacturing -0.303** 0.138 0.008 0.162 -0.071 0.171 -0.155 0.141 
Healthcare 0.074 0.128 0.542*** 0.123 0.494*** 0.118 0.122 0.127 
Shopping Center 0.141 0.114 0.814*** 0.110 0.656*** 0.108 0.307*** 0.118 
Freestanding -0.180 0.213 0.352* 0.212 0.071 0.221 -0.001 0.206 
Regional Mall 0.582*** 0.168 1.458*** 0.167 1.272*** 0.175 0.753*** 0.164 
Lodging/Resort 0.063 0.158 0.818*** 0.154 0.641*** 0.160 0.216 0.152 
Diversified 0.211 0.134 0.905*** 0.134 0.743*** 0.133 0.362*** 0.135 
Office 0.639*** 0.126 1.427*** 0.122 1.280*** 0.121 0.772*** 0.123 




Industrial 0.154 0.138 1.006*** 0.147 0.705*** 0.138 0.386*** 0.142 
Office/Indust 0.356*** 0.117 1.120*** 0.133 0.919*** 0.115 0.541*** 0.133 
Constant -4.960*** 0.541 -0.695** 0.288 -0.928*** 0.295 -4.745*** 0.543 
Number of Obs. 761 761 761 761 
F 103.098 90.004 113.609 104.346 
Adjusted R2 0.816 0.785 0.780 0.819 
Notes:  In Model 1, Crisis and Crisis*ln(Audit Fees) are added to examine the impact of audit fees on post-crisis equity investment. In Model 2, Crisis and 
Crisis*Specialist are added to examine the impact of auditor specialization on post-crisis equity investment.  In Model 3, Crisis and Crisis*Big 4 Auditor are 
added to examine the impact of auditor reputation on post-crisis equity investment.  In Model 4, Crisis and all three interaction terms are included to examine the 
impact of the Audit Construct on post-crisis debt investment.  Bid-Ask Spread is an often used measure to capture transparency. Intangible Assets is used to 
capture firm's level of information asymmetry or opacity. Book/Market, ROA, and Leverage are used to capture individual REIT firm characteristics. Initial and 
ln(Non-Audit Fees) are used to capture individual REIT-auditor relationships. ln(Properties), ln(Subsidiaries), Foreign, and Extra/Disc are used to capture firm 
complexity. Year dummies are used but are not reported.  All regressions use robust estimations. Statistical significance indicated as: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** 
p < 0.001, respectively. 
 
Table 16.  Results of OLS Regression testing the expectation that the financial crisis of 2007-2008 positively influenced the 
relationship between the Audit Construct and combined equity and debt investment in REITs. 
 
  Model 6a Model 6b Model 6c Model 6d 
  Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error 
Crisis -1.709* 0.886 0.312** 0.132 0.570*** 0.203 -1.678* 0.970 
Crisis * ln(Audit Fees) 0.113* 0.064         0.127 0.077 
ln(Audit Fees) 0.544*** 0.048         0.480*** 0.050 
Crisis * Specialist     0.026 0.107     -0.013 0.099 
Specialist     0.357*** 0.073     0.224*** 0.069 
Crisis * Big 4 Auditor         -0.131 0.160 -0.132 0.198 
Big 4 Auditor         0.646*** 0.123 0.287** 0.139 
Bid-Ask Spread -39.477*** 6.773 -53.596*** 7.487 -44.651*** 7.292 -36.519*** 6.734 
Intangible-Assets -6.491*** 0.730 -7.065*** 0.854 -6.238*** 0.802 -6.424*** 0.742 
Book-Market Ratio 0.123*** 0.047 0.073* 0.041 0.074* 0.041 0.128*** 0.045 
ROA 0.290 0.401 -0.015 0.477 0.103 0.404 0.288 0.418 
Leverage 2.602*** 0.260 2.869*** 0.279 2.720*** 0.290 2.568*** 0.269 




Initial 0.040 0.067 0.019 0.069 0.060 0.067 0.045 0.066 
ln(Non-Audit Fees) 0.061*** 0.016 0.138*** 0.017 0.135*** 0.017 0.063*** 0.016 
ln(Properties) 0.314*** 0.032 0.390*** 0.034 0.413*** 0.033 0.296*** 0.032 
ln(Subsidiaries) 0.118*** 0.021 0.213*** 0.023 0.182*** 0.022 0.137*** 0.022 
Foreign 0.347*** 0.129 0.823*** 0.167 0.858*** 0.155 0.340** 0.134 
Extra/Disc 0.155*** 0.053 0.217*** 0.057 0.171*** 0.058 0.170*** 0.054 
Multifamily 0.229* 0.130 0.933*** 0.129 0.846*** 0.130 0.384*** 0.128 
Manufacturing -0.207 0.140 0.119 0.168 0.058 0.175 -0.015 0.140 
Healthcare 0.109 0.135 0.585*** 0.134 0.534*** 0.132 0.164 0.133 
Shopping Center 0.167 0.117 0.861*** 0.118 0.704*** 0.117 0.367*** 0.119 
Freestanding -0.115 0.220 0.440** 0.221 0.139 0.231 0.085 0.211 
Regional Mall 0.649*** 0.169 1.549*** 0.170 1.355*** 0.179 0.851*** 0.164 
Lodging/Resort 0.131 0.156 0.907*** 0.155 0.720*** 0.163 0.306** 0.149 
Diversified 0.224* 0.134 0.938*** 0.138 0.770*** 0.138 0.401*** 0.135 
Office 0.658*** 0.128 1.467*** 0.128 1.310*** 0.128 0.814*** 0.124 
Industrial 0.194 0.135 1.077*** 0.148 0.759*** 0.139 0.461*** 0.138 
Office/Indust 0.479*** 0.105 1.266*** 0.126 1.061*** 0.105 0.699*** 0.120 
Constant -4.550*** 0.540 -0.278 0.287 -0.587** 0.291 -4.302*** 0.536 
Number of observations 761 761 761 761 
F 100.962 84.951 115.914 105.920 
Adjusted R2 0.814 0.782 0.778 0.818 
Notes:  In Model 1, Crisis and Crisis*ln(Audit Fees) are added to examine the impact of audit fees on post-crisis equity investment. In Model 2, Crisis and 
Crisis*Specialist are added to examine the impact of auditor specialization on post-crisis equity investment.  In Model 3, Crisis and Crisis*Big 4 Auditor are 
added to examine the impact of auditor reputation on post-crisis equity investment.  In Model 4, Crisis and all three interaction terms are included to examine the 
impact of the Audit Construct on post-crisis combined equity and debt investment.  Bid-Ask Spread is an often used measure to capture transparency. Intangible 
Assets is used to capture firm's level of information asymmetry or opacity. Book/Market, ROA, and Leverage are used to capture individual REIT firm 
characteristics. Initial and ln(Non-Audit Fees) are used to capture individual REIT-auditor relationships. ln(Properties), ln(Subsidiaries), Foreign, and Extra/Disc 
are used to capture firm complexity. Year dummies are used but are not reported.  All regressions use robust estimations. Statistical significance indicated as: * p 






Many of the control variables provide interesting results.  For example, Bid-Ask 
Spread, one of the variables used to capture transparency, is also negative and significant 
in all models.  Similarly, Intangible Assets, used to control for information 
asymmetry/opacity, is negative and significant in all models.  This suggests that when 
REIT investors view REITs as less transparent (higher bid-ask spreads), or when they 
perceive higher levels of information asymmetry (higher levels of intangible assets), they 
are less inclined to invest in REITs.  The number of properties owned by REITs and/or 
their subsidiaries contributes to their demand for capital investment.  To control for this, I 
use the variable ln(Properties).  In all models, the coefficients for ln(Properties) are 
positive and significant, revealing a positive relationship between the number of 
properties owned and REIT capital investment.  This finding is not altogether surprising.  
REITs have to distribute the bulk of their available cash as dividends.  This means that to 
acquire additional properties, they need new capital.  The more properties REITs acquire, 
the more they need additional capital, magnifying the importance of lowering information 
asymmetries and increasing transparency.  Therefore, finding means of doing so takes on 
added importance.   
The literature indicates that when firms signal investors about their increased 
financial information transparency, they increase their chances of motivating capital 
investment.  Results from the initial empirical analysis show a positive association 
between the Audit Construct components and increased capital investment.  In the 
extended empirical analysis, after controlling for the effects of the financial crisis, the 
results support the auditor quality component of the Audit Construct by showing that 








 Part of the analysis in this study is the comparison of relationships between using 
the Audit Construct to increase transparency, and REITs‘ access to capital in the post-
crisis period to the pre-crisis period.  Since the authorization of REITs in 1960, there 
have been six economic recessions in the United States prior to the financial crisis of 
2007-2008.
12
  To the extent that data are available, as this study includes data from a 
single post-recession period, it may be of interest to include other such recessionary 
periods in future tests of the Audit Construct in relation to increasing transparency as a 
means to motivate capital investment to see if the outcomes are similar. 
 
Section VII.  Concluding Remarks 
Because REITs must distribute a minimum of 90% of their net income as 
dividends, they frequently access capital markets to raise cash necessary for operations or 
new investments.  Existing research indicates that firms use aspects of the audit process 
as a means of conveying information to investors, often in attempts to signal their 
increased financial information transparency.  In this paper, I examine how REITs use the 
audit-related attributes of auditor quality, specialization, and reputation to signal or 
convey financial information transparency to potential investors in order to motivate 
capital investment.  I first analyze the relation between audit attributes and REIT equity, 
                                                 
12
 Data obtained from ECR Research available at http://www.ecrresearch.com/world-economy/table-us-
recessions. 




debt, and combined equity and debt capital investment.  I further analyze this relationship 
by taking into account the 2007-2008 financial crisis to investigate whether the use of 
these attributes has a stronger impact on capital issuance after the crisis.   
Extant research shows that when firms signal their increased financial information 
transparency to investors, they improve their abilities to attract new capital investment.  
Results from this study show a positive relationship between audit attributes as a means 
of increasing transparency, and capital investment in REITs.  Using auditing fees, and 
controlling for the effects of the financial crisis, the results suggest that transparency 
related to auditor quality is more important after the financial crisis than before it.  
However, there was no support for the use of the other two audit attributes of auditor 
specialization or auditor reputation as means to increase transparency, and the reader 
should therefore use caution with respect to this interpretation.  A possible explanation 
for the lack of support for the other two auditing attributes may be that REITs in the 
sample most likely already have a specialized auditor or one from the Big 4.  As such, it 
is unlikely that the status of either auditor specialization or auditor reputation would 
change significantly after the financial crisis.  Therefore, any substantial impact on 
capital investment during the post-crisis period is due primarily to the auditor quality 
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MOTIVATING REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT: 
BUYER AND AGENT SALES INCENTIVES 
 
Abstract 
Challenging real estate market conditions present highly motivated sellers with a difficult 
trade-off between lowering list price, and offering sales incentives to attract buyers.  
Research suggests that under-pricing may not prove effective, while empirical 
investigations of seller-paid sales incentives have yielded mixed results.  This study 
extends the literature by investigating seller-paid incentives offered to buyers, buyers‘ 
agents, and/or both.  I find a positive association between: (1) the likelihood of sellers 
offering buyer sales incentives and higher real estate asset bid-ask spread; (2) the 
likelihood of sellers offering agent sales incentives and highly motivated sellers; (3) 
offering sales incentives and sales price; and (4) offering sales incentives and market 
duration.      
Keywords:  Residential real estate sales; sales incentives; bid-ask spread; coverage; sales 







MOTIVATING REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT:  
BUYER AND AGENT SALES INCENTIVES 
 In the aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial crisis,
13
 millions of Americans faced 
a new, unfamiliar reality: homeowners, who prior to the crisis had enjoyed a strong 
seller‘s market characterized by rising property values and a robust mortgage-lending 
environment, faced a different post-crisis market characterized by falling property values 
and a weak mortgage-lending environment (Baker, 2008).  Many sellers, buyers, and 
agents, accustomed to continuously rising home prices before the crisis, struggled 
afterward to determine fair market values
14
 as sales prices plummeted nationwide.  
Federally-mandated, tightened underwriting requirements added to the market confusion 
(Samuel, 2009), restricting credit and effectively eliminating thousands of potential 
borrowers who most likely would have qualified for a loan prior to the crisis (Udell, 
2009).  To make matters worse, many sellers discovered that because they owed more on 
their mortgages than their homes were worth, selling without incurring a loss was 
unlikely (Cunningham & Reed, 2012).  All of these conditions worked to reduce sales 
prices and increased marketing durations (Lutz, Molloy, & Shan, 2011).   
Under any market condition, a seller‘s property pricing and listing decisions are 
critical to a successful sales outcome.  Fundamental to the pricing decision is how to best 
position a property‘s list price relative to its fair market value.  Also important is whether 
                                                 
13
 The financial crisis began during the summer of 2007 with the implosion of two Bear-Stearns mortgage 
backed securities hedge funds holding nearly $10 billion in assets (Foster, 2008). 
14
 ―Fair market value is the market price established in a market that is characterized by several necessary 
conditions, such as rational, well-informed, and typically motivated buyers and sellers; reasonable time of 
exposure of the product on the market; normal circumstances surrounding financing of the purchase; and 
freedom from undue bargaining power by one of the parties in the transaction‖ (Epley, Rabianski, & 
Haney, 2002, p. 520). 
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to hire a real estate agent to market the property for sale, or to go it alone as a FSBO—for 
sale by owner.  In a cold market, information asymmetries and rapidly falling sales prices 
can make fair market value determinations difficult.  Moreover, as real estate agents 
scramble for the few qualified buyers that do exist, sellers who try the FSBO route can 
find it difficult to compete with the many organized marketing and sales resources 
available only to licensed real estate professionals.  The focus of this study is on sellers, 
who during cold market conditions, list their property for sale with real estate agents and 
offer sales incentives to buyers, buyers‘ agents, and/or both to motivate property sales.
15
    
It seems intuitive that the easiest way for a motivated seller to attract buyers is to 
price her/his property well below comparable ones in the hopes that buyers will consider 
it a bargain.  Yet, existing research shows that setting the initial list price too low impacts 
marketing success as buyers have difficulty interpreting the seller‘s motivations (Anglin, 
Rutherford, & Springer, 2003).  Additionally, buyers often avoid underpriced homes 
because they believe there may be unobservable problems associated with a house that is 
highly underpriced relative to similar available properties (Anglin, et al., 2003).  
The motivated seller can offer sales incentives (often referred to hereafter as 
―incentives‖) to the buyer or the selling agent as a way of sweetening the deal, but 
research in this area is limited.  Studies on buyer incentives focus primarily on seller-
provided closing costs assistance, yet the results are somewhat mixed.
16
  Another study of 
                                                 
15
 This study does not examine incentives offered by listing agents to sellers. 
16
 For example, Johnson, Anderson, & Webb (2000) find full capitalization of closing costs into the sales 
price, yet Asabere & Huffman (1997), Smith & Sirmans (1984), and Zerbst & Brueggeman (1977) find 
only partial capitalization of closing costs when the seller also provides mortgage financing. 
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agent incentives finds that selling agent bonuses do not consistently produce higher sales 
prices or shorter marketing durations (Johnson, Anderson, & Benefield, 2004).   
Not all sellers are alike, as each has different levels of selling motivation.  Highly 
motivated sellers face a trade-off: lowering the price versus offering incentives as a 
means to attract buyers.  It is an especially important question for highly motivated 
sellers trying to sell under any market condition, but even more so when conditions are 
challenging.  Using residential sales transactions data that occurred during the volatile 
post-financial-crisis market, this study seeks to expand three areas that so far have 
received little attention from researchers.  The first examines whether there is a positive 
association between real estate asset bid-ask spreads, and the likelihood of sellers 
offering incentives to buyers.  The second looks at whether highly motivated sellers are 
more likely to offer incentives to buyers‘ agents.  The third investigates whether offering 
incentives to buyers, buyers‘ agents, and/or both is associated with sales prices and/or 
lower marketing durations.    
Capital market illiquidity is often due to information asymmetry (Healy & Palepu, 
2001; Welker, 1995).  For real estate market participants, information asymmetry also 
contributes significantly to illiquidity (Goetzmann & Spiegel, 1995; Schill, 1991).  
Consider that in capital markets, there is a high degree of standardization among financial 
assets.  Unlike capital market assets, however, all real estate assets are uniquely different 
from every other, partly due to differences among each real estate asset‘s individual 
attributes—age, size, number of rooms, type of construction—and partly due to 
differences between parcels of land—no parcel of land is the same as another.  Precisely 
because each real estate asset is different from all others, and because only sellers know 
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what their true motivations are for selling, it is not only critical for sellers to reduce 
property information asymmetries, but in many ways, they must also undertake actions 
that reduce information asymmetries about their individual motivations as well (Springer, 
1996).   
Typically, information asymmetry is a firm level concept.  For example, a firm‘s 
management knows more than the market does about the firm‘s prospects for growth, and 
continued abilities to meet its financial obligations (Healy & Palepu, 2001).  However, 
there are also many examples or areas in finance in which information asymmetry is 
found at the individual level.  For example, a health insurer has no idea if an applicant 
will start smoking after purchasing a policy (Browne, 1992), and a lender cannot be 
certain if a loan applicant intends to repay a loan after borrowing money (Gardner & 
Mills, 1989).   
Information asymmetry is also applicable at the individual level in a real estate 
transaction between a seller and a buyer.  In a declining capital market, investors can 
liquidate their investment positions relatively easily, albeit at a loss; however, the same 
does not hold in declining real estate markets.  In the post-crisis real estate environment, 
the presence of severe information asymmetries made a typically illiquid asset even more 
difficult to sell.  Therefore, finding ways to reduce illiquidity, and thereby increase sale 
probability is crucial for sellers under such market conditions.  One strategy for sellers to 
consider, and one of the propositions investigated in this study, is offering incentives 
directly to buyers.   
Wimmer, Townsend, and Chezum (2000) find that, historically, intermediaries in 
market-based economies have played a crucial role in the function of commerce by 
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matching sellers and buyers with similar risk profiles; indeed, sharing information and 
providing market exposure on behalf of their clients are key aspects of an intermediary‘s 
function.  In capital markets, intermediaries perform multiple services for their clients, 
including collecting and analyzing data, providing strategic guidance and advice, 
analyzing and underwriting investment risk, identifying sources of debt financing or 
directly providing it, and insuring against financial risk (Allen & Gale, 2004).  While the 
obvious role of financial intermediaries is to assist their clients in the pursuit of their 
business, financial intermediaries also help shape and drive the market by sharing 
information, effectively mitigating substantial portions of their clients‘ risks by exposing 
their assets to the broader market (Adrian & Shin, 2010).   
In real estate markets, intermediaries, commonly referred to as real estate agents, 
also perform myriad functions for their clients.  Services include data collection and 
analysis, strategic advice and guidance, risk analysis, valuation, assessment, and 
identification of sources of mortgage financing and insurance (Zumpano, Elder, & 
Baryla, 1996).  Thus, as with their capital market counterparts, real estate market 
intermediaries assist their clients in the pursuit of their business.  They also help shape 
and drive the market through their direct involvement and participation in exposing their 
clients‘ properties to buyers and buyers‘ agents.   
When considering issuing securities, particularly equity, a critical decision facing 
a firm‘s managers is how to best position its stock, in order to maximally expose it to the 
market, and enhance the likelihood of attracting investment.  Because investors know less 
about a firm than its managers do, it can be difficult for them to evaluate the firm 
thoroughly or accurately.  Often, a firm‘s managers will hire an agent, such as an 
   
82 
 
investment banker who employs financial analysts, to assist in overcoming this problem 
(Healy & Palepu, 2001).  After assessing the firm‘s current financial condition, analysts 
formulate sentiments about its future prospects, and issue investment advice expressed in 
terms of recommendations to buy or sell its stock.  This process is also known as 
providing analysts‘ coverage of the firm.  As firms become better known, it is common 
for other analysts to initiate coverage, and provide investment recommendations.  
Increasing coverage reduces information asymmetry (Chang, Dasgupta, & Hilary, 2006), 
and increases the likelihood of investment in the firm. 
 Likewise, when considering selling property, a seller faces a critical decision 
about how to best position her/his property for maximum market exposure.  Because the 
property listing process can be complex, many sellers may not be well-equipped to 
initiate or manage the process by themselves.  Hence, just as when a firm hires an 
investment banker to act as her/his intermediary to assist in overcoming the information 
asymmetry problem and increasing market exposure, a property seller can turn to a real 
estate agent to act as its intermediary to do likewise.  In doing so, sellers not only enlist 
the services of a single agent, but also in effect, hire an entire network of agents due to 
agents‘ participation in wide-ranging, electronic Multiple Listing Services (MLS).  Yet, 
when market conditions are difficult, or when sellers are highly motivated to sell their 
properties within a short timeframe, simply listing and exposing their properties through 
an MLS system may not be enough.  Under such circumstances, sellers may need to do 
something more to interest and motivate other agents to present their homes when 
showing properties to prospective buyers.  If a seller can successfully increase the 
number of buyers‘ agents who are aware of her/his property, and who are willing to show 
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it to their clients, chances of a sale will likely increase.  One way a seller may increase 
buyers‘ agent coverage is to offer incentives directly to agents.  Increased buyers‘ agent 
coverage will most likely lead to increased showing activity, and eventually a sale.   
Although a seller cannot hire all buyers‘ agents in a market, she/he can make 
her/his property more financially attractive to buyers‘ agents, and thereby, effectively 
increase buyers‘ agent coverage.  Even though the data I use in this study do not permit 
direct testing of increased buyers‘ agent coverage—the number of buyers‘ agents 
showing a seller‘s property—I can observe and quantify what sellers explicitly indicate to 
their agents regarding their high level of motivation to sell their property.  I argue that 
because they are highly motivated to sell, to increase agent coverage, these sellers will be 
more willing to offer incentives to buyers‘ agents.  Therefore, I expect to observe a strong 
relationship between a seller‘s statement that indicates high selling motivation and 
increased buyers‘ agent coverage.   
In sum, selling a typically illiquid asset is difficult under any market condition, 
and increased information asymmetries most likely added to the difficulties after the 
financial crisis.  Devising means to reduce illiquidity, despite the turmoil in the market, 
such as by offering incentives to buyers, was most likely critical to many sellers‘ 
achieving successful sales outcomes.  After the financial crisis, the role of real estate 
agents as intermediaries was likely more vital as they assisted many sellers, irregular 
market participants to begin with, who were at a distinct disadvantage grappling with 
market conditions not seen in many years.  Devising means to engage the coverage and 
support of additional agents, such as by offering incentives to buyers‘ agents, is one 
strategy that may have worked for motivated sellers.  Finally, as difficult as market 
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conditions were for sellers after the crisis, even though many considered it a strong 
buyer‘s market, still, buyers had to find some way to make sense of the market confusion.  
Offering incentives might mitigate this problem, and result in higher sales prices and 
shorter marketing durations. 
 
Section II.  Literature Review 
Liquidity and Illiquidity  
Liquidity is the ability to convert an asset to cash, with little or no real loss in 
value, to make funds immediately available to satisfy obligations (Mises, 1912).  In 
capital markets, one way that researchers measure a security‘s liquidity is through its bid-
ask spread—the degree to which its ‗bid‘ price differs from its ‗ask‘ price (Chordia, Roll, 
& Subrahmanyan, 2000; Chordia, Sarkar, & Subrahmanyan, 2005; Holmstrom & Tirole, 
1993; Kluger & Stephan, 1997).  Securities with low trading volume, frequently referred 
to as ‗thinly traded‘ assets, with only a few trades in a given trading day, generally have 
higher bid-ask spreads than securities with heavy daily trading volume (Ibbotson, 1975).  
Thus, the higher the bid-ask spread of a security, the higher the degree of illiquidity 
associated with it (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986; Demsetz, 1968).  While illiquidity is 
applicable to financial assets, it can also occur in other types of markets, involving other 
types of non-financial assets such as art, antiques, collectibles, jewelry, and of course, 
real estate.   
 Residential properties are characteristically highly illiquid assets (Goetzmann & 
Spiegel, 1995; Schill, 1991); but the illiquidity associated with residential real estate is 
different from that of thinly traded securities (Lin & Vandell, 2007).  Although 
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occasionally, home sales do occur simultaneously with the time of listing, such 
transactions are rare, primarily due to the illiquid nature of real estate assets (Kluger & 
Miller, 1990).  Real estate assets vary not only from market to market, but also on a more 
basic level, from property to property.  Typically, homeowners hold their properties for 
long periods.  Trading in residential properties is thin, and does not occur using a 
simultaneous, real time bid-type auction process.  Instead, residential real estate trades 
occur through a negotiation process that is essentially a no-recall, sequential bid 
mechanism, and search and discovery costs are high.  A significant difference is that 
while in capital markets all participants are aware of all bid and ask prices, in real estate 
markets, only the final bid price (sales price) is made public; all other bid prices (offers) 
are known only to the seller and the buyer(s) making the offer(s).  Thus, only the seller 
knows the price below which he/she will not sell (reserve price), and only the seller can 
initiate actions to reduce the difference between his list price and his reserve price (the 
bid-ask spread).   
Real estate markets are not static.  Unique, heterogeneous assets, differing 
motivations of the market players, fluid financing environments, and various economic 
forces all contribute to the dynamism that characterizes individual real estate markets.  
Such characteristics work to create an endogenous relationship between trading time, 
trading volume, and trading price in residential real estate markets (Lin & Vandell, 2007).  
Real estate agents, participants, and other market observers describe real estate markets 
as being ‗hot,‘ or ‗cold,‘ and ‗up,‘ or ‗down.‘  In a ‗hot‘ or ‗up‘ market, there are many 
bidders, trades occur frequently, marketing durations are shorter, and the increased 
number of buyers tends to force the distribution of seller reservation prices upward.  
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Hence, when markets are ‗hot‘ or ‗up,‘ real estate asset bid-ask spreads increase (Krainer, 
2001).  Conversely, in a ‗cold‘ or ‗down‘ market, such as in the post-crisis period, there 
are few bidders, trades occur infrequently, marketing durations are longer, and the 
decreased number of buyers tends to force the distribution of seller reservation prices 
downward.  Hence, when markets are ‗cold‘ or ‗down,‘ real estate asset bid-ask spreads 
decrease (Krainer, 2001).  
 
Capital Markets, Financial Intermediaries, and Analysts‘ Coverage 
Financial intermediaries work to mitigate their clients‘ risks (Adrian & Shin, 
2010) through such functions as data gathering and analysis, developing and 
implementing investment and capital acquisition strategies, operations and investment 
risk analysis, loan underwriting, and assistance in securing or even providing equity and 
debt capital (Allen & Gale, 2004).  In essence, financial intermediaries have a significant 
impact on modern capital markets due to their specialized abilities to expose their clients‘ 
assets to a broader investment base.  In doing so, they match their clients with buyers 
having similar risk and investment objectives (Wimmer, Townsend, & Chezum, 2000).   
Because an absence or shortage of information works to inhibit efficient capital 
market functions (Healy & Palepu, 2001), it is crucial for firms to provide myriad types 
of information to market participants.  While federal and state laws mandate certain 
disclosures such as financial statements and earnings reports, other information 
disclosures such as earnings forecasts and press releases about firm actions or operations 
are strictly voluntary.  Firms use disclosures as the primary means of delivering such 
information, and doing so helps pave the way for investment in the firm.  Quite often, 
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they hire financial intermediaries, such as investment bankers, and the financial analysts 
whom they employ, to provide many of these voluntary disclosures (Healy & Palepu, 
2001). 
The role of the financial analyst is to provide investment analysis and 
recommendations to the market—also known as providing coverage—about their client 
firms.  They do so by gathering and analyzing data, formulating opinions and forecasts 
about the firm‘s future performance prospects, and issuing investment advice and 
recommendations to investors about the firm‘s stock.  Research suggests that financial 
analysts add value to the capital markets (Healy & Palepu, 2001), their forecasts are 
highly accurate (Givoly, 1982), and investment recommendations based on their coverage 
tend to affect stock prices (Francis & Soffer, 1997; Lys & Sohn, 1990).  Indeed, Barth 
and Hutton (2004) indicate that financial analysts play a key role in the efficient 
functioning of capital markets, and the study of Elgers, Lo, and Pfeiffer (2001) confirms 
the value that financial analysts provide through their coverage as purveyors of 
information.  As firms become better known when analysts provide coverage, other 
analysts are more likely to follow suit and initiate coverage.  This increased coverage 
works to reduce information asymmetry (Chang, Dasgupta, & Hilary, 2006), with the 
most likely outcome being increased investment in the firm.  
 
Real Estate Markets, Real Estate Intermediaries, and Agents‘ Coverage 
The preamble to the Code of Ethics of the National Association of Realtors© 
begins with the following sentence: ―Under all is the land.‖
17
  This statement underscores 
                                                 
17
 The Code of Ethics is available at http://www.realtor.org/mempolweb.nsf/pages/code. 
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the heterogeneous nature of real estate assets.  Just as every real estate asset is different, 
so too is every real estate owner.  Both the heterogeneity of real estate assets and their 
owners contribute to the complexity of real estate markets.  At the core of this complexity 
is information, and by extension, varying levels of information asymmetry.   
Consider that securities transactions involving publicly traded companies take 
place on organized exchanges, and are subject to myriad regulations dictating extensive, 
complex information disclosures.  In contrast, real estate sales transactions occur in 
small, local markets, and are subject to minimal information disclosure regulations.  
Because of the complexity of real estate as an asset class, as well as the real estate sales 
transaction process itself, disseminating information as accurately and thoroughly as 
possible is critical to successful outcomes (Garmaise & Moskowitz, 2004).   
Detailed information about listed properties can be difficult and costly to obtain, 
and search times can be extensive (Zumpano, Elder, & Baryla, 1996).  Buyers can 
thoroughly examine surveys, appraisals, title abstracts, ad valorem tax assessments, 
public records, and sellers‘ disclosure statements.  Buyers can also contract with various 
service professionals to perform professional inspections and offer property condition 
evaluations.  All such efforts work to reduce information asymmetries related to 
individual properties (Knight, Lizieri, & Satchell, 2005).  Quite often though, the most 
difficult type of information asymmetry for many buyers to overcome is the true extent of 
a seller‘s motivation for selling.  Real estate intermediaries can assist sellers in conveying 
this type of information to the market. 
Just as firms in capital markets hire financial intermediaries to assist them in 
exposing their assets to a broader market, real estate owners do likewise by hiring real 
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estate intermediaries (Jud, 1983; Zumpano et al., 1996).  These intermediaries, or real 
estate agents, participate in MLS systems to gather, organize, track, and disseminate 
information about properties that are for sale, or that have previously sold.  Listing 
agents, who work for sellers, gather and analyze data on comparable properties, advise 
their clients as to their property‘s optimum list price, and effectively provide coverage for 
their client‘s property by exposing it to the broader market by listing it on MLS systems 
and other types of electronic property listing platforms
18
 (Crowston, Sawyer, & Wigand, 
2001).  Because inherent within MLS systems is an agreement between participating 
agents to share information, cooperate in transactions, and split commissions in the event 
of a sale, selling agents, who work for buyers, also participate by providing additional 
coverage.  Indeed, research suggests that buyers who hire an agent to represent them 
improve their search efficiency, primarily because of their agent‘s access to multiple 
listing services (Baryla & Zumpano, 1995).
19
  
                                                 
18
 Other internet-based platforms exist, such as Trulia, Redfin, and Zillow, but these are more marketing 
oriented.  Because MLS systems are local-market oriented and invite cooperation between participating 
agents, it is the listing platform preferred by most agents.  
19
 In a typical real estate transaction, there are two sides of a deal.  The listing side involves the listing agent 
(the seller‘s agent) who lists the seller‘s property for sale.  The selling side involves the selling agent (the 
buyer‘s agent) who brings the buyer to the table.  In most transactions, there are two agents involved, and 
each agent receives a portion of the sales commission for their efforts.  However, when a single agent 
handles both sides of the sales transaction, she/he receives the entire sales commission—the listing side and 
the selling side, as well as any incentives offered to the selling agent. Additionally, although many buyers 
choose agent representation in purchase transactions, there is no federal law in the United States requiring 
that buyers do so.  In Alabama, the state in which the sales transactions in this study‘s data sample occur, 
the Real Estate Consumers Agency and Disclosure Act (RECAD) provides that an agent may act: (1) as a 
single agent representing only one party; (2) as a sub-agent representing only one party; (3) as a dual agent 
representing both parties with mutual consent; or (4) as a transaction broker providing assistance, but not 
representation to one or more parties.  For more information on RECAD, go to 
http://acre.cba.ua.edu/license_index/License%20Law/code/34-27-81.htm.  








 and/or both, and sellers can offer them 
to the buyer, the agent, and/or both.  However, existing research is limited to studying 
cash incentives offered to buyers, and cash and non-cash incentives offered to agents;  
moreover, these studies provide mixed results.  To the best of my knowledge, only seven 
studies investigate specific examples of buyer cash incentives, and none that examine to 
non-cash buyer incentives.  Rutherford, Springer, and Yavas (2001), and Yavas and Yang 
(1995), show that sellers use buyer cash incentives to signal increased selling motivation, 
and Johnson, Anderson, and Webb (2000) show that list prices reflect full capitalization 
of closing costs when buyers use lender-funded mortgage financing.  However, Asabere 
and Huffman (1997), Smith and Sirmans (1984), and Zerbst and Bruggeman (1977) find 
that such capitalization is only partial when owners offer mortgage financing.   
In terms of existing research of agent incentives, only one study investigates cash 
incentives, and the few studies on non-cash incentives are very limited in scope.  The 
study examining agent cash incentives shows that when sellers offer selling agent 
bonuses, they do not consistently experience either higher sales prices or shorter 
marketing durations (Johnson, Anderson, & Benefield, 2004).  The primary focus of 
agent non-cash incentives is on the use of imputed non-cash incentives derived from 
finite duration listing contracts (Brastow, Springer, & Waller, 2011; Geltner, Kluger, & 
                                                 
20
 Examples of buyer cash incentives include offering to pay for closing costs, appraisal, survey, home 
warranty, and allowances for repairs or redecorating.  Examples of agent cash incentives include higher 
selling agent commission splits and/or selling bonuses. 
21
 Examples of buyer non-cash incentives include offering to include removable items such as refrigerators, 
washers and dryers, televisions and surround sound systems, art, furniture, and automobiles with the 
property, and gifts or prizes such as airline tickets, cruises, club memberships, jewelry, and even fur coats.  
Examples of agent non-cash incentives can also take the form of various prizes or gifts. 
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Miller, 1991; Miceli, 1989; Waller, Brastow, & Johnson, 2010).  Soyeh, Wiley, and 
Johnson (2012) find no selling price capitalization of closing costs in cold markets, and 
that closings costs are the only incentives type to reduce marketing duration. 
 
Research Importance and Contribution 
To date, no one has studied sales incentives paid to the buyer, the buyer‘s agent, 
and/or both in the course of residential real estate sales transactions.  This study seeks to 
fill that gap by focusing on the role such seller-paid incentives play in increasing real 
estate asset liquidity bid-ask spreads, and reflecting the degree to which sellers are 
motivated to sell.  Doing so will contribute to our understanding of what strategies are 
available to address and overcome the adverse effects of financial crisis shocks on real 
estate market functions.  In addition, this study will clear new ground in an area that, thus 
far, has received little attention: the use of seller-paid incentives as a means to reveal a 
seller‘s level of selling motivation to the marketplace.  Moreover, examining the impact 
of the use of several types of incentives on sales price and marketing duration will add to 
the literature, and offer valuable information to many real estate market researchers and 
participants, such as if, to what extent, and what forms or types of incentives work best to 
increase sales price, and/or reduce marketing duration. 
  
Section III.  Hypotheses Development 
Hypothesis 1 
Researchers show a connection between real estate market information 
asymmetries and real estate asset liquidity; higher information asymmetries cause larger 
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bid-ask spreads, while lower information asymmetries cause smaller bid-ask spreads 
(Krainer, 1999; Lippman & McCall, 1986).  Demsetz (1968) and Bagehot (1971) were 
the first economics and finance researchers, respectively, to suggest a relationship 
between the bid-ask spread in a firm‘s stock price, and the trading characteristics of the 
firm‘s securities.  Since these early studies, researchers now commonly use bid-ask 
spread as a proxy for the liquidity associated with the firm‘s stock; the smaller the bid-
ask spread, the greater the liquidity (e.g., Amihud & Mendelson, 1986, 2000; Glosten & 
Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985).  Housing market researchers commonly account for market 
liquidity in terms of measures of marketing duration, which they define in the context of 
various property and market characteristics (e.g., Asabere, Huffman, & Mehdian, 1993; 
Belkin, Hempel, & McLeavey, 1976; Haurin, 1988; Kalra & Chan, 1993; Kluger & 
Miller, 1990; Miller, 1978).   
Jud, Winkler, and Kissling (1995) are the first to develop a model for housing 
market liquidity based on bid-ask spread: the difference between the averages of the sale 
and list prices of all observations.  However, in their model, they use the average of list 
prices, at the time of contract, which does not take into account changes in individual 
property list prices over time. 
In practice, over the duration of the listing period, it is common for a seller to 
reduce the list price, sometimes more than once.  If the property remains unsold at the 
termination of the listing period and the seller still desires to sell, she/he re-lists the 
property at the then current list price, or at another, presumably lower price, and 
continues to reduce the price until it either sells or reaches the seller‘s reservation price.  I 
argue that a better measure of the real estate asset‘s liquidity should reflect the difference 
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between the original list price established on the first listing day and the ultimate sales 
price.  To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to use the difference between 
the average market sales price, and a property‘s original list price in the computation of 
the bid-ask spread to capture real estate asset liquidity.   
Using the original list price is likely to capture more realistically the level of the 
real estate assets‘ liquidity for the following reason.  Prior to finalizing a listing contract, 
the listing agent gathers information about the seller‘s property, and compares it to other 
similar properties that have recently sold, and that are currently for sale in the market 
area.  In a process similar to that used by the real estate appraiser establishing a fair 
market value,
22  
the listing agent prepares a Comparative Market Analysis (CMA) for the 
seller‘s property.  Using MLS data, the listing agent evaluates the seller‘s property in 
terms of recent sales and current listings of properties that are comparable and within 
close proximity.  After adjusting for property features differences, the listing agent is then 
able to approximate an initial list price that is optimal relative to the selected comparable 
properties.  Thus, I argue that computing a bid-ask spread using the original price is more 
representative of the underlying unobserved liquidity of the real estate asset.   
It is typical that in cold markets, the CMA will reveal larger differences between 
sales and list prices (larger bid-ask spreads), underscoring increased market illiquidity 
problems.  As these market conditions increase selling difficulties, it is critical that sellers 
implement strategies enabling them to overcome market illiquidity problems, and make 
                                                 
22
 When performing a real estate appraisal, the appraiser compares the subject property against comparable 
properties, and makes certain adjustments in terms of size, land area, property features, and location 
between the properties compared.  After doing so, the appraiser is able to derive a fair market value for the 
subject property based on adjusted equivalent sales of other similar properties recently sold in the market 
(Epley et al, 2002). 
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their properties more financially attractive.  One such strategy is to offer sales incentives 
directly to buyers.  Buyer sales incentives work to reduce buyer costs, and likely increase 
the probability of a sale. Therefore, I argue that when real estate market conditions are 
highly illiquid—when bid-ask spreads are larger—the probability that sellers will offer 
buyer sales incentives increases.  Hence, the following hypothesis posits: 
H1: There is a positive association between seller-paid sales incentives offered to 
buyers and real estate asset bid-ask spread.  
 
Hypothesis 2 
In financial markets, firms increase their exposure to investors and others in the 
market by hiring financial analysts to provide coverage of the firm (D‘Mello & Ferris, 
2000).  Similarly, real estate sellers can increase their property‘s exposure to the market 
by engaging as many buyers‘ agents as possible to show their property to prospective 
buyers.  While a seller cannot hire all buyers‘ agents in a market, she/he can make her/his 
property more financially attractive to buyers‘ agents, and thereby, effectively increase 
buyers‘ agent coverage.  A likely outcome of increased buyer‘s agent coverage is an 
increased probability of sale.  In a cold market, it is important for motivated sellers to 
consider taking action designed to appeal to the agents who represent the few qualified 
buyers who are active in the market.   
The process of selling a house is generally time-consuming, and for many sellers, 
it is a very stressful, emotional experience (Meyer, 1987).  Therefore, it is logical to 
assume that all sellers have some basic degree of selling motivation; otherwise, they 
would not even begin the selling process.  However, the level of selling motivation varies 
from seller to seller.  For example, a seller who is simply interested in selling, and is 
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under no particular pressure or other outside influence requiring or forcing him to sell, 
may have a very low level of selling motivation.  For this seller, achieving a particular 
sales price is most likely more important than how long it takes to sell the property.  
However, other sellers may be more motivated to sell due to their own actions.  For 
example, a seller who accepts a job in another city and must sell her/his home in order to 
free up the equity and debt resources that she/he needs to purchase another home in 
her/his new location.  Although not financially desperate, compared to the seller in the 
first example, this type of seller is more motivated to sell.  Still, there exists a most highly 
motivated seller, one who is under financial duress due to circumstances over which 
she/he has no control, such as job loss or health issues, and who must therefore sell 
her/his home to reduce the risk of foreclosure, or even bankruptcy.   
It is possible that all three types of sellers can simply say they are ‗motivated to 
sell‘ as a ploy to attract potential buyers.  However, it is logical to assume that sellers 
who are under pressure to sell will do more than just say they are motivated; it is highly 
likely that they will actually act on their motivation.  One such available action is to offer 
incentives to increase the probability of a sale. 
To the extent that the inability to determine a seller‘s level of selling motivation 
acts to impede a buyer‘s decision to buy a property, it becomes important for a seller, 
especially a highly motivated one, to find ways to reveal her/his selling motivation to 
buyers in the market.  One of the most important marketing mechanisms the listing agent 
typically has at her/his disposal is the MLS.  An interesting facet of how MLS systems 
work is their multi-tiered information structures.  The first information tier contains two 
types of information: property specific information (e.g. number of rooms, square 
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footage, price, etc.), and descriptive information (e.g. setting, location, aesthetics, etc.).  
The first tier is viewable by all market participants, as well as anyone capable of viewing 
the MLS‘s public website.  The second tier also contains two types of information: listing 
information (e.g. listing date, type of agency, commission split offered to the selling 
agent, etc.), and an Agent‘s Remarks section that contains subjective information 
provided by the listing agent.  However, as the second tier is only viewable by other 
agents, listing agents often use the second tier‘s Agent‘s Remarks section to reveal 
information about her/his client‘s selling motivation to other agents in the market by 
using such phrases as ‗seller extremely motivated,‘ ‗seller transferred, make offer,‘ or 
even more telling, ‗seller desperate‘ (referred to hereafter as ―Motivated Phrases‖).  
Typically, this section will also provide selling motivation clues as evidenced by a 
seller‘s willingness to offer sales incentives.  I argue that because these types of sellers 
are highly motivated to sell, they will be willing to offer incentives to buyers‘ agents as a 
means of increasing buyer‘s agent coverage of their property, and motivating a sale.  
Therefore, I expect to observe a positive association between a seller‘s statements 
indicating she/he is highly motivated to sell and her/his desire for increased buyers‘ agent 
coverage.  Hence, the following hypothesis posits:  
H2: There is a positive association between seller-paid sales incentives offered to 
agents and a seller being highly motivated to sell. 
 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 
In a cold market, when sellers far outnumber buyers, implementing strategies that 
attract buyers and buyers‘ agents to a seller‘s property can ultimately be the difference 
between a seller successfully selling her/his property, or continuing to own it.  Because 
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the dataset used in the proposed study reveals that some sellers did in fact offer incentives 
to buyers and buyers‘ agents, a possible inference is that sellers did so in an effort to 
market their properties differently, perhaps even more aggressively, than sellers of 
properties who did not offer incentives.  Hence, the following two hypotheses refer to the 
expected positive association between offering seller-paid incentives and sales prices, and 
the expected negative association between offering seller-paid sales incentives and 
marketing duration: 
H3:  Offering seller-paid sales incentives is positively associated with sales 
prices.   
 




Section IV.  Data and Variable Selection 
MLS Data 
The data used in this study includes Mobile and Montgomery, Alabama 
residential property sales that occurred during the ‗cold market‘ conditions experienced 
from 2008 to 2011.
23
  The Mobile market area, in the southwest part of the state, is 
approximately the same size as the Montgomery market area, in the central part of the 
state.  Each area has active, diverse economies, significant manufacturing bases, 
innovative healthcare systems, established higher education systems, and strategically 
located, well-developed waterway and rail transportation networks.   
                                                 
23
 All Mobile, Alabama market sales activity as reported by the Gulf Coast Multiple Listing Service, Inc., a 
subsidiary of the Mobile Area Association of Realtors, Inc.  All Montgomery, Alabama market sales 
activity as reported by the Alabama Multiple Listing Service, Inc., a subsidiary of the Montgomery Area 
Association of Realtors, Inc. 
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The same vendor operates both MLS systems.  However, there are certain 
structural differences between each of the MLS databases.  Some differences are minor 
such as in the naming conventions used.  For example, Mobile‘s MLS system uses the 
term ―#Stories‖ to refer to the number of stories in listed properties, while Montgomery‘s 
MLS system uses the term ―Design.‖  Similarly, the Montgomery MLS system simply 
indicates whether a fireplace is present, whereas Mobile‘s system actually provides the 
number of fireplaces that are present.  A more complicated example is while Mobile‘s 
MLS system lists one variable for the presence of a garage, and another variable for the 
number of parking spaces, Montgomery‘s MLS system utilizes an additional descriptive 
category that uses words such as one, two, or three to indicate the number of garage 
parking spaces.  To enable a precise database merging, I thoroughly review raw data from 
each MLS system, and clean as necessary to correct errors, align conventions, match 
descriptions, and remove duplications.   
 
Variable Selection 
Prior to beginning the empirical analysis, to control for the unique qualities of 
each individual real estate asset, I construct a number of variables following hedonic 
models typically used in the real estate literature to estimate sales price.  Sirmans, 
Macpherson, and Zietz (2005) conduct an extensive review of the history of the use of 
hedonic price modeling to estimate real estate sales prices and related marketing 
durations.  In their review of over 125 studies dating back to 1922, they group the 
variables typically used into eight general categories as follows: (1) Construction and 
Structure; (2) House Internal Features; (3) House External Features; (4) Environmental: 
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Natural; (5) Environmental: Neighborhood and Location; (6) Environmental: Public 
Service; (7) Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors; and, (8) Financial Issues.  In this 
study, I replicate as much as possible a number of the variable controls and modeling 
structures of Sirmans et al. (2005).  Table 1 lists and defines all variables I use in the 
initial analysis. 
 
Sales Incentives Variables 
I use different sales incentive types and forms to test the hypotheses.  I capture the 
presence of any type of incentive using a dummy variable, Incentives, that takes the value 
of one if the seller offers incentives, and zero otherwise.  I capture the presence of buyer 
incentives using a dummy variable, Buyer Incentives, that takes the value of one if the 
seller offers incentives only to the buyer, and zero otherwise.  I capture the presence of 
agent incentives using a dummy variable, Agent Incentives, that takes the value of one if  
the seller offers incentives only to the agent, and zero otherwise.  I capture the presence 
of incentives to both the buyer and the agent using a dummy variable, Both Incentives, 
that takes the value of one if the seller offers incentives to both the buyer and the agent, 
and zero otherwise.  Table 2, Panel A, lists the distributions of sales incentives offered to 
buyers, buyers‘ agents, and/or both.  Of the 32,128 sold property observations in the 
dataset, 20,789 included some type of seller-paid sales incentive.  There are 9,809 
observations of buyer only incentives, 4,843 observations of agent only incentives, and 
6,137 observations of incentives offered to both the buyer and the agent.
24
 
                                                 
24
 Although logically it seems likely that a highly motivated seller will offer sales incentives, it is not 
possible to account for such sellers who do not.  Likewise, although logically it seems unlikely that a seller 
who is not highly motivated to sell will offer incentives, it is not possible to account for such sellers who 
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Table 1.  Description of Variables. 
 
List List price at time of sale 
Reduced Percentage difference between original property list price and contract sales price 
Motivated 1 if Motivated Phrases appear in MLS Agent Remarks section; 0 otherwise
a
 
Sale Property contract sales price 
TOM Total number of days between current property list date and sale date 
IMR Inverse Mills Ratio produced in first stage of 2SLS estimation 
Incentives 1 if incentives are offered; 0 otherwise 
Age Property age in years 
SqFeet Total number of heated and cooled square feet within property 
Storynum Total number of stories within property 
New 1 if property is either new construction or never previously occupied; 0 otherwise
b
 
Brick 1 if property exterior is brick, cement block, or cement board; 0 otherwise 
Bedroom Total number of bedrooms within property 
Bathnum Total number of bathrooms within property 
Fire Total number of fireplaces within property 
Central 1 if property has central heating and cooling; 0 otherwise 
Parknum Total number of garage parking spaces (default value is zero if no garage is present) 
Pool 1 if property has a swimming pool, hot tub, and/or spa; 0 otherwise 
Water 1 if property is situated on or has a view of a body of water; 0 otherwise 
Urban 1 if property is located within city or municipal jurisdictional limits; 0 otherwise 
Golf 1 if property I situated on or has a view of a golf course; 0 otherwise 
Subd-PUD 1 if property is subject to subdivision or planned unit development covenants; 0 otherwise 
Pubwater 1 if property has access to public water service; 0 otherwise 
Pubsewer 1 if property has access to public sewer service; 0 otherwise 
DOP Degree-of- Over-Pricing measure
c
 
Vacant 1 if property is vacant; 0 otherwise 
Inven Total number of active listings in property listing month 
SL-Ratio Ratio of property sales to property listings in property listing month 
Exclusive 1 if property listing type is an exclusive-right-to-sell agency; 0 otherwise
d
 
Listrank 1 if listing firm is ranked in the top five of all listing firms in the market; 0 otherwise 
Salerank 1 if selling firm is ranked in the top five of all selling firms in the market; 0 otherwise 
Agentsame 1 if selling agent is also listing agent; 0 otherwise
e
 
Corporate 1 if property seller is not an individual; 0 otherwise 
Zip-Md Median income by Zip Code 
Unemp Unemployment rate for location of property listing 
Interest Prevailing national 30-year conventional interest rate in month of property listing
f
 
Foreclosed 1 if property has been foreclosed; 0 otherwise 
Financing 1 = None; 2 = Conventional; 3 = FHA; 4 = VA; 5 = USDA; 6 = Owner; 7 = Other 
Mobsold 1 if property observation is from Mobile MLS database; 0 otherwise 
Spring 1 if property is listed in March, April or May; 0 otherwise 
Summer 1 if property is listed in June, July, or August; 0 otherwise 
Fall 1 if property is listed in September, October, or November; 0 otherwise 
                                                                                                                                                 
do. The dataset‘s richness permits testing using more specific incentive types (cash or noncash), 
combinations (cash and noncash), and forms (home warranty or agent bonus).  The Robustness Testing 
Results section contains explanations of the remainder of the data presented in Table 2, and the outcomes 
of a series of additional robustness tests utilizing dummy variables constructed from these data.   
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Winter 1 if property is listed in December, January, or February; 0 otherwise 
Year2008 1 if property is listed in 2008; 0 otherwise 
Year2009 1 if property is listed in 2009; 0 otherwise 
Year2010 1 if property is listed in 2010; 0 otherwise 
Year2011 1 if property is listed in 2011; 0 otherwise 
a 
 First, I examine the Multiple Listing Services‘ Agent Remarks sections of 2,500 randomly drawn listing 
observations, and compile a list of over 500 Motivated Phrases, that directly indicate, or I that interpret to 
suggest the seller is highly motivated to sell.  I then develop a macro within an Excel® (Microsoft, 2010) 
spreadsheet, and use it to scan the Agent Remarks section of each property listing to identify listings with 
any of the Motivated Phrases. 
b
  New refers to houses that have never been occupied since being built, regardless of age. 
c
  ―The degree of above-market pricing, as measured by the difference between the natural logarithm of the 
list price and the natural logarithm of the predicted price from a hedonic price equation‖ (Jud, Seaks, and 
Winkler, 1996, p. 450).  In a footnote to this quote, the authors state, ―The hedonic price equation used in 
this study is the same as that reported in the appendix to Jud and Winkler (1994)‖ (Jud, Seaks and Winkler, 
1996, p. 456).  Referring to that article, Jud and Winkler (1994) use a hedonic price equation to estimate 
predicted residential prices using a vector of housing physical characteristics.  In the spirit of Jud and 
Winkler (1994), the calculation necessary to form the DOP variable for use in the proposed study adapts 
similar variables including age, bedrooms, bathrooms, square feet, garage, fireplace, central air 
conditioning, and swimming pool. 
d
  Under an exclusive-right-to-sell agency, the listing agent receives a sales commission regardless of who 
sells the property, even if sold by the seller (Epley et al., 2002). 
e
  In some instances, the listing agent is also the selling agent, and therefore receives any buyer‘s agent 
incentives.  
f












Buyer                
Only 
% Of Total 
Agent                
Only 
% Of Total 
Both Buyer      
& Agent 
% Of Total 
  
        Seller-Paid Incentives 20,789  9,809  47.18%           4,843  23.30%           6,137  29.52% 
        
  
Buyer                
Only 
% Of Buyer 
Total 
Agent                
Only 
% Of Agent 
Total 
Both Buyer      
& Agent 
% Of Both 
Total 
  
Cash Only 16,056  7,405  75.49%           4,797  99.05%           3,854  62.80% 
Noncash Only 2,483            1,489  15.18%                36  0.74%              958  15.61% 
Both Cash & Noncash 3,647               915  9.33%                10  0.21%           2,722  44.35% 
Panel B 
 Total 
Cash              
Type 
% Of Total % Of Type 
Noncash              
Type 
% Of Total % Of Type 
  
        Incentives to Buyers:         13,762          10,019  72.80% 
 
          3,743  27.20% 
 
        Warranty 
 
          9,211  
 
91.94% 
   
Closing Costs Allowance 
 
             724  
 
7.23% 
   
Repair/Redecorating Allowance 
 
               84  
 
0.84% 
   




    




    
          1,477  
 
39.46% 
Prize or Gift 
    




       Incentives to Agents:           8,893            6,532  73.45% 
 
          2,361  26.55% 
 
        Higher Commission Split 
 
          5,098  
 
78.05% 
   
Selling Agent Bonus 
 
          1,434  
 
21.95% 
   
        Prize or Gift 
    
          2,361  
 
100.00% 
Notes:  The table above presents the distribution of seller-paid sales incentives offered to buyers, buyers' agents, or both.   
1  
Lease-purchase means the seller is willing to lease the property for a time while providing the tenant the right to acquire the property at a set price within a 








Section V.  Research Design and Methodology 
Empirical Analysis - Hypothesis 1 
To test the first hypothesis, I follow the finance literature to construct a variable, 
Reduced, which uses the property‘s calculated bid-ask spread to capture real estate asset 
liquidity.
25
  Since the interest of this part of the paper is to study the relation between a 
measure of asset liquidity and probability of incentives, I use logit estimation for the 
following vector model:  
exp [ Reduced, (Construction and Structure),                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
(Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors),  
and, (Financial Issues) ]  
      P ( Buyer Incentives )    =      [  ―――――――――――――――――――  ] 
                                              1 + exp [ Reduced, (Construction and Structure), 
(Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors),  
and, (Financial Issues) ]                                (1) 
 
where Buyer Incentives, is the dependent variable discussed above; and, the Construction 
and Structure, Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors, and Financial Issues vectors 
provide selected control variables unique to my study (from Sirmans et al. (2005) as 
discussed in Section IV above).  The operational form of the logit model shown in 
Equation (1) is: 
                                                 
25
 I first sort all properties in the dataset according to their respective MLS system defined sub-market 
areas.  I do this because there are multiple sub-market areas within both MLS systems (34 in Mobile and 35 
in Montgomery), that are largely drawn upon geographic lines.  In this way, for example, historic district 
properties in Mobile are in the same sub-market area as other Mobile historic district properties, while 
downtown Montgomery properties are in the same sub-market area as other similar downtown 
Montgomery properties.  After totaling the sold prices for all observations within each respective sub-
market area, for each observation, I sequentially subtract the sold price from the total of all sold price 
observations in each sub-market area.  I divide each sub-market area‘s total sold prices by one less than the 
number of sold observations in each sub-market area.  For each observation, this produces the average sold 
price of all observations, excluding each individual observation, on a per sub-market area basis, which I 
then use a denominator, and using the original property list price (earlier defined) as the numerator, I obtain 
the bid-ask spread for each observation in the sample. 
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                  P ( Buyer Incentives )      ( β
0 + β1∙Reduced + β2Ln(Age)  
      ln  ―――――――――――――  =    
























































∙Financing  + β
26
∙Mobsold )               (2) 
where the Construction and Structure vector includes Ln(Age), the natural logarithm of 
the age of the property in years;
26
 the Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors vector 
                                                 
26
 According to the American Society of Home Inspectors (ASHI), 39 states now require a professional 
home inspection as part of a purchase contract, and 29 states require that professional home inspectors 
obtain licensure; Alabama requires a license (Information obtained from ASHI available at: 
www.ashi.org.).  The purpose of a professional home inspection is to provide buyers with comprehensive 
information on the age, condition, and performance of all property components, including exterior systems, 
structural systems, roofing systems, electrical systems, heating and cooling systems, insulating and 
ventilating systems, plumbing systems, interior systems, and fireplace and chimney systems.  In addition, it 
is customary for the seller to provide a comprehensive seller‘s property disclosure to the buyer that either 
affirms or denies the existence of a multitude of conditions possibly considered problematic (Epley et al., 
2002).  The seller‘s property disclosure is the foundation upon which any future legal action by the buyer 
against the seller rests, and prior to signing the seller‘s disclosure, listing agents advise their clients to be 
both careful and thorough when completing it.  Therefore, while it is possible that older properties will 
present higher levels of information asymmetries, it is most likely that the home inspection process and 
seller‘s disclosure either greatly reduces or eliminates them. 
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includes Vacant, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if no one occupies the 
property, and zero otherwise; Ln(Inven), the natural logarithm of the total number of 
active listings in the property listing month; SL- Ratio, the ratio of property sales to 
property listings in the property listing month; Exclusive, a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if the listing contract type is an exclusive-right-to-sell listing, and zero 
otherwise;
27
 Listrank, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the listing 
brokerage firm is ranked in the top five of all listing firms in the market, and zero 
otherwise; Salerank, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the selling brokerage 
firm is ranked in the top five of all selling firms in the market, and zero otherwise; 
Agentsame, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the selling agent is also the 
listing agent, and zero otherwise; Corporate, a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the property is not owned by an individual, and zero otherwise; Spring,
28
 a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the property is listed in March, April, or May, and 
zero otherwise; Summer, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the property is 
listed in June, July, or August, and zero otherwise; Fall, a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if the property is listed in September, October or November, and zero 
otherwise; Winter, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the property is listed in 
December, January, or February, and zero otherwise; Year2008, a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the property is listed in 2008, and zero otherwise;
29
 Year2009, a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the property is listed in 2009, and zero 
                                                 
27
 Under an exclusive-right-to-sell agency, the listing agent receives a sales commission regardless of who 
sells the property, even if sold by the seller within a specified period of time (Epley et al., 2002). 
28
 Forgey et al. (1996), and Springer (1996) reveal that season of the year of the property listing affects the 
likelihood of sale in terms of both sales price and marketing duration. 
29
 Properties sold in 2008 or later but listed prior to 2008 are included in the sample. 
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otherwise; Year2010, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the property is 
listed in 2010, and zero otherwise; Year2011, a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the property is listed in 2011, and zero otherwise; Ln(Zip-Md), the median income 
per Zip Code;
30
 and Unemp, either the Mobile or Montgomery market unemployment 
rate by county in the month of property listing; and, the Financing Issues vector includes 
Interest, the prevailing national average interest rate for a 30-year conventional 
residential mortgage in the month of the property listing;
31
 Foreclosed, a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one if the property is marketed as a foreclosed property sale, and 
zero otherwise; Financing, a variable drawn from the MLS‘ reporting of buyer financing 
taking the value of one if the buyer used no financing, two if the buyer used conventional 
financing, three if the buyer used financing insured by the U.S. Federal Housing 
Administration, four if the buyer used financing insured by the Veteran‘s Administration, 
five if the buyer used financing insured by the U.S. Department of Agriculture or 
underwritten by some type of housing bond, six if the buyer used financing provided by 
the owner, and seven if the buyer used some other type of financing such as a lease-
purchase option arrangement;
32
 and, Mobsold, a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the observation is from the Mobile, AL MLS system. 
                                                 
30
 Per capita income per zip code is based on the 2007-2011 American Community Survey 5-Year 
Estimates, as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau available at  
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml#none. 
31
 Mortgage interest rate data obtained from FreddieMac available at: 
http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/pmms30.htm. 
32






Empirical Analysis - Hypothesis 2 
To test the second hypothesis, I use the results of a content analysis to construct a 
dummy variable, Motivated that takes the value of one if Motivated Phrases are present, 
and zero otherwise.
33
  As discussed earlier, since highly motivated sellers want greater 
buyer‘s agent coverage to increase the chances that their properties sell quickly, they will 
likely offer incentives.  I use the Motivated dummy variable to capture whether the seller 
authorized her/his agent to convey her/his heightened selling motivation to other agents 
in order to maximize exposure to the market.  I use logit estimation for the following 
vector model:    
exp [ Motivated, (Construction and Structure),                                                                                                                                                                                       
(Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors),  
and, (Financial Issues) ]  
       P ( Agent Incentives )       =   [  ―――――――――――――――――――  ] 
                     1 + exp [Motivated, (Construction and Structure), 
(Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors),  
and, (Financial Issues) ]                                (3) 
    
where Agent Incentives, is the dependent variable discussed above; and, the Construction 
and Structure, Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors, and Financial Issues vectors 
provide selected control variables as defined in Equation (1).  The operational form of the 
logit model shown in Equation (1) is: 
 
 
                                                 
33
 First, I examine the Agent Remarks sections of 2,500 randomly drawn listing observations, and compile 
a list of over 500 Motivated Phrases, that directly indicate, or I that interpret to suggest the seller is highly 
motivated to sell.  I then develop a macro within an Excel® (Microsoft, 2010) spreadsheet, and use it to 
scan the Agent Remarks section of each property to identify listings with any of the Motivated Phrases. 
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         P ( Agent Incentives )              ( β
0 + β1∙Motivated + β2∙Ln(Age)  
     ln  ―――――――――――――  =    
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∙Financing  + β
26
∙Mobsold )              (4) 
where Agent Incentives as defined in Equation (3);  Motivated  as defined in Equation (3); 
and, all other variables as defined in Equation (2).  
 
Empirical Analysis – Hypotheses 3 and 4 
In the third part of this study, I examine the relation between offering seller-paid 
incentives, and sales price and marketing duration.  I could test both hypotheses using a 
dummy variable to capture the use of incentives utilizing ordinary least squares 
regression (OLS).  In testing Hypotheses 3 and 4, a positive coefficient for the dummy 
would indicate that offering incentives increases sales price, while a negative coefficient 
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for the dummy would indicate that offering incentives decreases marketing duration.  If it 
were certain that the data were normally distributed, OLS would be a logical choice.  
However, with respect to the research question, therein lays the problem: that there is no 
certainty that all sellers choose to offer incentives.  Hence, precisely because of this 
uncertainty, sample selection bias is a potential concern.   
Within the real estate literature, two-stage least squared estimation (2SLS) is a 
well-established method for addressing sample selection bias issues (Elder, Zumpano, & 
Baryla, 2000; Knight, 2002; Munneke & Slade, 2000; Waller et al., 2010).  Therefore, in 
this study, I utilize 2SLS estimation to test Hypotheses 3 and 4.  The first stage uses a 
probit regression to capture the choice of using incentives.  In the second stage, the 
Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR)
34
 from the first stage becomes an independent variable in the 
(OLS) estimation of the equations for sales price and marketing duration.  The decision to 
use incentives represents a binary outcome, and is therefore an index function of the 
following form: 
Incentives Used:      Ii  =  1  if  Zi'γ ≥ i 
Incentives Not Used:     Ii  =  0   otherwise 
where Zi = 'Xi;  Xi is a vector of independent, observable variables,  are the estimators, 
and i is normally distributed with a mean zero and standard deviation of one (i.e. 
NID(0,1)), for a probit model.  Thus, I denote the likelihood of using a sales incentive 
considering observable vectors as: 
                                                 
34
 Due to the possibility that some sellers will not offer sales incentives, effectively, some incentives values 
may be missing.  The 2SLS regression corrects for any potential bias resulting from missing values.  In the 
first stage, a probit estimation produces the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR), which essentially is a prediction of 
missing ‗incentives‘ variable values based on estimates of ‗incentives‘ variable values that are present. 
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p (Incentives)    =  Φ [ ln(List)    
+  ∑ (Construction and Structure)  
+ ∑ (Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors) 
+ ∑(Financial Issues) ]                                     (5) 
where Incentives is the dependent variable discussed at the beginning of this section; 
Ln(List) is the natural logarithm of the property list price on the date of sale; and, the 
Construction and Structure, Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors, and Financial 
Issues vectors as defined in Equation (1).  In the first stage, I derive the Inverse Mills 
Ratio (IMR) using the Incentives dummy variable as the dependent variable.  The 
following operational form of Equation (5) is: 
P (Incentives = 1 | x)  =  Φ ( β




















































∙Financing  + β
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∙Mobsold ) +  ε.                  (6)    
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where Incentives and Ln(List) as defined in Equation (5), and all other variables as 
defined in Equation (2).  The second stage of the empirical model takes the following 
form:  
 Ln(Sale)       =   ᶂ {IMR + ∑(Incentives)   
+ ∑(Construction and Structure)  
+ ∑(House Internal Features)  
+ ∑(House External Features)   
+ ∑(Environmental - Natural)   
+ ∑(Environmental – Neighborhood and Location)  
+ ∑(Environmental – Public Service)  
+ ∑(Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors)  
+ ∑(Financing Issues)}                                                    (7)  
where Ln(Sale) is the natural logarithm of the property sales price; IMR and Incentives as 
defined in Equation (5); and, selected vectors of control variables as discussed in Section 
IV above.  The operational form of Equation (7) is: 







































































































∙Mobsold  +  ε.                   (8) 
where Ln(Sale) as defined above; and IMR and Incentives as defined in Equation (5).  As 
controls, the Construction and Structure vector includes: Ln(Age), as defined in Equation 
(2); Ln(SqFeet), the natural logarithm of the total number of heated and cooled square 
feet in the property; Storynum, the total number of stories in the property; New, a dummy 
variable taking the value of one if the property is new construction and has never been 
occupied, and zero otherwise; and, Brick, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if 
the property exterior is brick, cement block, or cement board, and zero otherwise; the 
House Internal Features vector includes Bednum, the total number of bedrooms; 
Bathnum, the total number of bathrooms; Fire, a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the property has a fireplace, and zero otherwise; and Central, a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one if the property has central heating and air-conditioning, and 
zero otherwise; the House External Features vector includes Parknum, the total number 
of garage parking spaces (the default is zero if there is no garage); and Pool, a dummy 
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variable that takes the value of one if the property has a swimming pool, hot tub, or spa, 
and zero otherwise; the Environmental – Natural vector includes Water, a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the property is situated on or has a view of a body 
of water such as a lake, river, or bay, and zero otherwise; the Environmental – 
Neighborhood and Location vector includes Urban, a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if the property is located within an incorporated municipal jurisdiction, and 
zero otherwise; and, Golf, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the property is 
situated on a golf course, and zero otherwise; the Environmental - Public Service vector 
includes Subd-PUD, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the property is in a 
subdivision or planned unit development, and zero otherwise; Pubwater, a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if public water service is available to the property, and 
zero otherwise; Pubsewer, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if public sewer 
service is available to the property, and zero otherwise; DOP is the degree of overpricing 
of the listed property;
35
 the Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors and Financing 
Issues vectors are the same as in Equation (2).   
As with the sales price estimation, the second stage of the empirical model to 
estimate marketing duration takes the following form:  
 
                                                 
35
 ―The degree of above-market pricing, as measured by the difference between the natural logarithm of the 
list price and the natural logarithm of the predicted price from a hedonic price equation‖ (Jud, Seaks, & 
Winkler, 1996, p. 450).  In a footnote to this quote, the authors state, ―The hedonic price equation used in 
this study is the same as that reported in the appendix to Jud and Winkler (1994)‖ (Jud, Seaks & Winkler, 
1996, p. 456).  Referring to that article, Jud and Winkler (1994) use a hedonic price equation to estimate 
predicted residential prices using a vector of housing physical characteristics.  In the spirit of Jud and 
Winkler (1994), the calculation necessary to form the DOP variable for use in the proposed study adapts 
similar variables including age, bedrooms, bathrooms, square feet, garage, fireplace, central air 
conditioning, and swimming pool.  
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TOM         = ᶂ {IMR + ∑(Incentives)   
+ ∑(Construction and Structure)  
+ ∑(House Internal Features)  
+ ∑(House External Features)   
+ ∑(Environmental - Natural)   
+ ∑(Environmental – Neighborhood and Location)  
+ ∑(Environmental – Public Service)  
+ ∑(Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors)  
+ ∑(Financing Issues)}                                                    (9) 
where TOM, is the marketing duration calculated as the total number of days between the 
property‘s original listing date and the property sales date; IMR and Incentives as defined 
in Equation (5); and, selected vectors of control variables as discussed in Section IV 
above. 
 The operational form of the second stage of the empirical model to estimate 
marketing duration shown in Equation (9) is: 
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∙Mobsold  +  ε.                 (10) 
where TOM as defined above; IMR and Incentives as defined in Equation (5); Ln(Sale) as 
defined in Equation (10); and, all other vectors and variables are the same as used in 
Equation (9).  All estimations are robust (White, 1980).  
 
Robustness Checks   
In general, robustness testing is necessary to attain reasonable degrees of quality 
assurance, not only with respect to the predictive power of the critical core variables,
36
 
but also with respect to the soundness of the empirical design (White & Lu, 2010).  The 
purpose of robustness testing is to determine if the addition, removal, or substitution of 
variables changes the significance of the most important independent variables.  Because 
                                                 
36
 Critical core variables are of primary interest as plausible drivers or determinants of the dependent 
variable.  While only critical core variables should be subject to robustness testing, other core and non-core 
variables are necessary (White & Lu, 2010).  For detailed discussion of the process for selecting critical 
core covariates, core covariates, and non-core covariates, as well as the relationships and importance of 
exogeneity among covariates, see White and Lu (2010). 
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―robustness is necessary for valid causal inference‖ (White & Lu, 2010, p. 3), a failure to 
implement effective robustness testing methods may lead readers to consider the 
possibility that inferences drawn from the coefficient results are not robust.  This may 
then lead readers to question the structural validity of the empirical models.  Therefore, I 
conduct a battery of robustness tests to diminish such possibilities.   
Sellers can offer sales incentives that are cash, non-cash, or both, and can offer 
them to buyers, buyers‘ agents, or both.  In some cases, the incentive may be only one 
type offered to only one party, such as a buyer cash incentive.  Other cases may include 
multiple incentive types offered to multiple parties, such as buyer cash incentives and 
agent non-cash incentives.  I first disaggregate the data into specific incentive subsets.  I 
then retest each hypothesis to conclude if the results of using particular incentive types, 
forms, or combinations are similar to those from the initial hypotheses testing.  As a final 
robustness test, I also estimate Equations (8) and (10) using OLS.   
 
Section VI.  Results of Empirical Analysis 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 3 presents t-test results comparing means of selected variables, and Table 4 
presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the primary analysis.  The dataset 
includes 32,128 residential properties sold in the Mobile and Montgomery, Alabama 
markets from 2008 to 2011.  Properties average 1,891 square feet, 3.3 bedrooms, 2.3 
bathrooms, 1.15 stories, and 0.82 garage parking spaces.  Properties sell for an average 






Table 3.  Two-Sample t-Tests of Select Mobile & Montgomery Variables.  
 
Variable 
Mobile: N = 17,317 Montgomery: N = 14,811 Group      
Differences 
t-stat 
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
Number of Bedrooms 3.281 0.667 3.321 0.668 0.040*** 5.389 
Number of Bathrooms 2.249 0.823 2.216 0.786 -0.033*** -3.6594 
Square Feet 1906.835 765.428 1873.206 715.136 -33.629*** -4.0459 
List Price 163857.000 144459.100 156178.200 113698.000 -7678.969*** -5.2303 
List Price Per Square Foot 80.658 39.673 78.446 37.245 -2.122*** -5.1243 
Sale Price 156417.400 131532.200 149306.300 107728.600 -7111.100*** -5.2448 
Sale Price Per Square Foot 77.331 36.982 75.052 36.554 -2.279*** -5.5362 
Sale-List Ratio 0.083 0.022 0.148 0.040 -0.007*** 183.5009 
Marketing Duration 144.107 123.738 140.568 118.728 -3.538*** -2.6033 
Reduced 1.000 0.065 1.001 0.087 -0.001 0.727 
Motivated 0.392 0.488 0.418 0.493 0.003*** 4.753 
Incentives 0.606 0.489 0.695 0.461 0.088*** 16.612 
Notes:  Statistical significance indicated as * < 0.05, ** < .01, and *** < .001, respectively.  Data includes 32,128 sold property observations that occurred 
from 2008-2011 in the Mobile and Montgomery, Alabama markets, as reported by the MLS systems of the Mobile Area Association of Realtors and the 






Table 4.  Descriptive Statistics. 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Reduced 32,128 1.001 0.076 0.573 1.302 
Motivated 32,128 0.404 0.491 0.00 1.00 
Sale 32,128 153,139.200 121,190.900 1000.00 3562500.00 
TOM 32,128 142.476 121.465 1.00 1910.00 
Incentives 32,128 0.647 0.478 0.00 1.00 
List 32,128 160,317.200 131,231.400 2,000.00 3,750,000.00 
Age 28,427 23.620 22.115 1.00 186.00 
SqFeet 32,127 1,891.331 742.843 440.00 17,655.00 
Storynum 27,774 1.149 0.339 1.00 3.00 
New 28,548 0.168 0.374 0.00 1.00 
Brick 32,023 0.596 0.491 0.00 1.00 
Bednum 32,128 3.299 0.671 0.00 8.00 
Bathnum 32,128 2.233 0.806 0.00 12.00 
Fire 32,128 0.645 0.479 0.00 1.00 
Central 32,128 0.901 0.299 0.00 1.00 
Parknum 32,128 0.827 0.999 0.00 5.00 
Pool 32,128 0.086 0.281 0.00 1.00 
Water 32,128 0.072 0.258 0.00 1.00 
Urban 32,128 0.543 0.498 0.00 1.00 
Golf 32,128 0.022 0.147 0.00 1.00 
Subd-PUD 32,128 0.795 0.404 0.00 1.00 
Pubwater 28,279 0.960 0.196 0.00 1.00 
Pubsewer 28,198 0.775 0.418 0.00 1.00 
DOP 28,427 0.000 0.450 -4.81 3.28 
Vacant 31,976 0.646 0.478 0.00 1.00 
Invent 32,128 3,137.541 1,072.319 1,293.00 4,691.00 
SL-Ratio 32,128 0.113 0.045 0.04 0.41 
Exclusive 32,089 0.970 0.170 0.00 1.00 
Listrank 32,128 0.209 0.407 0.00 1.00 
Salerank 32,128 0.191 0.393 0.00 1.00 
Agentsame 32,128 0.025 0.156 0.00 1.00 
Corporate 31,241 0.352 0.478 0.00 1.00 
Zip-Md 32,128 51,458.290 12,785.870 18,190.38 85,103.67 
Unemp 32,128 0.076 0.026 0.02 0.20 
Interest 32,128 0.052 0.007 0.04 0.07 
Foreclosed 32,126 0.317 0.466 0.00 1.00 
Mobsold 32,128 0.539 0.498 0.00 1.00 
Financing 23,809 2.450 1.273 1.00 7.00 
Spring 32,128 0.272 0.445 0.00 1.00 
Summer 32,128 0.256 0.436 0.00 1.00 
Fall 32,128 0.238 0.426 0.00 1.00 
Winter 32,128 0.235 0.424 0.00 1.00 
Year2008 32,128 0.253 0.435 0.00 1.00 
Year2009 32,128 0.234 0.424 0.00 1.00 
Year2010 32,128 0.219 0.413 0.00 1.00 
Year2011 32,128 0.207 0.405 0.00 1.00 
Notes:  The table above provides descriptive statistics for dependent, main independent, and 
control variables. 
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observations with age information, the average is 23.6 years.  On average, 64.5% of sold 
properties have a fireplace, 90.1% have central heating and cooling, and 8.6% have a  
pool or spa.  Nearly all properties use public water services, and a significant number of 
homes use public sewer services (96.0% and 77.5%, respectively).  Most properties‘ 
exteriors are brick, block, or cement board (59.6%), and nearly all have central heating 
and cooling (90.1%).  Approximately 7.2% of the properties are on or have view of a  
body of water, while a mere 2.2% are on or have a view of a golf course.  Slightly more 
than half of the properties are located in an incorporated city or municipality, but more 
than 78% are subject to subdivision or planned unit development covenants.
37
 Table 5 
shows correlations between all variables.  I ran Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) tests to 
detect if there are issues with multicollinearity.  Testing reveals VIF factors greater than 
10.0 for Ln(Age) and Ln(SqFeet) with respect to Ln(Sale) and TOM.  To determine if 
these collinear relationships threaten any of the estimation results, I re-estimate all  
equations excluding the Ln(Age) and Ln(SqFeet) variables.  Although the coefficient 
values vary slightly as expected, the signs and significance levels remain the same for the 
main independent variables.  Therefore, multicollinearity is not problematic in my 
estimations (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010).  
                                                 
37
 As shown in Table 3, the t-test results show that all of the means of the select variables are statistically 
different from each other (p < .001), with the exception of the Reduced variable.  This is not surprising 
given the Reduced variable mean and standard deviation for the entire sample are 1.006 and 0.076, 
respectively.  I use a dummy variable in all regressions to account for the differences between Mobile and 






Table 5.  Variable Correlations. 
 
# Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Reduced 1.0000 
       
2 Motivated -0.1801* 1.0000 
      
3 Ln(Sale) 0.9524* -0.1908* 1.0000 
     
4 Ln(TOM) 0.0663* 0.0653* 0.0773* 1.0000 
    
5 Incentives 0.0688* 0.2884* 0.0666* 0.0181 1.0000 
   
6 Buyer Only 0.2291* -0.1286* 0.2094* 0.0083 0.4896* 1.0000 
  
7 Agent Only -0.2660* 0.2688* -0.2706* -0.0271* 0.3111* -0.2793* 1.0000 
 
8 Both 0.0575* 0.2566* 0.0819* 0.0369* 0.3589* -0.3221* -0.2047* 1.0000 
9 Ln(Age) -0.4682* 0.0399* -0.5020* -0.0223* -0.2587* -0.1313* 0.1700* -0.3073* 
10 Ln(SqFeet) 0.6521* -0.0690* 0.6851* 0.1128* 0.0257* 0.0653* -0.1148* 0.0592* 
11 Storynum 0.3039* -0.0228* 0.3242* 0.0617* -0.0020 -0.0007 -0.0158 0.0122 
12 New 0.2600* -0.0244* 0.2836* 0.0100 0.3209* 0.1718* -0.1844* 0.3459* 
13 Brick 0.1514* -0.0113 0.1644* -0.0068 0.0785* 0.0806* -0.0727* 0.0672* 
14 Bednum 0.4341* -0.0187* 0.4402* 0.0623* 0.0627* 0.0664* -0.0733* 0.0652* 
15 Bathnum 0.5905* -0.0595* 0.6222* 0.0888* 0.0354* 0.0683* -0.0945* 0.0490* 
16 Fire 0.4563* -0.0583* 0.4679* 0.0546* 0.0406* 0.1426* -0.1280* -0.0012 
17 Central 0.4150* -0.0745* 0.4295* 0.0574* 0.0514* 0.1538* -0.1707* 0.0376* 
18 Parknum 0.4753* -0.0589* 0.5163* 0.0669* 0.0704* 0.0547* -0.1182* 0.1291* 
19 Pool 0.1805* -0.0172 0.1853* 0.0380* -0.0222* -0.0031 -0.0219* -0.0035 
20 Water 0.0584* -0.0102 0.0803* 0.0318* -0.0168 -0.0566* -0.0129 0.0575* 
21 Urban -0.1721* 0.0146 -0.1950* -0.0325* -0.0418* 0.0026 0.0122 -0.0649* 
22 Golf 0.0774* -0.0301* 0.0858* 0.0291* -0.0171 0.0038 -0.0187* -0.0081 
23 Subd-PUD 0.0582* -0.0355* 0.0573* -0.0004 0.0313* 0.1570* -0.1380* -0.0202* 
24 Pubwater -0.0208* 0.0041 -0.0043 -0.0135 0.0174 0.0092 -0.0023 0.0123 
25 Pubsewer -0.1258* 0.0057 -0.1026* -0.0392* 0.0174 0.0285* -0.0044 -0.0093 
26 DOP 0.5467* -0.2116* 0.5715* 0.0223* -0.0002 0.1771* -0.2177* -0.0169 
27 Vacant -0.1530* 0.1054* -0.1693* -0.0204* 0.0410* -0.0077 0.0879* -0.0213* 
28 Ln(Inven) -0.0070 -0.0171 0.0573* -0.0003 -0.0885* -0.3670* 0.1345* 0.2000* 
29 SL-Ratio 0.0453* -0.0320* 0.0033 0.0544* 0.0579* 0.3046* -0.1359* -0.1627* 
30 Exclusive -0.0182 0.0065 -0.0084 0.0105 -0.0197* -0.0362* 0.0114 0.0082 
31 Listrank 0.1055* -0.1480* 0.0959* 0.0219* -0.1520* 0.0154 -0.1184* -0.0951* 
32 Salerank 0.0319* -0.0382* 0.0232* -0.0146 -0.0014 0.0723* -0.0591* -0.0325* 
33 Agentsame -0.0466* -0.0714* -0.0415* -0.1539* -0.0464* -0.0718* 0.0206* 0.0090 
34 Corporate -0.1728* 0.3043* -0.1782* -0.0193* 0.2286* -0.0782* 0.1820* 0.2046* 
35 Ln(ZipMd) 0.5212* -0.0458* 0.5262* 0.0172 0.1038* 0.2036* -0.1458* 0.0203* 
36 Unemp -0.1171* 0.1064* -0.1219* -0.0533* 0.0345* -0.1123* 0.0960* 0.0861* 
37 Interest 0.0980* -0.1137* 0.1006* 0.0504* -0.0455* 0.0889* -0.0974* -0.0708* 
38 Foreclosed -0.4340* 0.3620* -0.4397* -0.0696* 0.0405* -0.3050* 0.4194* 0.0248* 
39 Mobsold -0.0041 -0.0265* 0.0628* 0.0101 -0.0923* -0.3665* 0.1312* 0.1978* 
40 Financing 0.2581* -0.0604* 0.2596* 0.0410* 0.0829* 0.1570* -0.1162* 0.0148 
41 Spring 0.0342* -0.0112 0.0346* -0.0311* -0.0053 0.0092 -0.0172 -0.0016 
42 Summer -0.0086 0.0055 -0.0095 0.0046 0.0150 -0.0007 0.0030 0.0162 
43 Fall -0.0220* 0.0023 -0.0225* 0.0423* 0.0043 0.0038 0.0047 -0.0035 
44 Winter -0.0050 0.0038 -0.0040 -0.0147 -0.0142 -0.0128 0.0102 -0.0114 
45 Year2008 0.0468* -0.0838* 0.0449* -0.1007* -0.0446* 0.0443* -0.0579* -0.0534* 
46 Year2009 0.0185* -0.0017 0.0209* -0.0167 -0.0077 0.0205* -0.0018 -0.0318* 
47 Year2010 -0.0320* 0.0613* -0.0338* 0.0127 0.0195* -0.0389* 0.0287* 0.0432* 
48 Year2011 -0.0794* 0.0674* -0.0809* -0.0277* 0.0427* -0.0684* 0.0714* 0.0670* 
Notes:  The table above presents the correlations between all variables. Statistical significance indicated as: * p < 0.05, 






Table 5.  Variable Correlations (Continued). 
 
# Variables 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Reduced 
        
2 Motivated 
        
3 Ln(Sale) 
        
4 Ln(TOM) 
        
5 Incentives 
        
6 Buyer Only 
        
7 Agent Only 
        
8 Both 
        
9 Ln(Age) 1.0000 
       
10 Ln(SqFeet) -0.2473* 1.0000 
      
11 Storynum -0.0859* 0.5052* 1.0000 
     
12 New -0.7857* 0.1232* 0.0485* 1.0000 
    
13 Brick -0.2124* 0.1030* -0.1079* 0.1511* 1.0000 
   
14 Bednum -0.2450* 0.6690* 0.3656* 0.1530* 0.1235* 1.0000 
  
15 Bathnum -0.2651* 0.7857* 0.5709* 0.1229* 0.0668* 0.5906* 1.0000 
 
16 Fire -0.2097* 0.4638* 0.1827* 0.0789* 0.0716* 0.2654* 0.3536* 1.0000 
17 Central -0.1948* 0.2083* 0.0507* 0.1057* 0.1055* 0.1456* 0.2075* 0.2182* 
18 Parknum -0.4904* 0.5017* 0.2257* 0.3038* 0.1521* 0.3475* 0.4112* 0.3196* 
19 Pool 0.0206* 0.2225* 0.1247* -0.0663* -0.0056 0.1385* 0.1962* 0.1222* 
20 Water -0.0328* 0.0528* 0.0621* 0.0022 -0.0445* 0.0060 0.0518* 0.0003 
21 Urban 0.2915* -0.0885* -0.0415* -0.1422* 0.0125 -0.0711* -0.0918* -0.0317* 
22 Golf -0.0313* 0.0815* 0.0548* -0.0006 -0.0049 0.0412* 0.0840* 0.0529* 
23 Subd-PUD -0.0462* 0.0289* -0.0153 0.0653* 0.0876* 0.0495* 0.0368* 0.1102* 
24 Pubwater -0.0013 -0.0150 -0.0103 0.0175 0.0295* -0.0053 -0.0099 -0.0090 
25 Pubsewer 0.0934* -0.0679* -0.0366* -0.0053 0.0780* -0.0340* -0.0496* -0.0350* 
26 DOP -0.0677* 0.0562* -0.0209* 0.0710* 0.0350* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
27 Vacant 0.0052 -0.0777* -0.0307* 0.0876* 0.0114 -0.0347* -0.0782* -0.0434* 
28 Ln(Inven) -0.1137* 0.0194* 0.0520* 0.0520* -0.1015* -0.0263* 0.0203* -0.1594* 
29 SL-Ratio 0.0341* -0.0148 -0.0376* 0.0031 0.0635* 0.0149 -0.0170 0.1281* 
30 Exclusive 0.0015 0.0006 0.0073 -0.0172 -0.0303* -0.0075 -0.0004 -0.0191* 
31 Listrank 0.0595* 0.0384* 0.0258* -0.0902* -0.0430* 0.0002 0.0292* 0.0071 
32 Salerank -0.0026 0.0107 -0.0120 -0.0049 0.0385* 0.0111 0.0063 0.0371* 
33 Agentsame -0.0369* -0.0396* -0.0132 0.0520* -0.0401* -0.0429* -0.0441* -0.0525* 
34 Corporate -0.3263* -0.0478* -0.0107 0.4682* 0.0806* 0.0374* -0.0303* -0.0417* 
35 Ln(ZipMd) -0.3468* 0.3224* 0.1219* 0.1876* 0.1601* 0.2627* 0.3155* 0.3503* 
36 Unemp 0.0776* -0.0130 -0.0018 -0.0640* 0.0250* -0.0088 -0.0092 -0.0554* 
37 Interest -0.0692* -0.0241* -0.0256* 0.0680* -0.0283* -0.0260* -0.0291* 0.0172 
38 Foreclosed 0.2457* -0.1613* -0.0446* -0.2374* -0.0820* -0.0966* -0.1375* -0.1864* 
39 Mobsold -0.1176* 0.0171 0.0501* 0.0534* -0.1067* -0.0301* 0.0204* -0.1627* 
40 Financing -0.1496* 0.0693* -0.0063 0.0875* 0.0644* 0.0698* 0.0638* 0.1233* 
41 Spring 0.0079 0.0157 0.0073 -0.0207* 0.0000 0.0122 0.0126 0.0140 
42 Summer -0.0239* -0.0095 -0.0091 0.0233* 0.0014 -0.0058 -0.0136 -0.0018 
43 Fall 0.0015 -0.0053 0.0095 0.0092 -0.0020 -0.0101 -0.0010 -0.0113 
44 Winter 0.0148 -0.0013 -0.0079 -0.0115 0.0005 0.0032 0.0017 -0.0015 
45 Year2008 -0.0159 -0.0353* -0.0252* 0.0138 -0.0231* -0.0296* -0.0398* 0.0038 
46 Year2009 0.0120 -0.0160 -0.0162 -0.0235* -0.0001 -0.0149 -0.0039 -0.0026 
47 Year2010 0.0217* 0.0108 -0.0003 -0.0364* 0.0076 0.0115 0.0094 -0.0087 
48 Year2011 0.0321* 0.0311* 0.0369* -0.0104 0.0242* 0.0301* 0.0265* -0.0052 
Notes:  The table above presents the correlations between all variables. Statistical significance indicated as: * p < 0.05, 






Table 5.  Variable Correlations (Continued). 
 
# Variables 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
1 Reduced 
        
2 Motivated 
        
3 Ln(Sale) 
        
4 Ln(TOM) 
        
5 Incentives 
        
6 Buyer Only 
        
7 Agent Only 
        
8 Both 
        
9 Ln(Age) 
        
10 Ln(SqFeet) 
        
11 Storynum 
        
12 New 
        
13 Brick 
        
14 Bednum 
        
15 Bathnum 
        
16 Fire 
        
17 Central 1.0000 
       
18 Parknum 0.1692* 1.0000 
      
19 Pool 0.0712* 0.1064* 1.0000 
     
20 Water 0.0306* 0.0558* 0.0212* 1.0000 
    
21 Urban -0.0502* -0.1696* -0.0116 -0.0567* 1.0000 
   
22 Golf 0.0348* 0.0848* 0.0173 0.0281* -0.0687* 1.0000 
  
23 Subd-PUD 0.1345* 0.0466* -0.0094 -0.0767* 0.1011* 0.0037 1.0000 
 
24 Pubwater 0.0253* 0.0036 -0.0007 -0.0369* 0.0901* 0.0010 0.1377* 1.0000 
25 Pubsewer -0.0190 -0.0438* -0.0221* -0.0710* 0.2837* -0.0013 0.2586* 0.3112* 
26 DOP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0541* -0.0948* 0.0172 -0.0327* -0.0013 
27 Vacant -0.1003* -0.0555* -0.0630* -0.1182* 0.0285* -0.0310* 0.0061 0.0005 
28 Ln(Inven) -0.0609* 0.0840* 0.0630* 0.1882* -0.0783* 0.0077 -0.3194* 0.0441* 
29 SL-Ratio 0.0520* -0.0502* -0.0464* -0.1369* 0.0653* -0.0100 0.2405* -0.0303* 
30 Exclusive -0.0213* 0.0034 0.0076 0.0225* -0.0148 0.0075 -0.0395* 0.0035 
31 Listrank 0.0690* 0.0026 0.0642* 0.0452* 0.1441* -0.0130 -0.0325* -0.0013 
32 Salerank 0.0113 0.0033 0.0033 -0.0599* 0.0568* -0.0350* 0.0429* 0.0012 
33 Agentsame -0.0550* -0.0092 -0.0149 -0.0181 -0.0037 -0.0116 -0.0726* 0.0099 
34 Corporate -0.1410* 0.0466* -0.1024* -0.0463* -0.0267* -0.0375* 0.0220* 0.0022 
35 Ln(ZipMd) 0.2639* 0.3221* 0.0894* -0.0258* -0.1440* 0.0587* 0.1271* -0.0011 
36 Unemp -0.0384* -0.0375* 0.0014 0.0057 0.0715* -0.0055 -0.0673* -0.0008 
37 Interest 0.0174 0.0008 -0.0034 0.0060 0.0483* -0.0113 0.0370* 0.0008 
38 Foreclosed -0.2671* -0.1772* -0.0547* -0.0172 0.0300* -0.0344* -0.1515* -0.0150 
39 Mobsold -0.0626* 0.0845* 0.0647* 0.1926* -0.0772* 0.0089 -0.3215* 0.0463* 
40 Financing 0.1791* 0.0615* 0.0198 -0.0266* -0.1029* 0.0094 0.0999* -0.0023 
41 Spring 0.0176 0.0064 0.0047 -0.0109 -0.0019 -0.0047 0.0002 -0.0087 
42 Summer -0.0073 0.0007 -0.0033 0.0035 -0.0017 0.0070 -0.0088 0.0020 
43 Fall -0.0059 -0.0094 -0.0031 0.0017 0.0036 0.0023 -0.0008 -0.0015 
44 Winter -0.0050 0.0021 0.0015 0.0061 0.0002 -0.0045 0.0096 0.0085 
45 Year2008 0.0037 -0.0119 -0.0058 0.0001 0.0419* -0.0180 0.0217* 0.0025 
46 Year2009 -0.0016 -0.0261* -0.0008 0.0007 0.0145 0.0126 0.0099 -0.0023 
47 Year2010 -0.0017 0.0075 0.0036 -0.0054 -0.0182 -0.0019 -0.0217* -0.0102 
48 Year2011 -0.0141 0.0197* -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0477* 0.0065 -0.0282* 0.0071 
Notes:  The table above presents the correlations between all variables. Statistical significance indicated as: * p < 0.05, 






Table 5.  Variable Correlations (Continued). 
 
# Variables 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
1 Reduced 
        
2 Motivated 
        
3 Ln(Sale) 
        
4 Ln(TOM) 
        
5 Incentives 
        
6 Buyer Only 
        
7 Agent Only 
        
8 Both 
        
9 Ln(Age) 
        
10 Ln(SqFeet) 
        
11 Storynum 
        
12 New 
        
13 Brick 
        
14 Bednum 
        
15 Bathnum 
        
16 Fire 
        
17 Central 
        
18 Parknum 
        
19 Pool 
        
20 Water 
        
21 Urban 
        
22 Golf 
        
23 Subd-PUD 
        
24 Pubwater 
        
25 Pubsewer 1.0000 
       
26 DOP -0.0615* 1.0000 
      
27 Vacant 0.0792* -0.1456* 1.0000 
     
28 Ln(Inven) -0.0399* 0.0828* -0.1554* 1.0000 
    
29 SL-Ratio 0.0212* -0.0018 0.1004* -0.7619* 1.0000 
   
30 Exclusive -0.0274* -0.0048 0.0012 0.0956* -0.0548* 1.0000 
  
31 Listrank -0.0012 0.1089* -0.1080* 0.1604* -0.0870* 0.0280* 1.0000 
 
32 Salerank 0.0335* 0.0246* 0.0339* -0.1148* 0.0930* 0.0029 0.2902* 1.0000 
33 Agentsame 0.0101 -0.0016 0.0193* 0.1440* -0.1016* 0.0103 0.0114 0.0123 
34 Corporate 0.0374* -0.2717* 0.2699* -0.1107* 0.0680* -0.0217* -0.2289* -0.0356* 
35 Ln(ZipMd) -0.0399* 0.2405* -0.0279* -0.1915* 0.1272* -0.0422* -0.0527* 0.0263* 
36 Unemp 0.0135 -0.1337* 0.0102 0.1468* -0.4242* 0.0123 -0.0451* -0.0065 
37 Interest 0.0034 0.1552* -0.0348* -0.0803* 0.4258* 0.0092 0.1073* 0.0183 
38 Foreclosed 0.0146 -0.3786* 0.2527* 0.1200* -0.1502* 0.0310* -0.1496* -0.0561* 
39 Mobsold -0.0396* 0.0958* -0.1620* 0.9782* -0.7154* 0.1014* 0.1738* -0.1049* 
40 Financing -0.0775* 0.2172* -0.0754* -0.0900* 0.0603* -0.0084 0.0241* 0.0230* 
41 Spring -0.0098 0.0372* -0.0338* 0.0112 0.1616* 0.0118 0.0021 0.0083 
42 Summer -0.0064 -0.0159 0.0276* 0.0407* 0.1454* -0.0076 -0.0067 -0.0011 
43 Fall 0.0161 -0.0233* 0.0037 0.0121 -0.0857* -0.0005 0.0061 -0.0066 
44 Winter 0.0007 0.0006 0.0033 -0.0657* -0.2332* -0.0040 -0.0015 -0.0011 
45 Year2008 0.0102 0.0926* -0.0221* -0.0355* 0.1923* 0.0127 0.0750* 0.0151 
46 Year2009 0.0042 0.0455* -0.0243* -0.0393* -0.0399* 0.0093 0.0645* -0.0080 
47 Year2010 -0.0260* -0.0519* 0.0169 0.0489* -0.1620* -0.0034 -0.0732* 0.0352* 
48 Year2011 0.0121 -0.1428* 0.0342* 0.0683* -0.2200* -0.0142 -0.0975* -0.0396* 
Notes:  The table above presents the correlations between all variables. Statistical significance indicated as: * p < 0.05, 






Table 5.  Variable Correlations (Continued). 
 
# Variables 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 
1 Reduced 
        
2 Motivated 
        
3 Ln(Sale) 
        
4 Ln(TOM) 
        
5 Incentives 
        
6 Buyer Only 
        
7 Agent Only 
        
8 Both 
        
9 Ln(Age) 
        
10 Ln(SqFeet) 
        
11 Storynum 
        
12 New 
        
13 Brick 
        
14 Bednum 
        
15 Bathnum 
        
16 Fire 
        
17 Central 
        
18 Parknum 
        
19 Pool 
        
20 Water 
        
21 Urban 
        
22 Golf 
        
23 Subd-PUD 
        
24 Pubwater 
        
25 Pubsewer 
        
26 DOP 
        
27 Vacant 
        
28 Ln(Inven) 
        
29 SL-Ratio 
        
30 Exclusive 
        
31 Listrank 
        
32 Salerank 
        
33 Agentsame 1.0000 
       
34 Corporate -0.0304* 1.0000 
      
35 Ln(ZipMd) -0.0701* 0.0026 1.0000 
     
36 Unemp -0.0071 0.0303* -0.0602* 1.0000 
    
37 Interest 0.0225* -0.0458* -0.0274* -0.7624* 1.0000 
   
38 Foreclosed -0.0370* 0.3702* -0.2213* 0.1658* -0.1783* 1.0000 
  
39 Mobsold 0.1475* -0.1190* -0.2008* 0.1100* -0.0363* 0.1128* 1.0000 
 
40 Financing -0.0271* -0.1094* 0.1538* -0.0202 0.0013 -0.2426* -0.0903* 1.0000 
41 Spring 0.0025 -0.0358* 0.0112 -0.0576* -0.0055 -0.0254* -0.0047 0.0030 
42 Summer -0.0072 0.0224* -0.0028 0.0845* 0.0885* 0.0153 -0.0058 -0.0005 
43 Fall 0.0039 0.0277* -0.0041 -0.0549* -0.0533* 0.0135 0.0029 0.0026 
44 Winter 0.0009 -0.0132 -0.0048 0.0287* -0.0318* -0.0026 0.0080 -0.0053 
45 Year2008 0.0296* -0.0431* -0.0243* -0.6529* 0.6586* -0.1008* -0.0244* -0.0056 
46 Year2009 0.0052 -0.0331* 0.0024 0.3873* -0.1399* -0.0406* -0.0003 0.0286* 
47 Year2010 -0.0176 0.0233* -0.0019 0.3537* -0.3607* 0.0952* 0.0025 -0.0147 
48 Year2011 -0.0169 0.0510* 0.0287* 0.2881* -0.5204* 0.1226* 0.0309* -0.0071 
Notes:  The table above presents the correlations between all variables. Statistical significance indicated as: * p < 0.05, 






Table 5.  Variable Correlations (Continued). 
 
# Variables 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 
1 Reduced 
        
2 Motivated 
        
3 Ln(Sale) 
        
4 Ln(TOM) 
        
5 Incentives 
        
6 Buyer Only 
        
7 Agent Only 
        
8 Both 
        
9 Ln(Age) 
        
10 Ln(SqFeet) 
        
11 Storynum 
        
12 New 
        
13 Brick 
        
14 Bednum 
        
15 Bathnum 
        
16 Fire 
        
17 Central 
        
18 Parknum 
        
19 Pool 
        
20 Water 
        
21 Urban 
        
22 Golf 
        
23 Subd-PUD 
        
24 Pubwater 
        
25 Pubsewer 
        
26 DOP 
        
27 Vacant 
        
28 Ln(Inven) 
        
29 SL-Ratio 
        
30 Exclusive 
        
31 Listrank 
        
32 Salerank 
        
33 Agentsame 
        
34 Corporate 
        
35 Ln(ZipMd) 
        
36 Unemp 
        
37 Interest 
        
38 Foreclosed 
        
39 Mobsold 
        
40 Financing 1.0000 
       
41 Spring 1.0000 
       
42 Summer -0.3577* 1.0000 
      
43 Fall -0.3412* -0.3275* 1.0000 
     
44 Winter -0.3382* -0.3246* -0.3097* 1.0000 
    
45 Year2008 0.0312* -0.0010 -0.0454* 0.0140 1.0000 
   
46 Year2009 -0.0026 0.0086 0.0092 -0.0155 -0.3221* 1.0000 
  
47 Year2010 0.0389* -0.0077 -0.0525* 0.0199* -0.3080* -0.2929* 1.0000 
 
48 Year2011 0.0205* 0.0109 -0.0292* -0.0034 -0.2977* -0.2831* -0.2707* 1.0000 
Notes:  The table above presents the correlations between all variables. Statistical significance indicated as: * p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, respectively. 
 




Table 6 shows the results for testing Hypothesis 1.  The coefficient for the 
Reduced dummy variable is positive and significant (β = 2.663).  This means that as the 
property bid-ask spread increases in the context of a cold market, there is a higher 
probability that the seller will offer incentives to the buyer.  The marginal effects value of 
the Reduced variable is 0.505, which means that sellers of properties with higher bid-ask 
spreads are 50.5% more likely to offer buyer sales incentives compared to sellers of 
properties with lower bid-ask spreads.  This finding provides support for Hypothesis 1. 
Many of the control variable coefficients are also significant.  For example, the 
coefficient for Ln(Age) is negative and significant (β = -3.99), indicating that sellers of 
older properties are less likely to offer incentives to buyers.  The negative and significant 
coefficient for the Foreclosed dummy (β = -1.271) suggests that sellers have little room 
for price negotiation, and therefore are less likely to incur the additional expense of 
offering incentives.  A possible explanation for the positive and significant coefficient for 
the Vacant dummy (β = 0.162) is that sellers of empty properties may benefit from 
offering buyer incentives.  The negative and significant coefficients for Agentsame and 
Listrank dummies (β = -0.673 and β = -0.125, respectively) may indicate that when the 
listing agent is also the selling agent, or when the listing company is one of the top-
ranked listing companies in the market, sellers are less likely to offer incentives.  
 
Hypothesis 2 
Table 7 shows the results for testing Hypothesis 2.  The coefficient for the 






Table 6.  Results of Logit Regression testing the hypothesis that there is a positive 
relationship between a seller offering buyer incentives and real estate asset bid-ask 
spread. 
 
Variable Coefficient St. Error Marginal Effects St. Error 
Reduced 2.663*** 0.351 0.505*** 0.066 
Ln(Age) -0.399*** 0.020 -0.076*** 0.004 
Vacant 0.162*** 0.044 0.031*** 0.008 
Ln(Inven) 0.246 0.414 0.047 0.079 
SL-Ratio 0.151 1.063 0.029 0.202 
Exclusive  -0.039 0.097 -0.007 0.018 
Listrank -0.125** 0.059 -0.024** 0.011 
Salerank 0.055 0.052 0.010 0.010 
Agentsame -0.673*** 0.148 -0.128*** 0.028 
Corporate 0.069 0.060 0.013 0.011 
Spring 0.016 0.079 0.003 0.015 
Summer 0.019 0.083 0.004 0.016 
Fall 0.011 0.066 0.002 0.012 
Ln(Zip-Md) 0.2005** 0.090 0.038 0.017 
Unemp 3.606 2.286 0.684 0.434 
Interest 6.847 8.700 1.300 1.651 
Foreclosed -1.271*** 0.067 -0.241*** 0.012 
Financing 0.104*** 0.017 0.020 0.003 
Mobsold -1.544*** 0.269 -0.293*** 0.051 
Year2008 -0.114 0.095 -0.022 0.018 
Year2009 -0.130 0.221 -0.025 0.042 
Year2010 -0.153 0.240 -0.029 0.046 
Year2011 -0.237 0.258 -0.045 0.049 
Constant -5.769* 3.384 - - 
Number of Obs.   14,280     
Wald Chi2 2,636.604 
 
  
Pseudo R2 0.186     
Notes:  Logit Regression Empirical Model:  P ( Buyer Incentives ) = exp [ Reduced, (Construction and 
Structure), (Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors), and, (Financial Issues) ] / 1 + exp [ Reduced, 
(Construction and Structure), (Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors), and, (Financial Issues) ].  The 
Incentives dependent variable is Buyer Incentives Only, defined as Buyer Incentives = 1 when all other 
incentives = 0. The main independent variable is Ln(Reduced), calculated by sorting all properties 
according to their respective MLS system defined sub-markets areas; totaling the sold prices for all 
observations within each respective sub-market area; subtracting the sold price for each observation from 
the total of all sold price observations in each sub-market area; calculating the average sold price of all 
observations per sub-market area by dividing each sub-market area‘s total sold prices by one less than the 
number of sold observations in each sub-market area; and, dividing the original list price established on the 
first day of the property listing by the average sold price of all observations per sub-market area (excluding 
each individual observation) (shown in bold-faced type). Control variables as follows: Construction & 
Structure vector: Ln(Age); Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors vector: include Vacant, Ln(Inven), 
SL-Ratio, Exclusive, Listrank, Salerank, Agentsame, Corporate, Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter (omitted), 
Year2008, Year2009, Year2010, Year2011, Ln(Zip-Md), and Unemp; Financing Issues vector: Interest, 
Foreclosed, and Financing; and Mobsold is the Mobile dummy. The results in the table reflect a total of 
14,280 observations because the control variables Ln(Age), Vacant, Exclus, Corporate, and Financing have 
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missing values.  Estimation of the equation without these five control variables produces different 
coefficient values; however, the result is the same, as the Reduced variable remains positive and 
significant.  All regressions use robust estimations.  Marginal effects reported are average marginal effects.  
Statistical significance indicated as:  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, respectively. 
 
Table 7.  Results of Logit Regression testing the hypothesis that offering sales 
incentives to buyers' agents is positively associated with a seller being highly 
motivated to sell. 
 
Variable Coefficient St. Error Marginal Effects St. Error 
Motivated 2.165*** 0.066 0.267*** 0.007 
Ln(Age) -0.017 0.039 -0.002 0.005 
Vacant 0.016 0.097 0.002 0.012 
Ln(Inven) -0.673 0.588 -0.083 0.072 
SL-Ratio -0.640 1.781 -0.079 0.219 
Exclusive  -0.061 0.174 -0.008 0.021 
Listrank -0.864*** 0.108 -0.106*** 0.013 
Salerank -0.267*** 0.083 -0.033*** 0.010 
Agentsame 0.610*** 0.168 0.075*** 0.021 
Corporate 0.731*** 0.090 0.090*** 0.011 
Spring -0.032 0.122 -0.004 0.015 
Summer 0.004 0.124 0.001 0.015 
Fall -0.106 0.100 -0.013 0.012 
Ln(Zip-Md) -0.306** 0.120 -0.038** 0.015 
Unemp -0.575 3.091 -0.071 0.380 
Interest 2.076 12.762 0.256 1.571 
Foreclosed 1.217*** 0.085 0.150*** 0.010 
Financing 0.033 0.022 0.004 0.003 
Mobsold 2.140*** 0.372 0.263*** 0.045 
Year2008 0.137 0.157 0.017 0.019 
Year2009 0.081 0.324 0.010 0.040 
Year2010 -0.004 0.357 -0.001 0.044 
Year2011 0.316 0.375 0.039 0.046 
Constant 4.667 4.822 - - 
Number of Obs.   9,332 
Wald Chi2 2,213.868 
Pseudo R2 0.365 
Notes:  Logit Regression Empirical Model:  P ( Agent Incentives ) = exp [ Motivated, (Construction and 
Structure), (Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors), and, (Financial Issues) ] / 1 + exp [ Reduced, 
(Construction and Structure), (Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors), and, (Financial Issues) ].  The 
Incentives dependent variable is Agent Incentives Only, defined as Agent Incentives = 1 when all other 
incentives = 0. The main independent variable is Motivated, representing property listings sold by highly 
motivated sellers as determined by content analysis of MLS agent remarks section searching for phrases 
indicative of seller motivation (shown in bold-faced type). Control variables as follows: from the 
Construction & Structure vector: Ln(Age); from the Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors vector: 
Vacant, Ln(Inven), SL-Ratio, Exclusive, Listrank, Salerank, Agentsame, Corporate, Spring, Summer, Fall, 
Winter (omitted), Year2008 (omitted in Model 4), Year2009, Year2010, Year2011, Ln(Zip-Md), and 
Unemp; from the Financing Issues vector: Interest, Foreclosed, and Financing; and Mobsold is the Mobile 
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dummy. The results in the table reflect a total of 9,332 observations because the control variables Ln(Age), 
Vacant, Exclus, Corporate, and Financing have missing values.  Estimation of the equation without these 
five control variables produces different coefficient values; however, the result is the same, as the 
Motivated variable remains positive and significant.  All regressions use robust estimations.  Marginal 
effects reported are average marginal effects.  Statistical significance indicated as: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001, respectively. 
 
motivated sellers are more likely to offer incentives to agents, providing support for the 
hypothesis.
38
  The marginal effects value of the Motivated variable is 0.267, which means 
that highly motivated sellers are 26.7% more likely to offer agent sales incentives 
compared to sellers who are not highly motivated.  The Corporate and Foreclosed 
dummy coefficients (β = 0.731 and β = 1.217, respectively) suggest that sellers of 
corporately owned, as well as foreclosed properties are more likely to offer agent 
incentives.  The coefficient for the Agentsame dummy is positive and significant (β = 
0.610).  This perhaps implies that listing agents are motivated to sell their own listings 
first, thereby earning both the listing and selling sides of the sales commission.  
Additionally, the significant, yet negative coefficients for the Listrank and Salerank 
dummies (β = -0.864 and β = -0.267, respectively) possibly indicate that motivated sellers 
believe a top-ranked company will perform better, and if this is so, they may be less 
likely to offer incentives.   
 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 
In testing Hypotheses 3 and 4, my interest is in finding out whether offering sales 
incentives helps sellers achieve a higher price and a shorter marketing duration.  I test 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 using the Incentives dummy variable.  Significant coefficients for the 
                                                 
38
 This result extends the findings of Rutherford, Springer and Yavas (2001) and Yavas and Yang (1995) 
that motivated sellers may offer varying types of buyer cash incentives to convey their heightened selling 
motivation to the market. 
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IMR will indicate whether the model corrected for self-selection.  In testing Hypothesis 3, 
a positive and significant coefficient for the Incentives dummy will confirm whether 
sellers achieve higher prices by offering incentives.  In testing Hypothesis 4, a negative 
and significant coefficient for the Incentives dummy will confirm whether sellers realize 
shorter marketing durations by offering incentives. 
Table 8 shows the results for testing Hypothesis 3.  The coefficient for the 
Incentives dummy is positive and significant (β = 0.018), which suggests that sellers can 
achieve a higher sales price by offering incentives.
39
  This finding provides support for 
Hypothesis 3.  As an example of the economic impact that offering an incentive has on 
sales price, consider three houses, each sold without incentives at prices of $100,000, 
$250,000, and $500,000, respectively.  The estimation results suggest that had the sellers 




The coefficient for Ln(Age)is negative and significant (β = -0.047), which 
indicates that property age tends to decrease sales price.  The coefficient for the New 
dummy variable is also negative and significant (β = -0.164), which at first glance seems 
at odds with the coefficient results for Ln(Age).  This may be because as the New dummy 
variable captures newly constructed, never occupied properties, regardless of age, 
builders may be more willing to reduce a property‘s price rather than hold it in inventory 
for an extended time.   
 
                                                 
39
 Effectively, the seller lowers the bid-ask spread by offering incentives. 
40
 As the data do not contain specific incentive values, it is not possible to determine if a higher- or lower- 
valued incentive is more or less effective in increasing sales price. 
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Table 8.  Results of 2SLS Regression testing the hypothesis that offering sales 
incentives is positively associated with sale price. 
 
Variable Coefficient St. Error 
IMR -1.133*** 0.044 
Incentives 0.018*** 0.003 
Ln(Age) -0.047*** 0.006 
Ln(SqFeet) 0.680*** 0.008 
Storynum 0.010 0.007 
New -0.164*** 0.007 
Brick 0.011*** 0.003 
Bednum -0.051*** 0.003 
Bathnum 0.200*** 0.007 
Fire 0.195*** 0.003 
Central 0.670*** 0.010 
Parknum 0.078*** 0.001 
Pool 0.104*** 0.004 
Water 0.015*** 0.005 
Urban -0.001 0.003 
Golf -0.000 0.007 
Subd-PUD 0.003 0.004 
Pubwater -0.005 0.006 
Pubsewer -0.006** 0.003 
DOP 0.938*** 0.009 
Vacant -0.013*** 0.003 
Ln(Inven) 0.038 0.024 
SL-Ratio -0.136** 0.062 
Exclusive 0.029*** 0.006 
Listrank 0.200*** 0.008 
Salerank -0.048*** 0.003 
Agentsame 0.163*** 0.011 
Corporate -0.227*** 0.007 
Ln(Zip-Md) 0.093*** 0.007 
Unemp -2.095*** 0.184 
Interest -1.938*** 0.506 
Foreclosed 0.048*** 0.005 
Financing -0.019*** 0.002 
Mobsold 0.079*** 0.016 
Spring -0.003 0.004 
Summer 0.004 0.005 
Fall -0.002 0.004 
Year2008 0.023*** 0.006 
Year2009 0.062*** 0.015 
Year2010 0.049*** 0.016 
Year2011 0.017 0.017 
Constant 5.190*** 0.198 
Number of Obs. 17,322 
F 7,440.726 
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Adjusted R2 0.970 
Notes:  2SLS Regression Empirical Model:  P (Incentives) = Φ [ ln(List) + ∑ (Construction and Structure) 
+ ∑ (Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors) + ∑ (Financial Issues) ].  In each of the four models 
presented, the first stage dependent variable is Incentives. The main independent variable is Ln(List). 
Control variables are: from the Construction & Structure vector: Ln(Age); from the Marketing, Occupancy, 
and Selling Factors vector: Vacant, Ln(Inven), SL-Ratio, Exclusive, Listrank, Salerank, Agentsame, 
Corporate, Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter (omitted), Year2008, Year2009, Year2010, Year2011, Ln(Zip-
Md), and Unemp; from the Financing Issues vector: Interest, Foreclosed, and Financing. In the second 
stage, the dependent variable is Ln(Sale). The IMR of Any Incentives from the first stage is included as an 
independent variable, and the main independent variable is Incentives.  Control variables are: from the 
Construction & Structure vector: Ln(Age), Ln(SqFeet), Storynum, New, and Brick; from the House 
Internal Features vector: Bednum, Bathnum, Fire, and Central; from the House External Features vector: 
Parknum and Pool; from the Environmental-Natural vector: Water; from the Environmental-Neighborhood 
& Location vector: Urban and Golf; from the Environmental-Public Service vector: Subdpud, Pubwater, 
Pubsewer; from the Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors vector: Vacant, Ln(Inven), SL-Ratio, 
Exclusive, Listrank, Salerank, Agentsame, Corporate, Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter (omitted), Year2008, 
Year2009, Year2010, Year2011, Ln(Zip-Md), and Unemp; from the Financing Issues vector: Interest, 
Foreclosed, and Financing; Mobsold is the Mobile dummy; and DOP is the degree of over-pricing. All 
regressions use robust estimations. Statistical significance indicated as: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001, respectively. 
 
The coefficient for Vacant is negative and significant (β = -0.013), which suggests 
that empty homes sell for less money than occupied homes.  The positive and significant 
coefficients for Brick, Fire, Central, Pool, and Water dummies (β = 0.011, β = 0.195, β = 
0.670, β = 0.104, and β = 0.015, respectively), and Bathnum and Parknum (β = 0.200 and  
β = 0.078, respectively) suggest that these property features have a positive impact on 
sales prices.  The positive and significant coefficient for the DOP variable (β = 0.938) 
suggests that homes that are not initially overpriced sell for higher prices than homes that 
are over-priced.  The positive and significant coefficients for Listrank and Agentsame (β 
= 0.200 and β = 0.163, respectively) suggest that listing properties with an agent at a top-
ranked listing company, or when the listing agent sells his/her own listing both work to 
increase sales price.  However, the negative and significant coefficient for Salerank (β = -
0.048) indicates homes sold by agents of top-ranked selling companies sell for less, 
possibly because sellers might perceive that an agent at such a firm is more likely to work 
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with a near certain buyer, and therefore they may be more willing to lower the price so as 
not to risk losing a deal.  
Table 9 shows the results for testing Hypothesis 4.  The Incentives dummy 
coefficient is positive and significant (β = 0.068), which is an unexpected result that does 
not provide support for Hypothesis 4.  Instead, it suggests an association between sales 
incentives and increased market duration.  To quantify the impact of sales incentives on 
marketing duration in terms of the estimation results, a property that sells in 180 days 
with no sales incentive would require 6.8% more time, or an additional 12 days to sell if 
the seller offered a sales incentive.  A possible explanation for this unexpected finding 
may draw from the basic tenets of economics: there are fewer people willing to pay a 
higher price than a lower one.  With respect to property sales, this would indicate that a 
greater number of potential buyers must view and consider a property in order to produce 
one that is willing and able to pay a higher price.  As incentives effectively increase 
selling expenses and decrease net profit, if sellers feel they have little room for price 
negotiation, finding a buyer willing to pay more may extend marketing duration.   
Consider a second, somewhat related possible explanation.  If buyers‘ agents 
understand their clients‘ needs and wants, then they would also have a clear 
understanding of their limitations, especially in terms of price.  If buyers‘ agents think 
sellers will only accept a higher price because of the lower expected net profit due to a 
sales incentive, then they may only show properties offering agent incentives to those 
buyers whom they believe will pay a higher price.  Again, because there are fewer such 
potential buyers, this possibility would also likely increase marketing duration.  






Table 9.  Results of 2SLS Regression testing the hypothesis that offering sales 
incentives is negatively associated with marketing duration. 
 
Variable Coefficient St. Error 
IMR -2.618*** 0.326 
Any Incentives 0.068*** 0.014 
Ln(Sale Price) -0.720*** 0.054 
Ln(Age) 0.207*** 0.043 
Ln(SqFeet) 0.786*** 0.052 
Storynum 0.02 0.028 
New -0.091* 0.049 
Brick -0.043*** 0.014 
Bednum -0.058*** 0.015 
Bathnum 0.119*** 0.019 
Fire 0.152*** 0.022 
Central 0.497*** 0.049 
Parknum 0.060*** 0.01 
Pool 0.112*** 0.025 
Water 0.145*** 0.033 
Urban 0.005 0.018 
Golf 0.114*** 0.04 
Subd-PUD 0.03 0.023 
Pubwater -0.013 0.034 
Pubsewer -0.094*** 0.019 
DOP 0.614*** 0.058 
Vacant 0.041*** 0.015 
Ln(Inventory) -0.389*** 0.144 
SL-Ratio -0.538 0.379 
Exclusive 0.166*** 0.038 
Listrank 0.421*** 0.061 
Salerank -0.106*** 0.023 
Agentsame -0.393*** 0.09 
Corporate -0.428*** 0.06 
Ln(Zip-Median) -0.132*** 0.036 
Unemployment -5.787*** 1.068 
Interest 3.45 3.183 
Foreclosed -0.024 0.025 
Financing -0.047*** 0.012 
Mobsold 0.555*** 0.092 
Spring 0.001 0.028 
Summer 0.122*** 0.029 
Fall 0.069*** 0.024 
Year2008 -0.642*** 0.033 
Year2009 -0.351*** 0.086 
Year2010 -0.295*** 0.093 
Year2011 -0.337*** 0.097 
Constant 12.351*** 1.297 
Number of Obs. 12,949 




Adjusted R2 0.098 
Notes:  2SLS Regression Empirical Model:  P (Incentives) = Φ [ ln(List) + ∑ (Construction and Structure) 
+ ∑ (Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors) + ∑ (Financial Issues) ].  In each of the four models 
presented, the first stage dependent variable is Incentives. The main independent variable is Ln(List). 
Control variables are: from the Construction & Structure vector: Ln(Age); from the Marketing, Occupancy, 
and Selling Factors vector: Vacant, Ln(Inven), SL-Ratio, Exclusive, Listrank, Salerank, Agentsame, 
Corporate, Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter (omitted), Year2008, Year2009, Year2010, Year2011, Ln(Zip-
Md), and Unemp; from the Financing Issues vector: Interest, Foreclosed, and Financing. In the second 
stage, the dependent variable is Ln(Sale). The IMR of Any Incentives from the first stage is included as an 
independent variable, as is Ln(Sale).  The main independent variable is Incentives.  Control variables are: 
from the Construction & Structure vector: Ln(Age), Ln(SqFeet), Storynum, New, and Brick; from the 
House Internal Features vector: Bednum, Bathnum, Fire, and Central; from the House External Features 
vector: Parknum and Pool; from the Environmental-Natural vector: Water; from the Environmental-
Neighborhood & Location vector: Urban and Golf; from the Environmental-Public Service vector: 
Subdpud, Pubwater, Pubsewer; from the Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors vector: Vacant, 
Ln(Inven), SL-Ratio, Exclusive, Listrank, Salerank, Agentsame, Corporate, Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter 
(omitted), Year2008, Year2009, Year2010, Year2011, Ln(Zip-Md), and Unemp; from the Financing Issues 
vector: Interest, Foreclosed, and Financing; Mobsold is the Mobile dummy; and DOP is the degree of over-
pricing. All regressions use robust estimations. Statistical significance indicated as: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001, respectively.                   
 
may be due to buyers simply taking longer to evaluate and compare the economic values 
of incentives offered before making a purchase decision.  Certainly, agents may do 
likewise, yet the buyer is the ultimate driver of the transaction.  The additional marketing 
durations in this case are most likely due to buyer comparisons rather than agent 
comparisons.  
The coefficients for Ln(Age) and the Vacant dummy are positive and significant 
(β = 0.207 and β = 0.041, respectively) which indicate that it takes more time to sell older 
homes, and homes that are vacant.  The negative and significant coefficient for the New 
dummy variable (β = -0.091) suggests that new homes sell more quickly than existing 
homes, and as discussed above, one reason may be that builders want to turn their 
inventory over as quickly as possible.  The negative and significant coefficient for the 
Brick dummy variable (β = -0.043) suggests that homes with brick, block, or cement-
board exteriors sell faster than homes with other types of exteriors such as wood or 
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stucco.  Likewise, the negative and significant coefficient for the Bednum dummy 
variable (β = -0.058) indicates that the more bedrooms a home has the faster it will sell.  
However, the positive and significant coefficients for the Fire, Pool, and Water dummy 
variables (β = 0.152, β = 0.112, and β = 0.145, respectively) suggest that properties with 
these features take longer to sell.  The positive and significant coefficient for the DOP 
variable (β = 0.614) indicates that initially overpriced properties take longer to sell than 
ones that are not.  Interestingly, the positive and significant Listrank dummy variable 
coefficient (β = 0.421) may suggest that listing a property for sale with a top-ranked 
listing company may actually increase the time it takes for a property to sell.  This may 
be because top-ranked listing agents, who because of their market activity help make 
their company rank high in terms of listing firms, focus more so on listing properties 
rather than selling them.  However, the negative and significant coefficients for the 
Agentsame and Salerank dummies (β = -0.393 and β = -0.106, respectively) may suggest 
that agents working for top-ranked selling companies sell homes faster than agents at 
other companies, and that listing agents sell their own listings faster than they sell other 
agents‘ listings.   
 
Robustness Tests 
Hypotheses 1-4 test results confirm that sellers are more likely to offer buyer 
incentives to reduce bid-ask spreads; highly motivated sellers are more likely to offer 
agent incentives; and seller-paid sales incentives increase sales prices.  These results may 
lead to other interesting questions.  For example, whether one form of incentive (such as 
cash or non-cash) or type of incentive (such as a bonus or a prize) is more effective than 
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another is.  Another set of questions might consider whether buyer incentives work the 
same as agent incentives do, or perhaps whether the results are the same when sellers 
offer incentives to both buyers and agents.  Therefore, for added robustness, I explore 
these questions by testing each hypothesis using a number of different dummy variables 
constructed to include different incentive forms, types, and combinations.  I list the 
dummy variables I construct for the additional testing on Table 10 and provide detailed 
explanations below. 
Although the primary focus of Hypothesis 1 is the use of seller-paid buyer 
incentives to reduce bid-ask spreads, it is possible that cash incentives will be more 
effective than non-cash incentives at doing so, or vice-versa.  To test this, I construct the 
dummy variables Buyer Only Cash that takes the value of one if the seller offers only 
cash incentives only to the buyer, and zero otherwise, and Buyer Only Noncash that takes 
the value of one if the seller offers only non-cash incentives only to the buyer, and zero 
otherwise.  As shown in Table 2, Panel A, of the 9,809 buyer only incentives, there are 
7,405 (75.49%) cash and 1,489 (15.18%) non-cash incentives.   
Table 11 shows the results for additional Hypothesis 1 testing.  In Models 1 and 2, 
the dependent variables are Buyer Only Cash, and Buyer Only Noncash, respectively.  
The Reduced variable is positive and significant in both models (β = 2.491 and β = 1.882, 
respectively), which suggests that sellers are likely to offer cash or non-cash incentives to 
reduce the bid-ask spread.  To find out if cash incentives are more effective than noncash 
incentives, or vice-versa, after condensing the sample to include only buyer incentives, I 
construct a dummy variable Buyer-Compare that takes the value of one if buyer 






Table 10.  Description of Additional Incentives Variables. 
 
Panel A 
Buyer Incentives Only 1 if incentives are offered only to the buyer; 0 otherwise 
Agent Incentives Only 1 if incentives are offered only to the agent; 0 otherwise 
Both Incentives 1 if incentives are offered to both the buyer and the agent; 0 otherwise 
Buyer Only Cash 1 if the only incentives offered are buyer cash incentives; 0 otherwise  
Agent Only Cash 1 if the only incentives offered are agent cash incentives; 0 otherwise 
Both Cash 1 if the only incentives offered are both buyer and agent cash incentives; 
0 otherwise 
Buyer Only Noncash 1 if the only incentives offered are buyer noncash incentives; 0 
otherwise  
Agent Only Noncash 1 if the only incentives offered are agent noncash incentives; 0 otherwise 
Both Noncash 1 if the only incentives offered are both buyer and agent noncash 
incentives; 0 otherwise 
Buyer Only Cash & Noncash 1 if the only incentives offered are buyer cash and noncash incentives; 0 
otherwise  
Agent Only Cash & Noncash 1 if the only incentives offered are agent cash and noncash incentives; 0 
otherwise 
Both Cash & Noncash 1 if the only incentives offered are both buyer and agent cash and 
noncash incentives; 0 otherwise 
Both Cash & Noncash 1 if the only incentives offered are both buyer and agent cash and 
noncash incentives; 0 otherwise 
Buyer-Compare From the buyer incentives only sub-group, 1 if the only incentives 
offered are buyer cash incentives and zero if the only incentives offered 
are buyer noncash incentives 
Agent-Compare From the agent incentives only sub-group, 1 if the only incentives 
offered are agent cash incentives and zero if the only incentives offered 
are agent noncash incentives 
Buyer-CNC1 From the buyer incentives only sub-group, 1 if the only incentives 
offered are buyer cash and noncash incentives or no incentives are 
offered at all (incentives = 0) 
Buyer-CNC2 From the buyer incentives only sub-group, 1 if the only incentives 
offered are buyer cash and noncash incentives and zero if the only 
incentives offered are buyer cash incentives 
Buyer-CNC3 From the buyer incentives only sub-group, 1 if the only incentives 
offered are buyer cash incentives, zero if the only incentives offered are 
buyer noncash incentives, and zero if the only incentives offered are 
buyer cash and noncash incentives 
Agent-CNC1 From the agent incentives only sub-group, 1 if the only incentives 
offered are agent cash and noncash incentives or no incentives are 
offered at all (incentives = 0) 
Agent-CNC2 From the agent incentives only sub-group, 1 if the only incentives 
offered are agent cash and noncash incentives and zero if the only 
incentives offered are agent cash incentives 
Agent-CNC3 From the agent incentives only sub-group, 1 if the only incentives 
offered are agent cash incentives, zero if the only incentives offered are 
agent noncash incentives, and zero if the only incentives offered are 
agent cash and noncash incentives 
Panel B 
Warranty 1 if the seller or builder offer the buyer a home warranty; 0 otherwise 
Closing Costs Allowance 1 if the seller offers the buyer a closing costs allowance; 0 otherwise 
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Repair/Redecorating Allowance 1 if the sellers the buyer a repair or redecorating allowance; 0 otherwise 
Finance/Lease Purchase/Trade 1 if the seller offers the buyer to finance, lease purchase, or trade; 0 
otherwise 
Appliances/Fixtures 1 if the seller offers the buyer to include unattached appliances or 
fixtures; 0 otherwise 
Buyer Prize or Gift 1 if the sellers offers the buyer a prize or gift; 0 otherwise 
Higher Commission Split 1 if the seller offers the buyers' agent a higher commission split; 0 
otherwise 
Selling Agent Bonus 1 if the seller offers the buyers' agent a selling bonus; 0 otherwise 
Agent Prize or Gift 1 if the sellers offers the buyers' agent a prize or gift; 0 otherwise 
Notes:  The table above presents the dummy variables used to depict the different forms and types of seller-
paid incentives. 
 
Table 11.  Results of additional robustness testing using Logit Regression to test the 
hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between sellers offering incentives to 
buyers and real estate asset bid-ask spread. 
 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error 
Reduced 2.491*** 0.383 1.882*** 0.588 1.884* 0.989 
Ln(Age) -0.474*** 0.023 0.060 0.046 -0.564*** 0.045 
Vacant 0.177*** 0.048 0.044 0.089 0.161* 0.096 
Ln(Inven) 0.092 0.462 -0.209 0.746 -0.243 0.895 
SL-Ratio -0.204 1.161 0.771 2.194 -2.655 2.343 
Exclusive  -0.109 0.105 0.240 0.245 -0.407 0.265 
Listrank -0.059 0.067 -0.238** 0.103 0.269** 0.118 
Salerank -0.029 0.059 0.205** 0.094 -0.239** 0.108 
Agentsame -0.356** 0.160 -1.474*** 0.392 0.810** 0.401 
Corporate 0.157** 0.069 -0.096 0.119 -0.174 0.125 
Spring 0.047 0.087 -0.065 0.158 0.197 0.176 
Summer 0.029 0.093 -0.030 0.162 0.249 0.181 
Fall 0.003 0.073 0.039 0.130 0.032 0.149 
Ln(Zip-Md) 0.274*** 0.099 -0.042 0.176 0.139 0.191 
Unemp 3.983 2.481 -1.722 3.828 11.066* 6.301 
Interest 0.109 9.559 43.058** 17.077 -63.153*** 20.834 
Foreclosed -1.682*** 0.084 -0.050 0.111 -1.091*** 0.121 
Financing 0.110*** 0.019 0.072** 0.030 0.007 0.040 
Mobsold -1.934*** 0.301 0.422 0.475 -2.273*** 0.586 
Year2008 -0.163 0.103 0.213 0.190 -0.645*** 0.223 
Year2009 -0.300 0.241 0.792* 0.408 -1.859*** 0.593 
Year2010 -0.311 0.261 0.929** 0.447 -2.059*** 0.635 
Year2011 -0.405 0.282 0.823* 0.482 -2.064*** 0.675 
Constant -4.637 3.771 -5.451 6.173 7.243 7.344 
Number of Obs.   12,798 7,312 7,036 
Wald Chi2 2,852.398 75.392 738.788 
Pseudo R2 0.244 0.016 0.205 
Notes:  Logit Regression Empirical Model:  P ( Buyer Incentives ) = exp [ Reduced, (Construction and 
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Structure), (Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors), and, (Financial Issues) ] / 1 + exp [ Reduced, 
(Construction and Structure), (Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors), and, (Financial Issues) ].  The 
Incentives dependent variable differs among the three models using dummy variables as follows: for Model 
1, the dummy variable includes observations when Buyer Only Cash = 1 (any observation with any other 
type of incentive is excluded), and the default value of zero is for cases where an incentive is not offered; 
for Model 2, the dummy variable includes observations when Buyer Only Noncash = 1 (any observation 
with any other type of incentive is excluded), and the default value of zero is for cases where an incentive is 
not offered; Model 3 compares Buyer Only Cash versus Buyer Only Noncash incentives when all other 
incentives = 0 (any observation with any other type of incentive is excluded). The main independent 
variable is Ln(Reduced), calculated by sorting all properties according to their respective MLS system 
defined sub-markets areas; totaling the sold prices for all observations within each respective sub-market 
area; subtracting the sold price for each observation from the total of all sold price observations in each 
sub-market area; calculating the average sold price of all observations per sub-market area by dividing each 
sub-market area‘s total sold prices by one less than the number of sold observations in each sub-market 
area; and, dividing the original list price established on the first day of the property listing by the average 
sold price of all observations per sub-market area (excluding each individual observation) (shown in bold-
faced type).  Control variables as follows: Construction & Structure vector: Ln(Age); Marketing, 
Occupancy, and Selling Factors vector: include Vacant, Ln(Inven), SL-Ratio, Exclusive, Listrank, 
Salerank, Agentsame, Corporate, Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter (omitted), Year2008, Year2009, Year2010, 
Year2011, Ln(Zip-Md), and Unemp; Financing Issues vector: Interest, Foreclosed, and Financing; and 
Mobsold is the Mobile dummy. The results in the table reflect a total of 12,798 observations in Model 2, 
7,312 observations in Model 3, and 7,036 observations in Model 3 because the control variables Ln(Age), 
Vacant, Exclus, Corporate, and Financing have missing values.  Estimation of the equation without these 
five control variables produces different coefficient values; however, the result is the same, as the Reduced 
variable remains positive and significant. All regressions use robust estimations. Statistical significance 
indicated as:  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, respectively. 
 
Equation (2), comparing the use of buyer cash incentives to buyer non-cash incentives; 
the purpose is to determine if it makes a difference whether the incentive is cash or 
noncash as captured by the dummy variable.  As shown in Table 11, in Model 3 the 
Reduced variable coefficient is positive and significant (β = 1.884), which means that to 
reduce the bid-ask spread, sellers are more likely to offer buyer cash incentives compared 
to buyer noncash incentives.
41
  
                                                 
41 I also conduct three additional series of robustness tests using additional dummy variables as defined in 
Table 10 (results not reported).  First, I test Equation (2) three separate ways using Buyer-CNC1, Buyer-
CNC2, and Buyer-CNC3, respectively, instead of the incentives dummy.  All estimations produce positive, 
significant coefficients for the Reduced variable, which again, suggests that sellers are more likely to offer 
incentives to buyers to reduce the bid-ask spread.  Second, I test Equation (2) six different ways using the 
individual buyer incentive types shown in Table 3, Panel B, to determine if a seller is more or less likely to 
offer a specific type of buyer cash or non-cash incentive.  The Reduced dummy coefficient is positive and 
significant for buyer cash incentives of Warranty and Repair/Redecorating Allowance, and the buyer non-
cash incentives of Appliances/Fixtures and Owner Finance/Lease Purchase/Trade.  Lastly, I test Equation 
(2) four different ways using various forms of agent incentives dummies in place of the buyer dummies as 
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To test Hypothesis 2, I examine whether there is a positive association between 
highly motivated sellers and the presence of agent incentives.  In the initial testing, I 
simply look at the presence of agent incentives but do not dissect the sample into specific 
subsets of cash or noncash incentives.  However, it may be that sellers are more likely to 
offer one type of incentive than another is.  To test this, I construct the dummy variables 
Agent Only Cash that takes the value of one if the seller offers only cash incentives only 
to the agent, and zero otherwise, and Agent Only Noncash that takes the value of one if 
the seller offers only noncash incentives only to the agent, and zero otherwise.  As shown 
in Table 2, Panel A, of the 4,843 agent only incentives, there are 4,797 (99.05%) cash and 
36 (0.74%) noncash incentives.   
Table 12 shows the results for additional Hypothesis 2 testing.  In Models 1 and 2, 
the dependent variables are Agent Only Cash, and Agent Only Noncash, respectively.  
The Motivated variable is positive and significant in both models (β = 2.161 and β = 
3.000, respectively), which suggests that highly motivated sellers are likely to offer cash 
or noncash incentives to agents to increase buyers‘ agent coverage.  To find out if cash 
incentives are more effective than noncash incentives, or vice-versa, after condensing the 
sample to include only agent incentives, I construct a dummy variable Agent-Compare 
that takes the value of one if agent incentives are cash, and zero if noncash.  I use the 
Agent-Compare dummy variable to test Equation (4) to compare the use of agent cash to 
agent noncash incentives; the purpose is to determine if it makes a difference whether the 
incentive is cash or noncash as captured by the dummy variable.  As shown in Table 12, 
                                                                                                                                                 
follows: Agent Incentives, Agent Cash, Agent Noncash, and Agent-Compare.  The Reduced coefficients are 
negative and significant when using Agent Incentives and Agent Noncash, suggesting sellers are less likely 







Table 12.  Results of additional robustness testing using Logit Regression to test the 
hypothesis that offering sales incentives to buyers' agents is positively associated 
with a seller being highly motivated to sell. 
 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coefficient  St. Error Coefficient  St. Error Coefficient  St. Error 
Motivated 2.161*** 0.067 3.000*** 0.730 -0.889 0.884 
Ln(Age) -0.016 0.039 0.126 0.476 -0.192 0.472 
Vacant 0.020 0.098 -0.395 0.653 0.314 0.784 
Ln(Inven) -0.605 0.591 -14.234 12.471 14.303 10.933 
SL-Ratio -0.603 1.785 -0.694 51.556 -7.487 55.343 
Exclus  -0.064 0.174 (o) (o) (o) (o) 
Listrank -0.895*** 0.109 0.847* 0.505 -2.183*** 0.622 
Salerank -0.252*** 0.084 -1.026 0.729 0.586 0.788 
Agentsame 0.630*** 0.168 (o) (o) (o) (o) 
Corporate 0.731*** 0.091 -0.528 0.852 0.908 0.896 
Spring -0.044 0.122 0.258 1.143 0.444 1.295 
Summer -0.006 0.124 0.460 1.043 -0.276 0.937 
Fall -0.111 0.100 (o) (o) (o) (o) 
Ln(Zip-Md) -0.299** 0.120 -1.838* 0.971 1.291 0.949 
Unemp -0.805 3.100 -39.464 35.774 63.729* 37.607 
Interest 3.119 12.800 79.030 152.384 -110.284 163.655 
Foreclosed 1.234*** 0.085 -0.170 0.631 1.598** 0.694 
Financing 0.029 0.022 0.343** 0.169 -0.316* 0.174 
Mobsold 2.086*** 0.374 13.725* 7.058 -13.683 8.715 
Year2008 0.136 0.158 21.086*** 4.770 -17.805*** 4.602 
Year2009 0.100 0.325 25.141*** 6.173 -23.078*** 6.873 
Year2010 0.010 0.358 25.678*** 6.775 -23.942*** 7.626 
Year2011 0.328 0.376 25.657*** 6.399 -23.310*** 6.982 
Constant 4.024 4.832 91.810 99.123 -90.890 86.251 
Number of Obs.   9,316 4,667 1,942 
Wald Chi2 2,214.041 217.695 952.436 
Pseudo R2 0.367 0.338 0.320 
Notes:  Logit Regression Empirical Model:  P ( Agent Incentives ) = exp [ Motivated, (Construction and 
Structure), (Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors), and, (Financial Issues) ] / 1 + exp [ Motivated, 
(Construction and Structure), (Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors), and, (Financial Issues) ].  The 
Incentives dependent variable differs among the three models using dummy variables as follows: for Model 
1, the dummy variable includes observations when Agent Only Cash = 1 (any observation with any other 
type of incentive is excluded), and the default value of zero is for cases where an incentive is not offered; 
for Model 2, the dummy variable includes observations when Agent Only Noncash = 1 (any observation 
with any other type of incentive is excluded), and the default value of zero is for cases where an incentive is 
not offered; Model 3 compares Agent Only Cash versus Agent Only Noncash incentives when all other 
incentives = 0 (any observation with any other type of incentive is excluded). The main independent 
variable is Motivated, representing property listings sold by highly motivated sellers as determined by 
content analysis of MLS agent remarks section searching for phrases indicative of seller motivation (shown 
in bold-faced type).  Control variables as follows: Construction & Structure vector: Ln(Age); Marketing, 
Occupancy, and Selling Factors vector: include Vacant, Ln(Inven), SL-Ratio, Exclusive, Listrank, 
Salerank, Agentsame, Corporate, Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter (omitted), Year2008, Year2009, Year2010, 
Year2011, Ln(Zip-Md), and Unemp; Financing Issues vector: Interest, Foreclosed, and Financing; and 
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Mobsold is the Mobile dummy. The results in the table reflect a total of 9,316 observations in Model 1, 
4,667 observations in Model 2, and 1,942 observations in Model 3 because the control variables Ln(Age), 
Vacant, Exclus, Corporate, and Financing have missing values.  Estimation of the equation without these 
five control variables produces different coefficient values; however, the result is the same, as the 
Motivated variable remains positive and significant.  All regressions use robust estimations. Statistical 
significance indicated as:  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, respectively. 
 
in Model 3 the Motivated variable coefficient is insignificant.  This means there is no 
statistical difference between using agent cash incentives versus agent noncash 
incentives.  Therefore, all that matters is the presence of incentives offered to the agent, 
not whether it is a cash or noncash incentive.  The results of these additional tests provide 
further support for Hypothesis 2, confirming that highly motivated sellers are likely to 
offer incentives to agents.
42
      
In my initial testing of Hypotheses 3 and 4, I include just the Incentives dummy 
variable to test how seller-paid sales incentives affect sales price and marketing duration.  
However, I did not analyze the effects of any specific incentive types or forms.  
Therefore, for robustness, using a 2SLS estimation, I test Hypotheses 3 and 4 using a 
number  of incentives dummy variables constructed to include different incentive forms, 
                                                 
42
 I also conduct three additional series of robustness tests using additional dummy variables as defined in 
Table 10 (results not reported).  First, I test Equation (4) three separate ways using Agent-CNC1, Agent-
CNC2, and Agent-CNC3, respectively, instead of the incentives dummy.  When Agent-CNC1 is the 
dependent variable, the Motivated dummy variable coefficient is positive and significant, which again 
suggests that highly motivated sellers are likely to offer sales incentives to agents, regardless of whether 
they are cash or noncash.  The Motivated dummy coefficients are insignificant when Agent-CNC2 and 
Agent-CNC3 are the dependent variables, respectively.  Second, I test Equation (4) three different ways 
using the individual agent incentive types shown in Table 2, Panel B, to determine if a highly motivated 
seller is more or less likely to offer a specific type of agent cash or noncash incentive.  The Motivated 
dummy coefficient is positive and significant in all estimations, suggesting that highly motivated sellers are 
just as likely to offer one type of agent incentive as another type.  Lastly, I test Equation (4) four different 
ways using various forms of buyer incentives dummies in place of the agent incentives dummies as 
follows: Buyer Incentives, Buyer Cash, Buyer Noncash, and Buyer-Compare.  The Motivated dummy 
coefficients are positive and significant in the first three estimations, suggesting that highly motivated 
sellers are likely to offer buyer incentives that are either cash, noncash, or both.  However, in the fourth 
estimation, the Motivated coefficient is negative and significant, suggesting that when comparing cash 
incentives to noncash incentives, highly motivated sellers are less likely to offer cash incentives than 
noncash incentives. 
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types, and combinations, to test Equations (8) and (10).
43
  I use two models to test 
separately each of the hypotheses.  In Model 1, I include the dummy variables Buyer 
Incentives Only that takes the value of one if the seller offers incentives only to the buyer, 
and zero otherwise; Agent Incentives Only that takes the value of one if the seller offers 
incentives only to the agent, and zero otherwise; and, Both Incentives that takes the value 
of one if the seller offers incentives to both the buyer and the agent, and zero otherwise.  
In Model 2, I include dummies for Buyer Only Cash that takes the value of one if the 
seller offers only cash incentives only to the buyer, and zero otherwise; Buyer Only 
Noncash that takes the value of one if the seller offers only noncash incentives only to the 
buyer, and zero otherwise; Agent Only Cash that takes the value of one if the seller offers 
only cash incentives only to the agent, and zero otherwise; Agent Only Noncash that takes 
the value of one if the seller offers only noncash incentives only to the agent, and zero 
otherwise; Both Cash that takes the value of one if the seller offers only cash incentives 
to both the buyer and the agent, and zero otherwise; and, Both Noncash that takes the 
value of one if the seller offers only noncash incentives to both the buyer and the agent.   
Table 13 shows the results for the additional Hypothesis 3 testing.  In Model 1, 
the Buyer Incentives Only and Both Incentives dummy variable coefficients are positive 
and significant (β = 0.023 and β = 0.013, respectively), yet there is no significance for the 
Agent Incentives Only dummy coefficient.  In Model 2, the dummy variable coefficients 
for Buyer Only Cash, Buyer Only Noncash, and Both Noncash are positive and 
significant (β = 0.015, β = 0.017, and β = 0.025, respectively), but in this model too, there 
is no significance for the agent incentives dummies.  These results provide additional 
                                                 
43







Table 13.  Results of 2SLS Regression testing the hypothesis that offering sales 
incentives is positively associated with sale price. 
 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 
Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error 
IMR -1.134*** 0.044 -1.148*** 0.044 
Buyer Incentives Only 0.023*** 0.003     
Agent Incentives Only 0.008 0.006     
Both Incentives 0.013*** 0.004     
Buyer Only Cash     0.015*** 0.003 
Buyer Only Noncash     0.017*** 0.006 
Agent Only Cash     0.006 0.006 
Agent Only Noncash     -0.112 0.077 
Both Cash     -0.005 0.004 
Both Noncash     0.025*** 0.009 
Ln(Age) -0.047*** 0.006 -0.045*** 0.006 
Ln(SqFeet) 0.680*** 0.008 0.680*** 0.008 
Storynum 0.010 0.007 0.010 0.007 
New -0.166*** 0.007 -0.158*** 0.007 
Brick 0.011*** 0.003 0.011*** 0.003 
Bednum -0.051*** 0.003 -0.051*** 0.003 
Bathnum 0.200*** 0.007 0.200*** 0.007 
Fire 0.195*** 0.003 0.195*** 0.003 
Central 0.670*** 0.010 0.671*** 0.010 
Parknum 0.078*** 0.001 0.078*** 0.001 
Pool 0.104*** 0.004 0.105*** 0.004 
Water 0.015*** 0.005 0.016*** 0.005 
Urban -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003 
Golf -0.000 0.007 -0.001 0.007 
Subd-PUD 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 
Pubwater -0.005 0.006 -0.005 0.006 
Pubsewer -0.006** 0.003 -0.006** 0.003 
DOP 0.936*** 0.009 0.937*** 0.009 
Vacant -0.013*** 0.003 -0.014*** 0.003 
Ln(Inven) 0.038 0.024 0.040* 0.024 
SL-Ratio -0.137** 0.062 -0.140** 0.062 
Exclusive 0.029*** 0.006 0.030*** 0.006 
Listrank 0.199*** 0.008 0.200*** 0.008 
Salerank -0.048*** 0.003 -0.048*** 0.003 
Agentsame 0.163*** 0.011 0.164*** 0.011 
Corporate -0.225*** 0.007 -0.228*** 0.007 
Ln(Zip-Md) 0.093*** 0.007 0.092*** 0.007 
Unemp -2.090*** 0.184 -2.105*** 0.184 
Interest -1.940*** 0.506 -1.932*** 0.506 
Foreclosed 0.050*** 0.005 0.049*** 0.005 
Financing -0.019*** 0.002 -0.019*** 0.002 
Mobsold 0.082*** 0.017 0.081*** 0.017 
Spring -0.003 0.004 -0.003 0.004 
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Summer 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 
Fall -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.004 
Year2008 0.023*** 0.006 0.023*** 0.006 
Year2009 0.061*** 0.015 0.062*** 0.015 
Year2010 0.049*** 0.016 0.050*** 0.016 
Year2011 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.017 
Constant 5.192*** 0.198 5.191*** 0.199 
Number of Obs. 17,322 17,322 
F 7,108.402 6,644.945 
Adjusted R2 0.970 0.970 
Notes:  2SLS Regression Empirical Model:  P (Incentives) = Φ [ ln(List) + ∑ (Construction and Structure) 
+ ∑ (Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors) + ∑ (Financial Issues) ].  In each of the four models 
presented, the first stage dependent variable is Any Incentives. The main independent variable is Ln(List). 
Control variables are: from the Construction & Structure vector: Ln(Age); from the Marketing, Occupancy, 
and Selling Factors vector: Vacant, Ln(Inven), SL-Ratio, Exclusive (omitted in Model 5b), Listrank, 
Salerank (omitted in Model 5b), Agentsame, Corporate, Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter (omitted), Year2008, 
Year2009, Year2010, Year2011, Ln(Zip-Md), and Unemp; from the Financing Issues vector: Interest, 
Foreclosed, and Financing. In the second stage, the dependent variable is Ln(Sale). The IMR of Any 
Incentives from the first stage is included as an independent variable, and the main independent variables 
are drawn from the Incentives vector as follows: (1) Model 1 uses Buyer Incentives Only, defined as Buyer 
Incentives = 1 and all other incentives = 0 , Agent Incentives Only, defined as Agent Incentives = 1 and all 
other incentives = 0, and Both Buyer & Agent Incentives, defined as Buyer & Agent Incentives = 1; Model 
2 uses Buyer Only Cash, defined as Buyer Only Cash = 1 when all other incentives = 0, Buyer Only 
Noncash, defined as Buyer Only Noncash = 1 when all other incentives = 0, Agent Only Cash, defined as 
Agent Only Cash = 1 when all other incentives = 0, Agent Only Noncash, defined as Agent Only Noncash 
= 1 when all other incentives = 0, Buyer Only Cash & Noncash, defined as Buyer Only Cash & Noncash 
incentives = 1 when all other incentives = 0, Agent Only Cash & Noncash, defined as Agent Only Cash & 
Noncash incentives = 1 when all other incentives = 0, and Both Buyer & Agent Cash & Noncash, defined 
as Buyer & Agent Cash & Noncash incentives = 1 when all other incentives = 0 (statistically significant 
IMR and main independent variables shown in bold-faced type). Control variables are: from the 
Construction & Structure vector: Ln(Age), Ln(SqFeet), Storynum, New, and Brick; from the House 
Internal Features vector: Bednum, Bathnum, Fire, and Central; from the House External Features vector: 
Parknum and Pool; from the Environmental-Natural vector: Water; from the Environmental-Neighborhood 
& Location vector: Urban and Golf; from the Environmental-Public Service vector: Subdpud, Pubwater, 
Pubsewer; from the Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors vector: Vacant, Ln(Inven), SL-Ratio, 
Exclusive, Listrank, Salerank, Agentsame, Corporate, Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter (omitted), Year2008, 
Year2009, Year2010, Year2011, Ln(Zip-Md), and Unemp; from the Financing Issues vector: Interest, 
Foreclosed, and Financing; Mobsold is the Mobile dummy; and DOP is the degree of over-pricing. All 
regressions use robust estimations. Statistical significance indicated as: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001, respectively. 
 
support for Hypothesis 3, but also show that buyer sales incentives positively affect sales 
price, while agent sales incentives do not.
44
  
                                                 
44
 This finding concurs with the findings of Johnson, Anderson, and Benefield (2004) that selling agent 
bonuses do not consistently produce higher sales prices. 
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Table 14 shows the results for the additional testing of Hypothesis 4.  In Model 1, 
the Agent Incentives Only and Both Incentives dummy variable coefficients are positive 
and significant (β = 0.119 and β = 0.022, respectively), yet there is no significance for the 
Buyer Incentives Only dummy coefficient.  In Model 2, the dummy variable coefficient  
for Buyer Only Cash is negative and significant (β = -0.033), while the coefficients for 
the Agent Only Cash and Both Cash dummies are positive and significant (β = 0.092 and 
β = 0.151, respectively).  In my initial tests of Hypothesis 4, contrary to my expectation, I 
find that incentives do not decrease marketing duration, but rather increase it.  The results 
of these additional tests underscore the influence of agent incentives in the initial test 
results, while they also indicate that buyer cash incentives, by themselves, may reduce 
marketing duration.  The significance of this particular result may be because of the 
actual type of buyer cash incentive itself.  Consider that a home warranty that insures 
against property component failures, or allowances for either closing costs or repairs 
essentially put cash in a buyer‘s pocket.  As these types of incentives actually reduce a 
buyer‘s purchase costs, buyers may react to properties offering these types of buyer cash 
incentives faster than they react to properties without them.
45
   
 
                                                 
45
 I use the individual types of incentives as shown on Table 2, Panel B, to test whether the type of 
incentive a seller offers a buyer or an agent (such as a warranty or prize) makes a difference in achieving 
the goal of higher price or shorter time on market (results not reported).  The coefficients for the 
Seller/Builder Warranty and Allowance for Repair/Redecorating dummies, both buyer cash incentives, and 
the Agent Prize or Gift dummy, an agent noncash incentive, are positive and significant, which suggests 
that offering these particular types of incentives may positively influence sales price.  The coefficients for 
Closings Costs Allowance, a buyer cash incentive, and Selling Agent Bonus and Selling Agent Prize or Gift, 
agent cash and non-cash incentives, dummies, respectively, are positive and significant, which suggests an 
association between these types of individual incentives and longer marketing duration.  As a final 
robustness test, I use OLS to alternatively test Hypotheses 3 and 4.  The results are strikingly similar to the 
results using a 2SLS estimation (results not reported).  The lone exception is that the results for tests for 
Hypothesis 3 also show a positive and significant coefficient for Both Noncash. 
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Table 14.  Results of 2SLS Regression testing the hypothesis that offering sales 
incentives is negatively associated with marketing duration. 
 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 
Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error 
IMR -2.572*** 0.326 -2.621*** 0.327 
Buyer Incentives Only 0.010 0.016     
Agent Incentives Only 0.119*** 0.022     
Both Incentives 0.179*** 0.022     
Buyer Only Cash     -0.033** 0.016 
Buyer Only Noncash     0.015 0.032 
Agent Only Cash     0.092*** 0.022 
Agent Only Noncash     0.266 0.244 
Both Cash     0.151*** 0.029 
Both Noncash     0.019 0.039 
Ln(Sale) -0.711*** 0.055 -0.701*** 0.055 
Ln(Age) 0.206*** 0.043 0.214*** 0.043 
Ln(SqFeet) 0.775*** 0.052 0.768*** 0.052 
Storynum 0.018 0.028 0.014 0.028 
New -0.087* 0.050 -0.059 0.050 
Brick -0.044*** 0.014 -0.044*** 0.014 
Bednum -0.058*** 0.014 -0.057*** 0.014 
Bathnum 0.121*** 0.019 0.119*** 0.019 
Fire 0.154*** 0.022 0.155*** 0.022 
Central 0.492*** 0.050 0.496*** 0.050 
Parknum 0.061*** 0.010 0.059*** 0.010 
Pool 0.110*** 0.025 0.111*** 0.025 
Water 0.141*** 0.033 0.141*** 0.033 
Urban 0.004 0.018 0.003 0.018 
Golf 0.115*** 0.040 0.112*** 0.040 
Subd-PUD 0.031 0.023 0.032 0.023 
Pubwater -0.010 0.034 -0.011 0.034 
Pubsewer -0.092*** 0.019 -0.092*** 0.019 
DOP 0.616*** 0.059 0.609*** 0.059 
Vacant 0.045*** 0.015 0.042*** 0.015 
Ln(Inven) -0.397*** 0.144 -0.395*** 0.144 
SL-Ratio -0.505 0.378 -0.540 0.378 
Exclusive 0.168*** 0.038 0.171*** 0.038 
Listrank 0.424*** 0.061 0.431*** 0.061 
Salerank -0.105*** 0.023 -0.108*** 0.023 
Agentsame -0.398*** 0.090 -0.394*** 0.090 
Corporate -0.441*** 0.060 -0.449*** 0.060 
Ln(Zip-Md) -0.126*** 0.036 -0.133*** 0.036 
Unemp -5.876*** 1.065 -5.907*** 1.065 
Interest 3.407 3.178 3.341 3.178 
Foreclosed -0.045* 0.026 -0.041 0.026 
Financing -0.046*** 0.012 -0.047*** 0.012 
Mobsold  0.515*** 0.092 0.513*** 0.092 
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Spring 0.000 0.027 0.001 0.027 
Summer 0.121*** 0.029 0.123*** 0.029 
Fall 0.071*** 0.024 0.071*** 0.024 
Year2008 -0.641*** 0.033 -0.641*** 0.033 
Year2009 -0.345*** 0.086 -0.345*** 0.086 
Year2010 -0.292*** 0.093 -0.291*** 0.093 
Year2011 -0.334*** 0.097 -0.335*** 0.097 
Constant 12.316*** 1.294 12.371*** 1.296 
Number of Obs. 17,322 17,322 
F 58.784 54.543 
Adjusted R2 0.101 0.100 
Notes:  2SLS Regression Empirical Model:  P (Incentives) = Φ [ ln(List) + ∑ (Construction and 
Structure) + ∑ (Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors) + ∑ (Financial Issues) ].  In each of the 
four models presented, the first stage dependent variable is Incentives. The main independent 
variable is Ln(List). Control variables are: from the Construction & Structure vector: Ln(Age); from 
the Marketing, Occupancy, and Selling Factors vector: Vacant, Ln(Inven), SL-Ratio, Exclusive, 
Listrank, Salerank, Agentsame, Corporate, Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter (omitted), Year2008, 
Year2009, Year2010, Year2011, Ln(Zip-Md), and Unemp; from the Financing Issues vector: 
Interest, Foreclosed, and Financing. In the second stage, the dependent variable is TOM. The IMR 
of Any Incentives from the first stage is included as an independent variable, as is Ln(Sale).  The 
main independent variables are drawn from the Incentives vector as follows: (1) Model 1 uses 
Buyer Incentives Only, defined as Buyer Incentives = 1 and all other incentives = 0 , Agent 
Incentives Only, defined as Agent Incentives = 1 and all other incentives = 0, and Both Buyer & 
Agent Incentives, defined as Buyer & Agent Incentives = 1; Model 2 uses Buyer Only Cash, 
defined as Buyer Only Cash = 1 when all other incentives = 0, Buyer Only Noncash, defined as 
Buyer Only Noncash = 1 when all other incentives = 0, Agent Only Cash, defined as Agent Only 
Cash = 1 when all other incentives = 0, Agent Only Noncash, defined as Agent Only Noncash = 1 
when all other incentives = 0, Buyer Only Cash & Noncash, defined as Buyer Only Cash & 
Noncash incentives = 1 when all other incentives = 0, Agent Only Cash & Noncash, defined as 
Agent Only Cash & Noncash incentives = 1 when all other incentives = 0, and Both Buyer & Agent 
Cash & Noncash, defined as Buyer & Agent Cash & Noncash incentives = 1 when all other 
incentives = 0 (statistically significant IMR and main independent variables shown in bold-faced 
type).  Control variables are: from the Construction & Structure vector: Ln(Age), Ln(SqFeet), 
Storynum, New, and Brick; from the House Internal Features vector: Bednum, Bathnum, Fire, and 
Central; from the House External Features vector: Parknum and Pool; from the Environmental-
Natural vector: Water; from the Environmental-Neighborhood & Location vector: Urban and Golf; 
from the Environmental-Public Service vector: Subdpud, Pubwater, Pubsewer; from the Marketing, 
Occupancy, and Selling Factors vector: Vacant, Ln(Inven), SL-Ratio, Exclusive, Listrank, Salerank, 
Agentsame, Corporate, Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter (omitted), Year2008, Year2009, Year2010, 
Year2011, Ln(Zip-Md), and Unemp; from the Financing Issues vector: Interest, Foreclosed, and 
Financing; Mobsold is the Mobile dummy; and DOP is the degree of over-pricing. All regressions 




Many real estate markets across the country, even though in different locations, 
share certain similarities including various demographic factors such as population size, 
   
150 
 
ethnicity makeup, education profiles, workforce characteristics, and income levels.  Many 
markets are also similar in terms of geography or climate patterns.  Thus, to the extent 
that other markets in the U.S. share such similarities with this study‘s samples, the results 
of the use of seller-paid incentives in this study should be generalizable to property sales 
in other, similar markets.  Nonetheless, the reader should exercise caution in interpolating 
the results of this study. 
An agent may possibly offer incentives to a seller (i.e. reduced sales commission) 
to secure a property listing.  However, the MLS systems do not report these data.  
Therefore, I do not examine any incentives that listing agents may offer to sellers.  
Individual seller and buyer characteristics, such as age, gender, occupation, 
wealth, income, tolerance for risk, and tastes and preferences for different types of 
properties are likely to influence sales outcomes.  However, because of privacy laws, 
MLS systems typically restrict the reporting of these data.  Therefore, such information is 
not included in the empirical analysis, providing opportunities for future research using 
field-based studies such as surveys and interviews to obtain the necessary data. 
 
VII.  Concluding Remarks 
 This study examines sellers who offer sales incentives to motivate residential 
property sales.  The dataset includes sales transactions occurring in the Mobile and 
Montgomery, Alabama market areas during the 2008-2011 cold market conditions.  I 
include a variety of cash and/or noncash seller-paid sales incentives offered to buyers, 
buyers‘ agents, and/or both.  Four areas are of primary interest. 
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First, just as the issue of financial asset liquidity is important to stockholders, it is 
equally important to owners of real estate assets.  Indeed, because stockholders may 
easily buy and sell their positions, yet owners of real estate generally cannot; therefore, 
liquidity may be an even more important issue to real estate owners.  Second, some 
sellers are highly motivated to sell for extreme reasons, such as financial problems, job 
loss, health problems, or even possible foreclosure.  These sellers not only want to sell, 
they have to sell.  Therefore, discovering ways to signal selling motivation to produce 
desired outcomes may be an important issue to property sellers.  Third, this study extends 
the work of previous studies that investigate the use of buyer incentives to increase sales 
price by also including agent incentives, and combinations of buyer and agent incentives.  
I do this to determine if, and to what extent offering incentives to the buyer, the agent, or 
both; or even if, and to what extent a particular type or form of incentive influences sales 
price.  Fourth, within the real estate literature, studies of the factors influencing sales 
price generally include a parallel examination of the length of time necessary to sell a 
property given certain conditions.  Accordingly, I also investigate if, and to what extent 
sales incentives affect marketing duration. 
I start by examining the use of buyer incentives as a means of adjusting a 
property‘s price downward relative to comparable properties in the market.  By offering 
incentives to buyers, things such as closing cost allowances, or a willingness to provide 
mortgage financing, effectively the seller attempts to reduce the difference between the 
list and sales prices, and as a result, works to motivate investment by pricing his/her 
property more competitively than similar properties.  I do find a positive relationship 
between the bid-ask spread and the likelihood that sellers will offer buyer incentives.  
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This suggests that by offering sales incentives to buyers, sellers can effectively increase 
the liquidity of their properties.  Of course, this also would seem to imply that by doing 
so, sellers should be able to sell in less time as well. 
I then explore the use of agent incentives as a means of attracting as many buyers‘ 
agents as possible.  By offering incentives to agents, things such as a higher selling agent 
commission split or selling bonus, or some type of prize or reward, in essence, the highly 
motivated seller effectively increases the economic utility available to agents for selling 
his/her property.  In doing so, the seller is in essence working to motivate investment by 
attempting to increase his/her property‘s awareness amongst the agents at work in the 
market.  I do find a positive relationship between a seller being highly motivated to sell, 
and the likelihood that sellers will offer agent incentives.  By successfully increasing 
agent coverage, a likely outcome is that not only will the chances of a sale increase, but 
also that it will happen in less time. 
Next, I investigate whether the use of incentives results in higher sales prices.  I 
test this in general at first, and find that offering incentives, regardless of recipient, or 
mode, does produce higher sales prices.  I further find that buyer incentives, and buyer 
incentives offered in combination with agent incentives have a positive impact on sales 
price, but that agent incentives, when tested in isolation, do not.  Moreover, I find no 
differentiation in the outcomes between the uses of buyer cash versus non-cash 
incentives.  Thus, the conclusion from this analysis is that it is possible for sellers to 
achieve higher sales prices by utilizing a sales incentives strategy. 
Finally, I assess how incentives influence marketing duration.  As in the 
examination of incentives‘ impacts on sales price, I start by testing the use of incentives 
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generally.  In this case, I find that incentives tend to increase marketing duration, and that 
specifically, buyer incentives as a whole have no statistically significant affect, but that 
agent incentives do.  The lone exception is buyer cash incentives, which according to the 
analysis, do seem to decrease the time it takes to sell a property.  Overall, though, these 
results seem at odds with the earlier findings that suggest that sellers are more likely to 
use incentives to reduce the bid-ask spread and increase buyers‘ agent coverage, both for 
the apparent purpose of obtaining the highest possible price in the shortest possible time.   
Collectively, the results of my study are consistent with a number of findings.  
Sellers offer sales incentives to buyers to reduce the bid-ask spread.  Sellers offer sales 
incentives to agents to increase buyers‘ agents‘ coverage.  Sellers offer sales incentives to 
increase their sales price.  However, when offering sales incentives, the seller must also 
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